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CAMPAIGN AND BATTLE 



OF 



GETTYSBURG 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 




THE 



U. S "n^ineer 
Scho^. iorary 
REC 

OCT "6 1924 

Washington 
•arraoks, a, C 



CAMPAIGN AND BATTLE 



OF 



GETTYSBURG. 



PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE CADETS OF THE UNITED STATES 
MILITARY ACADEMY/WEST POINT, N. Y. 



By 

COLONEL G. J. FIEBEGER 

Professor of Engineering 
U. S. M. A. 



[engineer SCHOOL LIBRARY 

BUILDING 270 
FORT BELVOIR, VIRGINIA 



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3 - JUN i 5 
Copy, _ .195 




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UNITED STJ^TO. fflEKT PROPE 



CHAPTER I. 
-Military Situation at the opening of the Gettysburg Campaign — 
Strength and location of Confederate and Union forces in the 
states along the Atlantic Ocean i-io 

CHAPTER II. 
Confederate plans for prosecuting the war 11-16 

CHAPTER III. 
The strength and organization of the opposing armies 17-28 

CHAPTER IV. 
Operations from June 1st, 1863, to July 1st, 1863 — Movement of Long- 
street and Ewell to Culpeper — Battle of Fleetwood or Brandy 
Station — Capture of Winchester — Retrograde movement of Army 
of Potomac — Cavalry engagements in the Loudon valley — Con- 
federate advance from the Potomac — Concentration of Union 
army at Frederick — Position of opposing armies on night of June 
2Q and 30 29-48 

CHAPTER V. 
Battle of July 1st — Movements preceding battle — Description of battle- 
field — Heth's attack on morning of July 1 — Afternoon engage- 
ment — Losses 49-64 

Battle of July 2nd — Movement of troops preceding battle — Distribution 
of troops before battle — Description of field — Confederate posi- 
tion — Change of position of III corps — Attack by Longstreet — 
Attack by Ewell — Council of War 65-89 

CHAPTER VI. 
Battle of July 3rd — Position of troops in the morning — Attack on 
Ewell's corps — Attack on Cemetery Ridge — Operations of cavalry 
on Union right flank — Description of field — Cavalry fight — Opera- 
tions of cavalry on Union left flank — Farnsworth's charge — Cas- 
ualties in entire battle 90-107 

CHAPTER VII. 
Retreat and Pursuit — Confederate trains under Imboden — Cavalry 

operations — Retreat of infantry • • • • 108-117 

CHAPTER IX. 

Comments em campaign and battle 1 18-147 



34684 



CHAPTER I. 

MILITARY SITUATION AT THE OPENING OF THE 
GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 

Confederate Forces. — On May 31, 1863, the total 
strength of the Confederate forces in the East, officers and 
men, was as follows: 

PRESENT FOR DUTY. 

Army of Northern Virginia — General Lee. . . . 74,468 W. R. Vol. 40, p. 846 

Dep't Western Virginia — General Sam Jones. 6,422 " " " 40, " 846 

■• of Richmond— General Elzey 8,464" " " 26, " 1,086 

" North Carolina— General D. H. Hill... 23,536 " " " 26, "1,086 

■• South Carolina, etc.— Gen. Beauregard. 22,040 " " " 20, " 964 

Valley District — General John D. Imboden. . . 2,100 Battles and Leaders,. 

Vol. 3, p. 422. 



Total 137,030 

The Army of 'Northern Virginia was encamped on the 
south bank of the Rappahannock, in the vicinity of Fred- 
ricksburg, Virginia, and its cavalry was guarding all the 
fords of the Rappahannock as far west as the Orange and 
Alexandria railroad. General Longstreet, who had been at 
Suffolk, Virginia, during the Chancellorsville campaign, with 
the divisions of Hood and Pickett, had returned to the army. 
Hood was at this time near Verdiersville, about half way be- 
tween Chancellorsville and Orange Court House; Pickett 
was at Hanover Junction watching the Union troops recent- 
ly landed at West Point on the York river. 

The Department of ^Yrsfe)•n Virginia was the territory 
along the Tennessee and Virginia railroad in the southwest- 
ern part of the state. Its troops were to defend the railroad 



and the important salt works at Saltville, Virginia, against 
raids made from West Virginia and Kentucky. In this de- 
partment were four small brigades of infantry, Jenkins' 
cavalry brigade, a few batteries of artillery and a few de- 
tached companies of infantry. 

The Department of Richmond was the territory between 
the Army of Northern Virginia and the James river. Its 
troops were to man the defenses of Eichmond and to protect 
that capital from the Union forces operating on the penin- 
sula between the York and James rivers. In this Department 
were Wise's brigade on the Chickahominy river, Pettigrew's 
brigade near Hanover, and the troops in the defenses of the 
city and in the batteries along the James river. 

The Department of North Carolina embraced that part 
of the state of Virginia south of the James river, and the en- 
tire state of North Carolina. Its troops were to resist in- 
vasion by the Union troops operating from Suffolk, Va., and 
also to protect North Carolina from the Union troops operat- 
ing from Newberne, N. C. 

In this department were seven field brigades; one at 
Wilmington, N. C, three between Newberne, N. C. and the 
Wilmington and Weldon railroad, one at Petersburg, Va., 
one between Petersburg and Suffolk, Va., and one, Davis' 
brigade, was on its way to join the Army of Northern Vir- 
ginia. In addition to these, there was a small cavalry force 
in eastern North Carolina, and a permanent artillery garri- 
son in the defenses of Wilmington. 

All the troops in the departments of Richmond and 
^North Carolina were under the orders of General Lee; how- 
ever, he could not order them out of these departments with- 



out the consent of the President or the Secretary of War. 

The Department of tioutlt Carolina, Georgia and Florida 
was made up of these states. Of the troops given in the 
table about 1^ ; 5U0 were in South Carolina; b',600 in Georgia 
and the remainder in Florida. These troops were to defend 
Charleston, which was threatened by land and sea, and also 
to protect the coastal territory from raids made from the 
different harbors occupied by the Northern troops. Nearly 
all the organized held brigades of this department had been 
recently sent either to General Joseph E. Johnston in Miss- 
issippi, or to General D. H. Hill in North Carolina. 

in the Valley District General Imboden had a mixed 
command of cavalry and mounted infantry organized for 
raids along the line of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad; its 
headquarters when not on a raid were in the upper Shenan- 
doah Valley. 

Union Forces. — The total strength of the Union forces 
in the same territory at this time was as follows : 

PRESENT FOR DUTY. 

Army of the Potomac— General Hooker 100,780 AY. R. Vol. 40, p. 574 

(Infantry, Cavalry and Field Artillery) — 

Dep't of Washington — General Heintzleman. 36,647 •• " 

Middle Department— General Schenck 32,247 " " 

Dep't of Virginia— General Dix 32,397 " " 

Dep't of North Carolina— General Foster 15,699 " " 

Dep't of the South — General Hunter 15,745 " " 



1". • 


586 


40, ' 


589 


26, ' 


733 


26, ' 


736 


20, < 


461 



Total 233,515 



The Army of the Potomac was encamped on the north 
bank of the Rappahannock opposite Fredericksburg and its 
cavalry was guarding- the upper Rappahannock as far west 



«i 



,. 1 1 ,. Orange and Alexandria railroad. Because of the ea 
i > 1 1 . i ( i<m ni the time of service of many of the regiments Prom 
New Vork, New Jersey .mil Pennsylvania, several of the army 
corps wore being reorganised. The cavalry, which had l<>si 

m.inv el Its horses in llie ( 'haneel lorsv i 1 1<> Campaign, Was 

• II III III" I I'llH'IIHls. 

The Department <>/ H ash in gton comprised the District 
of Columbia with the national capital, Washington. Most of 
the troops of this department were the Infantry and artillery 
permanently attached to the line of Ports which surrounded 
the capital The onlj available field troops were A.bercrom 
bio's ;iikI Crawford's divisions of Infantry, and Stahel's dl 
visum of cavalry, about 13,000 in all, which Pormed a cover 
Injj Porce i" protect the capital Prom raiding parties. A her 
crombie's division was composed of Stannard's Vermont 
brigade, Hay's New Vork t>rigade, and Fossenden's Maine 
brigade; Crawford's division eon sis ted of three brigades of 
Pennsylvania troops; Stahel's cavalry division was made n|> 
et* i hree brigades 

The Middle Department comprise<l the states <>f Mary 
land, Pennsylvania and West Virginia, lis troops, which 
Termed i ho \ 1 1 1 corps, were widely scattered and had differ- 
ent duties to perforin, Kelley's division \*\' si\ brigades, 
nbout 12,000 men, w;i^ ( barged v iih the Immediate protection 
of the Raltimore and Ohio railroad from Harper's Perrj to 
Grafton, For this purpose two brigades were strongly in- 
trenched ai Harper's Perry, one was posted at Martinsburg, 
"•>< v ai Komney, one ai Cumberland and one at Grafton, Mil 
roy's division, of 0,000 men, was at Winchester [tconsisted 
of three brigades ami was pushed to the front and Intrenched 



to observe the Confederates in the Shenandoah Va llcy ; Beam 
mon's division of two brigade , 1.000 men, va at Charleston, 
\\ < t Virginia, on the Kanawha river, where ii protected 
that state from invasion ;ni<i al o threatened invasion into 
southwestern Virginia. Lockwood'a independent brigade 
was a fteld force of infantry and cavalry encamped near 
Baltimore; Vforri independent brigade wa#. composed of the 
troops in the fort* protecting the citj of [Baltimore; Bri| 
independent brigade constituted the permanent city force ( >f 
Baltimore; Averell'n independent brigade guarded the Balti* 
more and Ohio railroad from Grafton to the Ohio river. 

The Department <>j I irginia comprised that portion of 
southeastern Virginia which wwt held bj LJnion troop 
li- troop belonged to the IV, VII and IX corp The [V 
army corpi had one division, of about 5,000 men, under 
General Gordon ;it West Point on i\\<' Sfork river and the 
other, of about the rength, under the corp* command 

er, General Keyes, at Sforktown, One di ision of Ui<- VII 
corp* and one of the IX corps, about L8,000 men, the whole 
under General Peck, were at Suffolk, Virginia, south of the 
James, where they had recently successfully frustrated the 
attempt of General Longstreet to capture thai place. 

The Department of North Car oVma comprised the coa 
territory of that state occupied by Union troop-. The 
main body of the XVI 1 1 corps, which occupied this depart 
ment, was at Newberne, X. ( '. 

The Department of the South comprised the coastal ter« 
ritory of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida occupied by 
t'nioii troops. 'I'Ik- X corps, which occupied this department, 



8 

was distributed by divisions in the coastal islands between 
Charleston and the mouth of the Savannah river. 

Comparison. — If the situation is viewed as a whole, 
it is apparent, that while the Union troops had the advan- 
tage of numbers, the Confederates were better disposed for 
concerted action and mutual support. 

The South. — The railroad running south from Freder- 
icksburg to Savannah, via Richmorid, Wilmington and 
Charleston, and the railroads running east and west from 
Richmond, permitted the Southern troops to be concentrated 
at any point in the theater of war which might be momen- 
tarily threatened. These roads enabled the authorities to 
withdraw troops from any department in which active op- 
erations were temporarily suspended and send them to the 
Army of Northern Virginia. 

The supreme direction of military affairs was vested in 
the President of the Confederate States, Mr. Davis, a sol- 
dier by training and experience. Under him were only three 
independent commanders. General Lee, General Beauregard, 
and Major General Sam Jones, all educated and experienced 
soldiers. General Lee, who commanded not only the Army of 
Northern Virginia but also all the troops assigned to the de- 
fense of the capital, was fortunate in possessing the complete 
confidence of the civil authorities, the army, and the people 
of the Confederate states. This confidence he had well earned 
by the able manner in which he had conducted his military 
operations since June, 1862, when he first assumed command. 
It was the President who insisted on his assuming and re- 
taining command of the departments of Richmond and of 
North Carolina, and be would have added the department of 



South Carolina had General Lee been willing to accept it. 
Mr. Davis appreciated the disadvantages of divided control. 
General Lee, however, was unwilling- to assume the responsi- 
bility for the conduct of affairs in departments to which he 
could not devote his entire attention. A compromise was 
therefore arrived at by which General Lee was consulted 
about all operations in the East which could even remotely 
affect him, and the operations of the Army of Northern Vir- 
ginia were made of primary importance in the conduct of 
military affairs. On May 31st, 1863, General Lee was in 
command of over 106,000 effectives, or about seventy-eight 
per cent, of the Confederate force in the east, and had 71,000, 
or fifty-four per cent., in the Army of Northern Virginia and 
in Imboden's command. This was increased to 80,000, or 
fifty-nine per cent., before the opening of the campaign. 

The North. — The sea, with its limited means of trans- 
portation, was the only route by which troops could be sent 
to, or withdrawn from, the Union departments of Virginia, 
North Carolina, and the South. These troops, could not, 
therefore, be quickly concentrated to take advantage of any 
weakness in the Confederate position, such as that created by 
the withdrawal of the Army of Northern Virginia from the 
front of Richmond, nor could they be quickly sent to rein- 
force the Army of the Potomac. In the general scheme of 
operations these forces merely assisted in the blockade of the 
coast and deprived the Confederate field armies of the troops 
retained by the coastal states for their own defense. 

In the North, neither the President nor the Secretary 
of War were soldiers by education. Their principal adviser 
was General Halleck, the commander in chief of all the 



10 

armies, who had had but little experience in conducting mili- 
tary operations and had not the genius of General Lee. 

There were too many independent commands in the same 
territory. This deprived the Army of the Potomac of many 
men who should have been in its ranks. In the three de- 
partments commanded by Generals Sehenck, Heintzleman, 
and Dix, there were more men than in the Army of the Po- 
tomac itself: at least one. half of these men would have been 
far more serviceable if united with that Army. 

In the middle department, the troops of General Milroy 
at Winchester and those of General Kelley at Harper's 
Ferry were of no particular value. They were unable to 
prevent invasion of Maryland, as will be seen later, nor could 
they effectually protect the Baltimore and Ohio railroad 
from raiding- parties. 

In the Department of Washington, a covering force was 
unnecessary since by his instructions, the commander of 
the Army of the Potomac was to perform this duty. During 
the campaign most of these troops were incorporated with 
the Army of the Potomac. 

While it was necessary to hold Fortress Monroe and 
Norfolk, the whole of General Dix's command was not nec- 
essary for this purpose. As auxiliary lines of operation, 
neither the line from Fortress Monroe to White House, nor 
that from Norfolk through Suffolk proved of any value dur- 
ing the Civil War. 

Of the total number of troops in the East at this time, 
only forty-three per cent, were in the Army of the Potomac. 



11 
CHAPTER II. 

CONFEDERATE PLANS. 

An offensive movement by the Army of Northern Vir- 
ginia was at this time almost forced on the Confederate au- 
thorities. 

On the Mississippi river, General Pemberton was in- 
rested in Vicksburg by a superior force under General Grant, 
-and it was apparent to those in authority that it was only a 
question of weeks when Pemberton must surrender. 

At Port Hudson, a short distance south of Vicksburg, 
General Gardner was similarly invested by General Banks. 

When these two places fell, the banks of the Mississippi, 
from the Ohio to the Gulf, would fall into the possession of 
the Union troops; Arkansas, Texas and Louisiana would 
then be separated from the Confederate states east of that 
river. This would be a serious blow to the Confederate cause 
both at home and abroad, and a brilliant counter-stroke at 
some other point in the theater of war was desirable to 
counteract its effects. 

The forces in the Departments of Tennessee and of 
South Carolina had been so depleted in the attempt to form a 
relieving army for Vicksburg, that neither General Bragg in 
Tennessee, nor General Beauregard in South Carolina could 
be expected to make this counter-stroke. General D. H. Hill 
In North Carolina was also reduced to the defensive because 
of the forces drawn from his department to reinforce the 



12 

Army of Northern Virginia and cover Richmond from an 
attack along the north bank of the James. 

The task of making this counter-stroke therefore fell on 
the Army of Northern Virginia, which had just been thor- 
oughly reorganized and recruited and was in the highest 
state of efficiency. 

There were still other reasons for an offensive movement. 

The Confederate authorities found themselves short of 
food supplies and had great difficulty in filling the requisi- 
tions of the armies. No relief from this situation could be 
expected until the coming harvest, except by an invasion of 
the rich farm lands of Maryland and Pennsylvania. 

The numerical strength of the Army of the Potomac was 
decreasing daily, due to the mustering out of the two-years 
men from New York who had volunteered in the spring of 

1861, and the nine-months' militia from Pennsylvania and 
New Jersey who entered the service under the call of August, 

1862. This army reached its minimum strength on June 
20th, before the troops of other departments were united 
with it; it then numbered 89,000 men present for duty. 

The Union troops in southeastern Virginia were giving 
the Confederate authorities some uneasiness about the safety 
of Richmond and it was thought that they would be drawn to 
Washington if that capital were threatened. 

That General Lee was in favor of such a movement is 
shown by his correspondence. On June 8th he wrote to the 
Secretary of War as follows: 

"As far as I can judge, there is nothing to be gained by 
this army remaining quietly on the defensive, which it must 
do unless it can be reinforced. I am aware that there is diffi- 



13 

culty and hazard in taking the aggressive with so large an 
army in its front, intrenched behind a river, where it cannot 
be advantageously attacked. .Unless it can be drawn out in 
a position to be assailed, it will take its own time to prepare 
and strengthen itself to renew its advance on Kichmond, and 
force this army back within the intrenchments of that city. 
This may result in any event ; still, I think it is worth a trial 
to prevent such a catastrophe. Still, if the Department 
thinks best to remain on the defensive, and guard, as far 
as possible, all the avenues of approach, and await the time 
of the enemy, I am ready to adopt this course. I think our 
southern coast might be held during the sickly season by 
local troops, aided by a small organized force, and the preda- 
tory excursions of the enemy be repressed. This would give 
us an active force in the field with which we might hope to 
make some impression on the enemy, both on our northern 
and western frontiers. Unless this can be done, I see little 
hope of accomplishing anything of importance. All our 
military preparations and organizations should be pressed 
forward with the greatest vigor, and every exertion made to 
obtain some material advantage in this campaign." (W. r. 

No. 45, p. 868.) 

On June 25th, when his army was north of the Potomac 
river, in further development of this plan, he wrote to Presi- 
dent Davis as follows: 

"You will see that the apprehension for the safety of 
Washington and their OAvn territory has aroused the Federal 
Government and the people to great exertions, and it is in- 
cumbent upon us to call forth all our energies. In addition 
to the 100,000 troops called for by President Lincoln to de- 



14 

fend the frontier of Pennsylvania, you will see that he is con- 
centrating- other organized forces in Maryland. It is stated 
in the papers that they are all being withdrawn from Suffolk 
[Virginia], and according to General Buckner's report, 
Burnside and his corps are recalled from Kentucky.* It is 
reasonable to suppose that this would be the case if their 
apprehensions were once aroused. 

"I think this should liberate the troops in the Carolinas, 
and enable Generals Buckner and Bragg to accomplish some- 
thing in Ohio. It is plain that if all the Federal Army is con- 
centrated upon this, it will result in our accomplishing noth- 
ing, and being compelled to return to Virginia. If the plan 
that I suggested the other day, of organizing an army, even 
in effigy, under General Beauregard at Culpeper Court 
House, can be carried into effect, much relief will be afforded. 
If even the brigades in Virginia and North Carolina, which 
Generals [I). H.] Hill and Elzey think cannot be spared, 
were ordered there at once, and General Beauregard were 
sent there, if he had to return to South Carolina, it would do 
more to protect both states from marauding expeditions of 
the enemy than anything else. 

"I have not sufficient troops to maintain my communi- 
cations, and, therefore, have to abandon them. I think I can 
throw General Hooker's army across the Potomac and draw 
troops from the south, embarrassing their plan of campaign 
in a measure, if I can do nothing more and have to return. 

"I still hope that all things will end well for us at Vicks- 
burg. At any rate, every effort should be made to bring 
about that result.'' (W. R. No. 45. p. 930.) 



One division of Burnside's corps was sent to Vicksburg at this time. 



15 

General Lee further explains the objects of his plan of 
campaign in the report he submitted at its close: 

"The position occupied by the enemy opposite Fred- 
ricksburg being one in which he could not be attacked to ad- 
vantage, it was determined to draw him from it. The exe- 
cution of this project embraced the relief of the Shenandoah 
Valley from the troops that had occupied the lower part of it 
during the winter and spring, and, if practicable, the trans- 
fer of the centre of hostilities north of the Potomac. It was 
thought that the corresponding movements on the part of the 
enemy, to which those contemplated by us would probably 
give rise, might offer a fair opportunity to strike a blow at 
the army then commanded by General Hooker and that in 
any event that army would be compelled to leave Virginia 
and, possibly, to draw to its support troops designed to oper- 
ate against other parts of the country. In this way it Avas 
supposed that the enemy's plan of campaign for the summer 
would be broken up and part of the season of active opera- 
tions be consumed in the formation of new combinations and 
the preparations they would require. In addition to these 
advantages, it was hoped that other valuable results might 
be attained by military success. Actuated by these and other 
important considerations, that may hereafter be presented, 
the movement began June 3rd." (W. R. No. 44, p. 305.) 

General Lee also recognized the fact that the South 
could hardly hope to succeed in a prolonged struggle with the 
united North. In a letter to President Davis, June 10, 18G3, 
just before starting north, he writes: 

"We should not therefore conceal from ourselves that 
our resources in men are constantly diminishing, and the 



16 

disproportion in this respect between us and- our enemies, if 
they continue united in their efforts to subjugate us, is con- 
stantly augmenting." ■ (W. R. No. 45, p. 880.) 

In this letter he advocates the encouragement of the 
peace party in the North by a discontinuance of speeches and 
newspaper articles in the South rejecting the terms of peace 
proposed by that party. 

He hoped to make his invasion of the North another 
argument for those members of the peace party who declared 
that the South could never be subdued. In his circular 
order, directing that no supplies should be taken in the 
North except on regular requisition payable by the Confed- 
erate government, he also sought to avoid unnecessarily irri- 
tating the inhabitants of the invaded country, and to make 
the establishment (if a permanent government in the South of 
material interest to them. (W. R. No. 45. p. 912.) 



17 

CHAPTER III. 

THE OPPOSING ARMIES. 

Army <>f Northern Virginia. — At the opening of the 
Gettysburg campaign, June 1, 1863, the Army of Northern 
Virginia had been under the command of General Robert E. 
Lee for one year. In that period it took part in the seven 
days' battles about Richmond, and in the campaigns and bat- 
tles of Manassas, Antietam, Fredericksburg and Chancel- 
lorsville. The almost uniform success of its operations 
raised the morale of the entire army to the highest pitch and 
caused both officers and men to feel absolute confidence 
in their commander. • 

Notwithstanding the active operations of the year, the 
organization of the army had greatly changed since the army 
was hastily organized in front of Richmond. In the cam- 
paigns following the Peninsular campaign, Generals Long- 
street and Jackson each commanded half the army; after 
Antietam, their commands were made army corps and both 
officers were promoted to the grade of lieutenant-general. 
Finding, however, that a corps of 30,000 men was too large 
to be conveniently handled, after the death of Jackson in 
May, 1^863, General Lee formed his army into three corps. 
Upon his recommendation, the commands of the second and 
third corps were given to Major Generals Ewell and A. P. 
Hill, who were promoted to the grade of lieutenant-general. 
Both had commanded divisions in Jackson's corps, and the 
former was chosen bv Jackson to succeed him. 



18 



Each of the three corps was composed of three divisions ; 
a new division was made by uniting two of the six brigades 
of A. P. Hill's old division w T ith the brigades of Pettigrew 
and Davis sent about May 31st from the departments of 
Richmond and North Carolina. Each of the nine divisions 
was composed of four brigades. All of the brigades had been 
reorganized so that, as far as possible, each was composed of 
troops from the same state. 

Each brigade was formed of four or five regiments of 
ten companies each. On entering the service the strength 
of a regiment was about 1,000 men; as it had no depot bat- 
talion or company, its strength was rapidly diminished in 
active service. 

Each division was commanded by a major general ; each 
brigade by a brigadier general, if possible from the same 
state as his command. 

The artillery of the army had, since the autumn of 1861 r 
been under the control of Brigadier General William N. Pen- 
dleton. In front of Richmond the batteries, other than those 
of the reserve artillery of the army, were distributed among 
the brigades. From that period to Chancellorsville they 
were distributed among the divisions; in addition, in Long- 
street's corps, there were two battalions of corps artillery. 
In the reorganization just before the Gettysburg campaign, 
the artillery reserve was broken up; one battalion of four 
batteries of four guns each was assigned to each division, 
and two similar battalions were assigned as corps artillery. 
The prescribed number of guns to each of the three corps 
was therefore eighty; this number was slightly exceeded, as 
the actual number with the army was two hundred and fifty- 



19 

one. Of these twelve were 20-pounder siege rifles, two were 
Whitworth rifles, twenty-six were howitzers, and the re- 
mainder 3-inch rifles and 12-poimder smooth bore Napoleons 
in about equal numbers. 

Although the batteries were attached to the divisions 
and army corps, the chief of artillery was responsible for 
the care and maintenance of his arm and supervised its em- 
ployment on the battle-field. In this he was assisted by the 
chiefs of the corps artillery. 

The cavalry of the army had, since the autumn of 1861, 
been under the command of Major General J. E. B. Stuart; 
it constituted an independent unit of the army. It had grad- 
ually grown from a brigade in the Peninsula campaign, to a 
division of three brigades in the Chancellorsville campaign. 
Just before the Gettysburg campaign General Lee still fur- 
ther strengthened it by adding to it the brigades of Generals 
A. G. Jenkins and W. E. Jones, which had been operating 
in the Shenandoah Valley, and that of General B. H. Robert- 
son from North Carolina. To the cavalry division was 
attached a battalion of horse artillery of 24 guns, one battery 
for each brigade. 

The actual strength of the army was approximately as 
follows, only the officers, and the enlisted men under arms, 
or effectives, being counted : 

Infantry, Mfey 31 59,44S W. R. No. 40, p. 845 

Infantry joining after May 31st — 

Pettigrew's brigade (four regiments) 2,948 W. R. No. 26, p. 1086 

Davis' brigade 2,414 W. R. No. 26, p. 1086 

25th and 31st Va 700 W. R. No. 40, pp. 714, 716 

Total .- 65,510 



20 

Infantry detached between May 31st and July 1st — 

13th and 58th Va., and 54th N. C left by 

Early at Winchester (approx.) 1,200 W. R. No. 44, p. 464 

Corse's brigade, Pickett's division, left near 

Hanover Station, Va 1,462 W. R. No. 49, p. 765 

E well's losses at Winchester 230 W. R. No. 44, p. 335 

Total 2.892 

Total infantry at time of battle 62,61S 

Artillery with army corps (thirteen battal- 
ions reported) 4,702 W. R. No. 40, p. S46 

Alexander's and Garnett's battalions (esti- 
mated ) 724 

Total 5.426 

Early's loss at Winchester 22 

Total artillery at time of battle 5,404 

Total guns at time of battle with army corps 251 W. R. No. 49. p. 637 

Cavalry — The brigades of Fitz Lee. Cham- 
bliss, Hampton, Jones and Robertson, 
.May 31st 10,292 W. R. No. 40, p. 846 

Jenkins' brigade 1,600 W. R. No. 44, p. 547 

Total 11.S92 

Detached and watching Harper's Ferry dur- 
ing invasion 12th Va. Cav 400 (estimated) 

11,492 

Casualties at Brandy Station, killed, wound- 
ed and missing 485 

Same in Loudoun Valley 510 

Same at Hanover, etc 117 

Total 1,112 

Total Stuart's Cavalry Division north of 

Potomac on day of battle 10,380 

Imboden's command 2.100 Battles and Leaders, Vol. 

3, p. 422. 
Maryland Line, found by Ewell near Win- 
chester and taken with him. about 600 W. R. No. 40, p. 602 



21 



TOTAL EFFECTIVES. INCLUDING OFFICERS. 

Infantry 62,618 

Army of Northern Virginia — Artillery 5,404 

Cavalry 10,380 

78,402 
Maryland Line incorporated in Ewell's corps 600 

79,002 
Imboden's command 2,100 

81,102 

All the organizations above given were on the field of 
Gettysburg on July 3, and, with the exception of the cavalry 
brigades of Jones and Robertson and Imboden's command, 
(5,000 effectives), took part in the battle on one of the three 
days. 

Before reaching the field the Confederate army lost an 
unknown number of men by sickness, straggling and deser- 
tion. This number cannot be estimated even approximately. 

Army of the Potomac. — The Army of the Potomac; as 
constituted in the Gettysburg campaign, was composed main- 
ly of the forces which had operated with General McClellan 
on the Peninsula, and General Pope in Northern Virginia. 
The two armies were united in September, 18G2, and together 
took part in the Antietam campaign under General McClel- 
lan, in the Fredericksburg campaign under General Burn- 
side, and in the Chancellorsville campaign under General 
Hooker. The battle of Gettysburg was fought under still 
another commander, General Meade. 

Until General Hooker took command in January, 1863, 
the general organization of the army remained as established 
by General McClellan iu the Peninsula campaign. The army 
was organized into army corps and an artillery reserve; in 



22 

the later campaigns two corps were united to form a grand 
division. The enlisted strength, present for duty, of the 
army corps, averaged about 12,000 men, which was about 
two-thirds of its enrolled strength. ( >f the seven corps, which 
now formed the army, the II, III, V, and VI corps, had been 
with McClellan on the Peninsula; the I, XI and XII corps 
had formed Pope's Army of Virginia. 

General Hooker abolished the grand divisions and re- 
organized both the artillery and cavalry. 

The division consisted wholly of infantry; when it was 
separated from its corps, one or more batteries of corps ar- 
tillery were assigned to it. The brigade and regimental 
organizations were as in the (Confederate service. 

Until the latter part of May, 1863, the batteries of artil- 
lery assigned to the army corps were generally distributed 
as divisional artillery; few of the corps had corps artillery. 
After the battle of Chancellorsville, the divisional artillery 
was abolished and corps artillery substituted for it. To 
each corps was assigned a brigade of artillery. The normal 
strength of a brigade was five batteries of six guns each, or 
thirty guns to each corps. The artillery reserve of the army 
was organized and commanded by Brigadier General H. J. 
Hunt, who in the Antietam campaign became Chief of the 
Artillery of tin 1 army. The artillery reserve was composed 
of five brigades of four or five batteries each, and had one 
hundred and fourteen guns. The actual number of guns 
with the army, not counting those with the cavalry, was 
three hundred and twenty. Of the guns of the corps artil- 
lery, one-half were 3-inch rifles and one-half were 12-pounder 
Napoleon smooth bores. Of the gnus of the artillery reserve, 



23 



eight were 4 1 ..-inch siege rifles, which, however, did not reach 
the battlefield of Gettysburg, two were howitzers, and the 
remainder were 3-inch rifles and 12-pounder Napoleons in 
equal numbers. 

In the Fredericksburg campaign, the cavalry was dis- 
tributed among the grand divisions, one or two brigades to 
each grand division. Before the battle of Chancellorsville, 
General Hooker united all the cavalry into a corps of three 
divisions of two or three brigades each. General Stoneman 
was assigned to command the cavalry corps. After Chan- 
cellorsville, he was succeeded by General Pleasanton. It 
was reorganized by General Pleasanton into two divisions 
of three brigades each. A few days before the battle of Get- 
tysburg, StaheFs division of cavalry was transferred from 
the Department of Washington to the Army of the Potomac 
and became the third division of the cavalry corps. General 
Kilpatrick was placed in command of this division, which 
was reorganized into two brigades and Generals Custer and 
Farnsworth were promoted to command them. To the 
cavalry corps were attached two brigades of artillery, each 
having five horse batteries of six rifled 3-inch guns. 

On May 31, at the opening of the campaign, the strength 
of the seven army corps, the cavalry corps and the artillery 
reserve was. (w. R. No. 40, p. 574.) 

Present for Duty. 

Seven army corps 86,690 

Cavalry corps 10,192 

Artillery reserve 3,898 

Total 100,780 



24 



On June 30th the strength of the Army was (W. R. No. 43, p. 151) : 

Present for Duty Equipped. 

Infantry 77,208 

Cavalry corps 14,973 present for duty, number equipped 

Artillery reserve 3,898 not stated. 

Cavalry with army corps 258 (estimated) 

Stannard's Vermont brig 2,000 joined on evening of July 1st.) 

Lockwood's Maryland brig 1,500 (estimated) joined July 2d. 

99,837 

Of the infantry all the organizations were on the field 
or in its immediate vicinity on July 3. Of the cavalry not 
more than five of the. eight brigades were on the field at any 
one time. All of the artillery was on the field July 3, ex- 
cept two batteries of siege artillery. 

Before reaching the field, the Union Army also lost an 
unknown number through sickness and straggling. This 
number, although it cannot be even approximately estimated, 
was probably large, as the army marched rapidly for several 
days before the battle in rainy weather and in the heat of the 
latter days of June. As the march was in a friendly coun- 
try, the Union stragglers were in no danger of capture as 
were those of the Confederate army. 

Although the aggregate strength of the seven corps, had 
not changed materially between May 31 and June 30, the 
composition and organization of some of the corps had great- 
ly changed, due to the expiration of the terms of service of 
many of the regiments. During the progress of the cam- 
paign, the deficiencies created by the withdrawal of these 
troops were made up by reinforcements from the Department 
of Washington and from the Middle Department, Of these 
reinforcements, Stannard's Vermont brigade was attached 



25 

to the I corps; Hay's or Willard's brigade was attached to 
the II corps; Crawford's division of two brigades was at- 
tached to the V corps; and Lockwood's brigade was attached 
to the XII corps. 

The cavalry corps was reinforced by the addition of 
StaheFs cavalry, a few days before the battle. 

The artillery reserve was decreased during this period. 

The aggregate strength of the infantry of the Union 
army present for duty, according to the returns, exceeded 
that of the corresponding units of the Confederate army, by 
about 15,000 men, which was about the strength of the in- 
fantry of the VI corps. 

Comparison. — If the history and organization of the 
two armies is studied, it will appear that the Confederate 
army was the superior in all respects save numbers and 
equipment. i 

General Lee had commanded an army in live separate 
campaigns, and in more than twice as many important bat- 
tles. General Hooker had commanded in a single campaign 
and battle, and General Meade was to be in supreme com- 
mand only three days before ho was to tight his first battle. 

General Lee had the absolute confidence of his superi- 
ors and was free to operate as he saw fit. Both officers and 
men of his army were confident of success under his guid- 
ance, and he had confidence in the ability and hearty support 
of every officer and man of his army. Nearly all the gen- 
eral officers had been promoted on his recommendation. 

General Hooker, having been unsuccessful in his one 
campaign, had not the confidence of his superiors, and there- 
fore his suggestions and plans did not, as a rule, meet with 



26 



cordial approval. His unsuccessful campaign of Chancel- 
lorsville must have caused both officers and men to distrust 
his ability to maneuver and fight his army. 

While General Meade was given all the support possible 
by his superiors, his lack of experience made him hesitate 
to utilize his authority to its fullest extent. It led him to 
trust too much in the judgment of the corps commanders. 
He had not complete confidence in the ability of some of his 
principal assistants, and, because of his lack of experience 
and confidence in his own judgment, he did not create in all 
his subordinates confidence in himself. 

The corps and division commanders of both armies were, 
as a rule, officers who had attained these commands only 
after successful service as brigade commanders; in the Con- 
federate army all except one, General Rodes, were graduates 
of the U. S. Military Academy and had served in the regular 
army; in the Union army one of the corps and about one- 
third of the division commanders had entered the service 
from civil life as colonels of volunteers. Nearly all the older 
graduates had seen service in the Mexican war. 

The ratio of officers to men was greater in the Confed- 
erate army than in the Union; according to the last returns 
before the battle the ratio of officers to men present for duty 
was .089 in the Confederate army, and .068 in the Union 
army. This ratio is an important factor in the value of 
an army when the officers have had a year's experience in the 
field, as had most of the officers of both armies. 

The Confederate army corps and divisions were larger 
and more important units than those in the Union army. 
Their commanders had therefore greater power and respon- 



27 

••sibility. This was emphasized by giving the corps command- 
ers the grade of lieutenant-general, and the division com- 
manders that of major-general. In the Union army a major- 
general commanded the entire army, and officers of the same 
rank commanded corps and divisions; brigadier-generals 
commanded divisions and brigades. The clear lines of de- 
markation in the Confederate commanders undoubtedly 
made it easier for all commanders to control their subordi- 
nates. 

The organization of the Confederate artillery was al- 
most ideal. The chief of artillery had absolute control of 
its equipment and employment on the field, while it was so 
divided that each corps and division had its own unit. Its 
ammunition and equipment were much inferior to those of 
the artillery of the Union army. In the Union army the 
duties of the chief of artillery were not definitely fixed. The 
only guns in his absolute control were those of the artillery 
reserve. While at times extremely valuable, as a rule its 
guns were not so available as those of the corps artillery. 

The cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia had beeu, 
as an independent unit, under the personal charge of Gene- 
ral J. E. B. Stuart from the beginning of the war. In the 
Union army it was not united into a single unit until Febru- 
ary, 1863. It was still inexperienced as an independent unit, 
and it will be observed that General Hooker always gave it 
an infantry support when he sent it against General Stuart's 
cavalry. 

The Confederate army had in the Gettysburg campaign 
fewer raw troops and fewer newly organized brigades and 
divisions than its adversary ; this was a distinct advantage. 

If the differences of the two armies are fairly weighed 



28 



it is not too much to say that the chances of success in the 
campaign about to be opened were in favor of General Lee,, 
notwithstanding his numerical inferiority. 



29 



CHAPTER IV. 

OPERATIONS FROM JUNE 1ST TO THE MORNING 

OF JULY 1ST. 

MOVEMENT OF LONGSTREET AND EWELL TO CULPEPER. 

On June 1, 1863, the main body Of the Army of North- 
ern Virginia lav on the south bank of the Rappahannock 
river, with headquarters at Fredericksburg. Stuart's cav- 
alry division was at Culpeper, where five brigades were as- 
sembled. The divisions of Hood and Pickett, of Longstreet's 
corps, which had recently returned from southern Virginia, 
were not with the main army; Hood was at Verdiersville, 
southeast of Culpeper, and Pickett was near Hanover Junc- 
tion with Pettigrew's brigade of Heth's division. 

The main body of the Union army lay on the north bank 
of the Rappahannock and along the railroad to Acquia Creek 
with headquarters at Falmouth. The cavalry corps was as- 
sembled at Bealeton, on the Orange and Alexandria railroad, 
north of Culpeper. 

On June 2 General Lee was informed that the Union 
troops had evacuated West Point on the York river and no 
longer threatened to advance on Richmond. He at once 
ordered the concentration of Ewell's corps and the divisions 
of Hood and McLaws of Longstreet's corps, at Culpeper. 
Hill's corps was left to hold Fredericksburg, and Pickett was 
ordered to join the army as soon as he was satisfied that his 
presence near Hanover Junction was no longer required. 



30 

On June 7 General Lee, having reached Oulpeper in 
person, issued orders to the cavalry forces of Generals Jen- 
kins and Imboden to prepare the way for his advance into 
the Shenandoah Valley. 

General Jenkins was ordered to move down the Shenan- 
doah valley at least as far as Strasburg and Front Royal, and 
there await the arrival of the infantry. In the meantime 
he was to obtain all possible information as to strength and 
position of the different Union posts in the lower valley. 

(W. R. No. 45, p. 865.) 

General Imboden was to move from the upper Shenan- 
doah valley into the South Potomac valley and engage the 
attention of the forces in and around Romney. He was to 
collect cattle for the main army and, if possible, by destroy- 
ing bridges, to interrupt railway communication between 
Cumberland and Martinsburg. (W. R. 45, p. 865.) 

While awaiting the execution of his preliminary orders, 
General Lee reviewed Stuart's cavalry corps on the plains 
about Brandy Station. 

BATTLE OF BBANDY STATION OB FLEETWOOD. 

The withdrawal of EwelPs forces from the Fredericks- 
burg lines and their movement westward having been re- 
ported by the Union pickets, General Hooker ordered the 
cavalry corps to make a reconnaissance in the direction of 
Culpeper where it was reported that Stuart had united 
his cavalry. Two brigades, each composed of 1,500 infantry 
and a battery of horse artillery, were to accompany the 
cavalry. 



31 

Stuart, who was preparing for an offensive movement 
instead of anticipating an attack on himself, had only one 
brigade along the river. Jones' brigade was picketing the 
river about Beverly Ford. Of the other brigades Fitz Lee 
was further up the river, and W. H. F. Lee, Hampton and 
Robertson were near Brandy Station. 

Early in the morning of June 9, Buford with his own 
division, the reserve brigade, and one brigade of infantry 
moved to Beverly Ford. It was a foggy morning and Jones' 
pickets were taken by surprise. The Confederates were be- 
ing driven slowly back when Stuart came to Jones' assist- 
ance with W. H. F. Lee, Hampton and Fitz Lee. He stop- 
ped Buford's advance but could not drive him back as Bu- 
ford was supported by infantry well posted. 

In the meantime Gregg with two divisions and a brigade 
of infantry crossed without opposition at Kelly's Ford. He 
sent the third division on the direct road towards Culpeper; 
with his own division he marched towards Brandy Station; 
the infantry he sent northward on a road nearer the river 
than the one followed by the cavalry. He found Robertson 
alone at Brandy Station and drove him out. Stuart now 
came to Robertson's assistance with W. H. F. Lee and Jones. 
After desperate fighting with charge and counter charge, 
Gregg was obliged to fall back on his infantry. As Buford 
had been slowly pushing the cavalry in his front and ad- 
vancing on the station, Gregg now found himself on Buford's 
left flank. Together they checked Stuart's advance until 5 
p. M v when they were ordered to withdraw across the river. 
The third division of the Union cavalry corps met with a 
single Confederate regiment on the Culpeper road, which was 



32 

easily brushed aside; it however took no further part in the 
day's operations and was withdrawn to the river with the 
other divisions. 

The forces engaged on this day were about 10,000 Con- 
federate cavalry, and 10,000 Union cavalry and infantry. 

The reconnaissance had been successful in developing 
the strength of the Confederate cavalry and had also shown 
that they were supported by infantry. Rodes' division of 
Ewell's corps was sent by General Lee to Stuart's assistance 
and arrived at Brandy Station just at the close of the engage- 
ment, but too late to take an active part in it. 

In the cavalry tight at Brandy Station General W. H. F 
Lee was severely wounded and Colonel Chambliss succeeded 
to the command of his brigade. 

CAPTURE OF WINCHESTER. 

On the following day, June 10, before the Union army 
could profit by the knowledge obtained and frustrate his 
movement, Ewell was ordered to march on Winchester via 
Front Royal and there, if possible, capture the division of 
Major General Milroy. 

Winchester, in the Shenandoah valley, was not occu- 
pied by Union forces after its evacuation in the Antietam 
campaign until January, 1863, when Brigadier General Mil- 
roy was sent there. Although General Halleck had giveu 
repeated instructions that this town was not to be occupied 
in force and its troops were to be withdrawn promptly when- 
ever threatened by superior numbers, nevertheless, it was 
gradually converted into a base for operations in the Shen- 



33 



andoah valley, by the formation of a weak entrenched camp 
and by the increase of its garrison to a division of three 

brigades, (W. R. No. 31, p. 947; No. 40, pps. 132, 317, 453.) 

Finally on June 10, when he learned of the concentra- 
tion oi' the Confederate forces at Culpeper, General Halleck 
ordered the immediate evacuation of Winchester. This 
order was sent to General Milroy by General Schenck, chief 
of staff, but afterwards, on General Milroy's representa- 
tions, was in effect rescinded by General Schenck ; in view, 
however, of an expected attack, the brigade which had 
occupied Berryville was ordered to Winchester. (W. R. No. 4~5, 

p. 50.) 

Ewell reached Cedarville, just beyond Front Royal, on 
the evening of June 12 and was there joined by Jenkins' 
cavalry. 

From the information given him, he decided to send 
Rodes' division with Jenkins' cavalry, on the 13th, to capture 
the brigade at Berryville, and then have Rodes push on and 
capture the post at Martinsburg. Early's division was to 
move to Newtown and thence to Winchester on the Strasburg 
road, while Johnson's division was to move on the direct road 
from Cedarville. 

The force under General Rodes moved on Berryville and 
while making dispositions to surround it, found that the 
Union forces had retreated, leaving only a small rear guard. 
Rodes followed the retreating force to Summit Point on the 
railroad, where the Union brigade had turned off towards 
Winchester; he there bivouacked for the night after a march 
of twenty miles. He attempted to report to General Ewell 
for further orders, but was unable to do so; therefore, in pur- 



34 

suance of his original orders, on the morning of June 14 he 
marched on Martinsburg and reached that town late in the 
afternoon after a long march. The garrison of that post 
having orders to retreat if menaced by superior forces, made 
its escape during the night. The cavalry was pursued by 
Jenkins as far as Williamsport, but the infantry escaped un- 
observed to Shepherdstown. 

Generals Early and Johnson, marching on Winchester 
on the 13th, met the main force under General Milroy north 
of Kernstown and from that point drove him to his fortified 
positions just south of Winchester. On the morning of the 
14th, finding the positions south of Winchester too strong to 
warrant an assault. General Early was directed to make a 
retrograde and turning movement with three of his brigades 
and assault the fortifications north and west of the town. 
To conceal his design, Gordon's brigade Avas left south of 
Winchester and Johnson's division threatened the lines east 
of the town. Early reached his point of attack without be- 
ing discovered, and having prepared the way with twenty 
guns carried the works in his front by assault. It was now 
dark and too late to attack the other works in the line of de- 
fense. 

That night Milroy decided to retreat on Harper's Ferry. 
This movement was anticipated by General Ewell, who sent 
three brigades of Johnson's division to prevent his escape. 
Johnson reached the Martinsburg road at a point five miles 
north-east of the town, with two of his brigades, some time 
after midnight. Just at that moment the head of the retreat- 
ing troops reached the same point. The opposing troops 
fought in the early dawn and the Confederates were about 



35 

to be overwhelmed when the opportune arrival of Johnson's 
third brigade, which had been accidentally left behind, 
turned the tide. The Union retreat then became a rout, in 
which about 4,000 men, 23 guns, and 300 wagons were cap- 
tured. The remainder of Milroy's force reached the Poto- 
mac either at Harper's Ferry or at Hancock. Rodes' divi- 
sion was too far from the lines of retreat to intercept either 
of the columns. 

Leaving three of Early's regiments to guard the pris- 
oners, Ewell moved to the Potomac, where Rodes crossed at 
Williamsport on the 15th, and on the 19th moved to Hagers- 
town ; on the 18th Johnson crossed at Sharpsburg, and on the 
same day Early moved to Shepherdstowu. In these posi- 
tions they remained until the arrival of Hill's corps. 

ACTION TAKEN BY THE PRESIDENT TO MEET THE INVASION OF 
NORTHERN STATES. 

In view of a probable invasion of Pennsylvania, on June 
10th, President Lincoln formed two new departments: that 
of the Susquehanna, with headquarters at Harrisburg, un- 
der General Couch, then commanding the II corps; and that 
of the Monongahela with headquarters at Pittsburg under 
General W. F. H. Brooks. (W. R. No. 45, p. 55.) 

On June 15, when the news of the disaster at Win- 
chester was received in Washington, the President issued a 
call for 100,000 militia to be furnished by the threatened 
states, Pennsylvania, Maryland, West Virginia and Ohio, 
aud had letters written to the Governor of New York asking 
for 20,000 men, and to the governors of the other states ask- 



36 



ing for such regiments as could be furnished at once. 

(W. R. No. 45, p. 136.) 

On June 24th, the Middle Department was divided into 
two parts: the part west of the Shenandoah Valley became 
the Department of West Virginia, under General B. F. 
Kelley. (W. R. No. 45, p. 299.) 

RETROGRADE MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

As soon as General Hooker became aware of the flank 
movement of the Confederate army, he wrote to the President 
suggesting that he be allowed to attack the force left at 
Fredericksburg, should it develop that Lee was dividing 
his army to make an offensive movement. He was advised 
by both the President and General Halleck not to move across 
the Rappahannock. Again, on June 10th, he requested per- 
mission to move on Richmond. This was also refused and 
he was directed to make his movements conform to those of 
General Lee, attacking him whenever possible, (w. R. No. 43, 

pp. 31-35.) 

On the 11th of June therefore he began to withdraw from 
the Rappahannock and concentrate along the Orange and 
Alexandria Railroad near Manassas Junction, en route for 
the Potomac near Leesburg. 

On June 15, the I, III, V and XI corps were already at 
Manassas Junction. The other corps were on their right and 
rear marching on Fairfax Court House. The cavalry corps 
had remained at and near Warrenton to cover this move- 
ment, and on the 15th and 16th joined the other corps about 
Manassas Junction. On the 17th, the V corps was ordered to 
Gum Springs, near the Little River turnpike northwest of 



3? 



Manassas; to coyer this movement Gregg's division of cav- 
alry was ordered to Aldie. 

CONCENTRATION OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY NEAR THE 

POTOMAC. 

When General Lee learned of the withdrawal of Hooker 
from the Rappahannock, he ordered Hill to move to Cul- 
peper and thence to Winchester, and Longstreet to move 
along the east slope of the Bine Ridge mountains from Oul- 
peper northward to Ashby and Snicker gaps. The exposed 
flanks of Longstreet and Hill were to be covered by Stuart's 
cavalry. 

Hill, being entirely protected and having free roads, 
left Fredericksburg on the 14th of June and reached the 
Potomac, at Shepherdstown, June 23. 

Longstreet moved northward on the lGth, as soon as 
Hill's leading division was at hand, and on the 19th he 
halted with Hood's division in Snicker Gap, McLaw's di- 
vision in Ashby Gap, and Pickett's in the mountain passes 
between the other two divisions. 

In this movement Fitz Lee's cavalry brigade formed his 
advance guard as far as the Manassas Gap railroad and the 
brigades of Chambliss and Robertson formed his flank 
guard. Hampton was left on the Rappahannock to protect 
Hill, and Jones was between Hampton and Robertson. 

CAVALRY ENGAGEMENTS IN LOUDOUN VALLEY. 

On the 17th of June, after escorting Longstreet's corps 
to the passes of the Blue Ridge mountains, Fitz Lee's cavalry 



38 



brigade moved eastward towards Aldie Gap in the Bull 
Run mountains. On the same day Gregg's cavalry division, 
after escorting the V corps to Gum Springs, moved west- 
ward through Aldie Gap to ascertain the position of the 
enemy. The two forces met just west of Aldie, where the 
brigades of Fitz Lee aud Kilpatrick had a spirited encounter. 
On the approach of Gregg's remaining brigades, Lee retired. 

On the following day the brigades of Chambliss and 
Robertson having arrived, they were posted on the road lead- 
ing from Aldie to Ashby Gap and about six miles from the 
former place. Fitz Lee was posted to their left and rear. 
On the 19th, when Jones' brigade arrived, it relieved Fitz 
L( e's brigade, which was then moved to the road from Aldie 
to Snicker Gap. On the 20th, Hampton's brigade arrived 
and was attached to the right wing. 

There was some skirmishing between the two cavalry 
commands at Middleburg June IS and 19 on the Ashby 
Gap road, but no serious movement was made until June 21. 
On June 21 Pleasanton was authorized to attack the cav- 
alry in his front and to ascertain what Confederate force 
was east of the Blue Ridge mountains. In this attack he 
was to be supported by the V corps, which bad been ordered 
to Aldie. On the 21st, therefore, with Gregg's cavalry di- 
vision and Barnes' division of the V corps on the Ashby Gap 
road, and with Buford's cavalry division on his right, Pleas- 
anton moved against Stuart and drove him from his in- 
trenched position at Upperville into the Blue Ridge passes. 
In the defense of these passes Stuart's command was tem- 
porarily relieved by Longstreet's infantry. Only Vincent's 



39 



brigade of the V corps was actively engaged in this move- 
ment. 

On the 22nd, Pleasanton's command returned to Aldie, 
where he remained with the V corps until the 26th, when 
he moved to Leesburg. Stuart's cavalry returned to the 
valley between the Bull Run and the Blue Ridge mountains, 
where he remained until the 25th. 

CONFEDERATE ADVANCE FROM THE POTOMAC. 

As it was apparent, on the 22nd of June, that the Union 
army had no intention of advancing across the Loudoun Val- 
ley, General Lee issued the orders for the advance of his army 
into Pennsylvania. 

On June 23 Ewell's corps moved northward. His orders 
were to move to the Susquehanna, collecting supplies on the 
way, and to seize Harrisburg if he could. (W. R. No. 45, p. 914.) 
Ewell's main body, consisting of most of Jenkins' cavalry 
and the infantry divisions of Rodes and Johnson, marched 
through Hagerstown, Greencastle and Chambersburg, to Car- 
lisle, which they reached June 27. His left flank was pro- 
tected by Steuart's infantry brigade with the Maryland 
Line, which moved from Greencastle to Chambersburg, via 
McConnellsburg, and his right flank by Early's division 
with one of Jenkins' regiments, the 17th Va. cavalry, which 
moved through Boonsborough and Waynesborough to Green- 
wood on the Chambersburg-Gettysburg road east of Fay- 
etteville. The march was a slow one, because of the flanking 
columns and because of the collection of supplies in a hostile 
country. From Carlisle, Jenkins' cavalry was sent to 



±0 

reconnoitre the defenses of Harrisburg, and on the morning 
of June 29 Ewell was preparing to move against it with his 
infantry, when he received orders to move towards Gettys- 
burg. 

Early's division, on reaching Greenwood, turned east- 
ward through the South mountains. Gordon's brigade, with 
White's battalion of Jones' cavalry brigade, moved di- 
rectly on Gettysburg, aud the other brigades, with the 17th 
Va. regiment of Jenkins' cavalry, moved to Mummasburg. 
From Mummasburg Hays' brigade was sent to Gettysburg. 
The right wing of Early's division then moved on the turn- 
pike to York, the cavalry going to Hanover Junction, while 
his left wing moved by the country roads through Hunters- 
town and Berlin. The division reached York on June 28 
and Gordon was at once sent to seize the bridge over the 
Susquehanna at Columbia. In this he was unsuccessful, as 
the bridge was burned by the local troops. Early's division 
was encamped around York, collecting supplies and destroy- 
ing the railroad, when on June 2!) its commander received 
orders to join his corps near Cashtown. 

Hill's corps crossed the Potomac on the 24th of June 
and inarched through Hagerstown and Chambersburg to 
Fayetteville, where it arrived June 27. On the 29th, 
Heth's division was sent across the South mountains to 
Cashtown. 

Long-street's corps crossed the Potomac on the 25th and 
26th of June and reached Chambersburg on the 27th. On 
the 29th, the divisions of McLaws and Hood were sent to 
Greenwood, just beyond Fayetteville; Law's brigade of 



41 



Hood's division was posted as an outpost at New Guilford on 
the road to Fairfield. 

General Imboden, who had carried out his preliminary 
instructions and had destroyed many of the bridges, block- 
houses and water tanks along the Baltimore and Ohio rail- 
road, was ordered to keep on the left flank of EwelPs corps 
and gather information and collect supplies. (W. R. No. 45, pp. 
905 and 924.) He therefore assembled his force at Hancock on 
the Potomac, where General Lee's courier found him on 
June 29. 

On General Stuart's cavalry, General Lee depended 
for information of the movements of the Army of the Poto- 
mac. He was therefore directed to cross the Potomac with 
three brigades as soon as their services could be spared from 
the defense of the Blue Ridge passes. He was directed to 
place himself on E well's right flank and was informed that 
one of Ewell's columns would probably march to Emmits- 
burg. (W. R. No. 45, p. 913.) 

General Stuart, it appears, had proposed a plan by 
which he was to move through Hopewell Gap and reach the 
Potomac by moving around the rear and right flank of the 
Union army. This plan was referred to by General Lono-- 
street in transmitting General Lee's order to General Stuart 
and in his letter to General Lee informing him of its trans- 
mittal. The movement met the approval of General Long- 
street, (W. R. No. 45, p. 915.) 

General Lee finally gave General Stuart permission to 
move by the route which seemed best to General Stuart. He, 
however, added that if the L T nion army was not moving 
northward, he advised him to move into the Shenandoah val- 



42 

ley on the night of the 23rd, cross the Potomac at Sheperds- 
town and move toward Frederick, Maryland. (W. R. No. 45, 

p. 923.) 

Acting under the discretionary orders thus given him, 
on June 24 General Stuart assembled the brigades of Fitz 
Lee, Chambliss and Hampton on the Manassas Gap railroad, 
a short distance west of Thoroughfare Gap. His original in- 
tention was to move through Hopewell Gap, north of Thor- 
oughfare Gap, and thence through Gum Springs to Seneca 
Falls. However, at this time the Union forces were too far 
south to permit it. In Aldie Gap were the V and cavalry 
corps; in Thoroughfare Gap and Gainesville was the II 
corps; at Bristoe station, south of Manassas and Centerville, 
was the VI corps. Not knowing fully the position of the 
Union forces, Stuart went through a gap just south of Thor- 
oughfare Gap early in the morning of June 25 and shortly 
ran into the II corps. The whole day was spent in recon- 
noitering the Union forces and in a useless engagement with 
them. On the 26th he marched by Brentsville to a point on 
the Occoquan River below its junction with the Bull Run. 
On the following day, June 27, he made a long march and that 
night crossed the Potomac at Powser's ford. On June 2S, 
finding that the entire Union army was at and near Freder- 
ick, he marched northward through Rockville to Brooksville. 
Near Rockville he captured a train of more than one hun- 
dred and twenty-five wagons, which he took with him. On 
the night of June 29, when the other commanders had re- 
ceived orders to march on Gettysburg, he had just reached 
Union Mills, half way between Westminster and Littlestown. 

The cavalry brigades of Robertson and Jones were left 



43 

by Stuart to guard the passes in the Blue Ridge mountains 
as long as the Union army was in their front. When that 
army crossed the Potomac, General Robertson, who was in 
command, was to withdraw beyond the Shenandoah River, 
cross the Potomac and place himself on the right and rear of 
the Confederate army. One battalion of Jones' brigade had 
been attached to Ewell's corps and a regiment was on picket 
duty near Harper's Ferry. Robertson's brigade and the 
three remaining regiments of Jones' brigade were assembled 
at Berryville on June 29, preparatory to crossing the Poto- 
mac and joining the army, when they received orders to 
march to Gettysburg. 

CONCENTRATION OF THE UNION ARMY AT FREDERICK, MARYLAND. 

On June 17 the Union army began its movement north- 
ward from Manassas for the Potomac near Leesburg, Vir- 
ginia, where bridges were to be constructed for its crossing. 
This movement was covered by the II corps at Thorough- 
fare Gap and the V and cavalry corps at Aldie Gap. 

On the 25th of June the Union army began crossing the 
Potomac and moving towards Frederick. It was preceded 
by StahePs cavalry division of the Department of Washing- 
ton, which had been sent from Fairfax Court House for this 
purpose. 

On June 26 the cavalry corps, which formed the rear 
guard, left Aldie and marched to Leesburg. 

On June 28 the entire army was concentrated in a, cir- 
cular area whose diameter is twenty miles and whose center 
is Frederick. On the night of June 27-2S, General Hooker 
was, at his own request, relieved from the command of the 



44 

army. He- stated that he submitted his resignation because 
the forces commanded by him were inadequate to meet his 
adversary and also cover Washington and Harper's Ferry as 
required by his instructions. He had just previously recom- 
mended the abandonment of Harper's Ferry and the rein- 
forcement of his army by its large garrison. This recom- 
mendation had been disapproved. (W. R. No. 43, p. 60.) 

General George G. Meade, commander of the V army 
corps, Avas appointed by President Lincoln to succeed General 
Hooker : lie assumed command on the morning of June 28. 
His instructions were to maneuver and light in such a way as 
to cover Washington and Baltimore. He was placed in com- 
mand of all forces in his sphere of operations, including 
those of Harper's Ferry, and was authorized to remove from, 
or assign to, the command of any part of his army, any 
officer whom he saw lit, (W. R. No. 43, pp. 61, 62, 63.) 

In pursuance of his orders and from definite information 
that the corps of Ewell, Hill and Longstreet had marched 
north of Hagerstown, he decided to move his army to the line 
Emmitsburg-Hanover, covering Baltimore and Washington. 
Westminster, Maryland, was made his new base. 

On the 29th of June, Buford with two brigades of his 
cavalry division, marched from Middletown, west of Fred- 
erick, through Boonsborough towards Fairfield; his third 
brigade was sent to Mechanicstown. Gregg's cavalry di- 
vision marched from Bidgeville, on Parr's Ridge east of 
Frederick, to New Windsor on the road to Westminster; Kil- 
patrick's cavalry division marched from Frederick to Littles- 
town, where it was joined by the 5th and 6th Michigan regi- 



45 

ments, which were returning from a reconnaissance to Get- 
tysburg which they reached June 28. 

On ttte-^ame-day, the I and XI corps moved to Emniits- 
burg; the III to Taneytown; the II to Union v4+le near West- 
minster; the V to Liberty in rear of the II; the XII to Bruce- 
ville in rear of the III, and the VI to New Windsor on the 
road to Westminster. 



THE ORDER FOR THE CONCENTRATION OF THE CONFEDERATE 
ARMY AT GETTYSBURG. 

On the night of June 28, General Lee learned from a 
spy that the Union army was around Frederick. This was 
his first intimation that the Army of the Potomac was north 
of the Fotomac River. He had assumed that General Stuart 
would precede the Union army across the river and give him 
due notice of that fact. To prevent the Union commander 
from moving still further westward and intercepting his 
communications he decided to concentrate his army east of 
the South mountains, either at Cashtown or Gettysburg. 
Orders to this effect were therefore sent to General Ewell 
and General Robertson, and orders were sent to General Im- 
boden to move to Chambersburg and relieve General Pickett 
of the charge of that town and the trains. 

POSITIONS OF THE ARMIES ON THE NIGHT OF JUNE 29. 

By the evening of June 29, these orders reached all the 
separate Confederate commanders, except Stuart. The mili- 
tary situation was then as follows: Of the nine infantry 
divisions of the Confederate army, one was at York ; two at 



46 

Carlisle; one at Chambersburg ; four near Fayetteville ; and 
one at Cashtown. Stuart, with three cavalry brigades, was 
at Union Mills en route for Littlestown ; Robertson, with two 
cavalry brigades, was at Berryville in the Shenandoah val- 
ley, and Imboden was at Hancock on the Potomac river. 

Of the Union forces, Buford with two cavalry brigades 
was moving on Fairfield and Gettysburg; Gregg's cavalry 
division was moving on Westminster; and Kilpatrick's di- 
vision was at Littlestown en route for Hanover. The in- 
fantry corps were assembled on the Eminitsburg-Taneytown- 
Westminster road. 

POSITIONS OF THE ARMIES ON THE NIGHT OF JUNE 30. 

The movements of each army on June 30 conformed to 
its general plan of operations. 

The Confederate army corps moved towards Cashtown 
and Gettysburg, and the Union army corps deployed on the 
general line Emmitsburg-Hanover. 

As Buford was advancing towards Fairfield he discov- 
ered that the town was in the possession of the Confederates. 
Not wishing his presence to be known, he turned eastward 
until he reached the Emmitsburg-Gettysburg road and upon 
that marched to Gettysburg, which he reached at 11 a.m. At 
the same hour Pettigrew's brigade of Heth's division had just 
reached the outskirts of the town on its march from Cash- 
town for supplies. 

Before the two commands came into actual conflict Pet- 
ti grew wi tin 1 row to Cashtown and reported the presence of 
Union cavalry at Gettysburg. Buford took possession of the 



47 

town and posted his pickets so as to watch all the roads from 
the Fairfield road on his left, to the York road on his right. 
Beyond the picket line, in all directions, he sent reconnoiter- 
ing patrols. 

Gamble's brigade, which was on the left of the line, was 
between the town and W illoughby Run and between the Fair- 
field and Cashtown roads. Its picket line was on a ridge just 
west of the creek and an advanced picket of the 8th Illinois 
cavalry was on a ridge nearly a mile and a half west of Wil- 
loughby Run. Devin's brigade was north of the town. 

On the night of June 29-30, Stuart, who was at Union 
Mills, learned that the Union troops had just inarched into 
Littlestown. On the morning of the 30th therefore, he 
marched to Hanover to avoid them. As his advance guard 
marched into that town it encountered Kilpatrick's rear 
guard which was just passing through it. Although outnum- 
bering Kilpatrick, Stuart was hampered by the long wagon 
train he had captured and was desirous of avoiding an en- 
gagement which would still further delay him. He there- 
fore turned eastward, made a forced march, and reached 
Dover on the morning of July 1. 

On the night of the 30th, the positions of the opposing 
forces were as follows : 

At Heidlersburg, north of Gettysburg, was General 
Ewell with Rodes' division, and three miles cast of that town, 
was Early's division. At Cashtown were the divisions of 
Heth and Pender of Hill's corps. Across the mountains, in 
the vicinity of Fayetteville, were the divisions of Anderson, 
McLaws and Hood. Johnson's division was on the Carlisle- 
Chambersburg road about five miles from the latter place. 



48 

Pickett's division was still at Ckambersburg. Stuart's cav- 
alry was making a night march between Jefferson and 
Dover, Penn. ; Robertson was near Martinsburg, Va. ; and 
Imboden near McConnellsburg, Penn. 

The main line of the Union army was composed of Mer- 
ritt's cavalry brigade at Mechanicstown ; the I corps at 
Marsh Run, midway between Emmitsburg and Gettysburg; 
the XI corps at Emmitsburg; the III corps a short dis- 
tance east of Emmitsburg, on the Taneytown road; the 
XII corps at Littlestown; the V corps at Union Mills; and 
the VI corps near Manchester. The II corps was in the 
second line at Unionvffle west of Westminster. Buford, 
with two cavalry brigades, was at . Gettysburg ; Kilpatrick's 
division was at Hanover; Gregg's cavalry division had two 
brigades at Westminster and one at New Windsor, Md. 



49 



CHAPTER V. 

BATTLE OF JULY 1. 

MOVEMENTS PRECEDING THE BATTLE. 

It was not the intention of either of the army command- 
ers to begin a decisive battle on this day. 

Confederate Army. — Of his nine infantry divisions, 
General Lee had only four east of the South mountains, and 
these were not concentrated. All of the other divisions were 
still west of the mountains, echeloned along the single road 
all must use to pass this barrier. As Imboden had not ar- 
rived, Pickett was still guarding the army trains. Of his 
cavalry, General Lee had a single brigade with his army; of 
Stuart's position he had no knowledge whatever and Robert- 
son was still far in the rear. Of the position of the Union 
army he knew only that Pettigrew had seen some cavalry 
entering Gettysburg. No new orders were therefore given 
for July 1; the corps commanders were allowed to complete 
the concentration and were informed that no general en- 
gagement was desired until the army was concentrated. 
General Lee remained with General Longstreet until noon, 
when Long-street's corps began to cross the mountains. 

The Confederate point of concentration having been 
shifted" by General Hill from Cashtown to Gettysburg, on the 
evening of June 30 he ordered the division of Heth to be fol- 
lowed by that of Pender to move to Gettysburg, and that of 
Anderson to cross the mountains to Cashtown. He also sent 






>0 



Ewell word that he was going through Cashtown to Gettys- 
burg. 

Early in the morning Heth started for Gettysburg, ac- 
companied by one battalion of the corps artillery in place of 
his own. Pender, who was bivouacked some distance in his 
rear, did not move until an hour or two later, and was fol- 
lowed by the other battalion of corps artillery. 

On the morning of July 1, General Ewell started with 
Rodes' division to march directly from Heidlersburg to Cash- 
town ; before he reached Middletown he was met by General 
Hill's messenger and therefore moved from Middletown to- 
wards Gettysburg. General Early was ordered by General 
Ewell to move southward until he reached the Hunterstown- 
Mummashurg road and thence move west to Cashtown. He 
was moving on the Heidlersburg-Gettysburg road southward 
when lie was overtaken by a message from General Ewell to 
move to Gettysburg. General Johnson, with Ewell's corps 
trains, was leaving the Carlisle-Chambersburg road about 
five miles north of Chambersburg and marching on a cross 
road for Fayetteville. 

On the morning of July 1, General Long-street was pre- 
paring to move aeross the mountains with the division of 
McLaws and Hood as soon as the road was clear; Pickett 
was to join them east of the mountains as soon as relieved by 
Imboden, who was expected that day. 

Union Army. — General Meade's orders for the move- 
ments on July 1 were issued before he knew definitely of 
the withdrawal of the Confederate forces from York and Car- 
lisle. Although he took the precaution to have all the un- 
necessary trains stmt to the rear and the armv readv for bat- 



51 

tie, he did not intend that the movements ordered should in- 
volve any of his army corps in an engagement with the 
enemy. His orders were, the I corps to Gettysburg; the XI 
to supporting distance from the I corps; the 111 corps to Eni- 
mitsburg; the XII corps to Two Taverns, five miles from 
Gettysburg on the Littlestown road; the II corps to Taney- 
town; and the V corps to Hanover. The VI corps was to 
remain at Manchester. 

After issuing these orders, he learned that Carlisle and 
York were being evacuated and that the Confederate army 
was being concentrated probably to make a sudden descent 
niton him. The point of concentration could not be accu- 
rately fixed, but he thought it would be somewhere on the 
road from Chambersburg to York, through Cashtown and 
Mummasburg. 

As his army was deployed over a long line, it was neces- 
sary for him to concentrate for battle either in advance of 
his present position or in rear of it. Acting upon the hy- 
pothesis that Reynolds might be attacked by the enemy and 
compelled to fall back, he selected a line along Pipe Creek 
between Middleburg and Manchester, and sent a circular to 
his corps commanders to study the roads by which it would 
be necessary for them to move in order to concentrate there. 

(TV. R. Xo. 45, p. 458.) 

He also wrote to General Reynolds giving him an outline 
of the military situation and asking his views as to the ad- 
visability of concentrating the army in the vicinity of Get- 
tysburg, in view of the information given him in General 
Meade's letter, and the knowledge General Reynolds had of 
the nature of the country, etc. He informed General Rey- 



52 

nolds that the orders for July 1 were issued before the evacu- 
ation of Carlisle and York were known. ' w R No - 45 - p- 460 •) 

Having great confidence in the ability and judgment of 
General Reynolds, he had placed him in command of the 
III and XI corps in addition to his own. with instructions 
" to make such dispositions and give such orders as urcu in- 
stances may require." (W. r. No. 45, p. 414.) 

General Reynolds ordered the XI corps to follow his 
own to Gettysburg; all the other corps moved according to 
the orders of the day. 

At 8 a.m. on July 1, Wadsworth's division of the 1 
corps, which was bivouacked on the Emmitsburg-Gettysburg 
road near the Marsh Creek bridge, with Hall's battery of ar- 
tillery, moved towards Gettysburg. General Reynolds rode 
with it. The second division, which was bivouacked on a 
road running from the Marsh Creek bridge to Fairfield, and 
the third division, which was in rear of the first division, 
started about !> :30 A.M. The XI corps started from Emmits- 
burg some time after 8 a.m.; Barlow's division moved by the 
direct road, but the other divisions being encamped east of 
the town moved by a country road which entered the Gettys- 
burg-Taneytown road about five miles south of Gettysburg. 

Neither the Confederate nor the Union movements were 
made either with haste or with extreme caution ; the rains of 
the preceding day had made the roads difficult and neither 
side was expecting to meet the enemy in force. General Hill 
assumed that Gettysburg was held by a small cavalry force, 
which could readily be brushed aside by Heth's division. 
General Reynolds assumed that no enemy could be met en 
route, since Buford held Gettysburg. 



53 



As no other troops received orders or requests to move 
to Gettysburg iu time, the only troops engaged in the battle 
of July 1 were the Confederate infantry divisions of Heth, 
Pender, Rodes and Early, seventeen brigades, and the Union 
corps of Reynolds and Howard, assisted by Buford's cav- 
alry, twelve infantry aud two cavalry brigades. 

BATTLEFIELD OF JULY 1. 

The field upon which the opposiug forces met on this day 
lies north and west of the town of Gettysburg and is limited 
on the east and west by two insignificant streams called Rock 
Creek and Willoughby Run. It is limited on the south by 
the Hanover, and the Fairfield or Hagerstoton road, and is 
traversed by the roads running to Cashtown, Mummasburg, 
Middletown, Carlisle, Heidlersburg and York. 

About a half mile west of the town is a ridge, running 
due north and south, which forms the divide between the two 
streams. At its extreme north end, where, in the reports of 
the battle it is called Oak Hill or Oak Ridge, it rises one 
hundred and twenty feet above the creeks; opposite the 
town, where it is called Seminar)/ Ridge, it rises to a height 
of only sixty feet. Its eastern slope is quite steep; its west- 
ern very gentle. 

Between Rock Creek and this ridge is a level plain, ris- 
ing only twenty feet above the creek. Its only elevation is 
Barlow's Knoll, near the Rock Creek crossing of the Heid- 
lersburg road. This knoll rises about thirty feet above the 
level of the plain and is connected with Seminary Ridge by a 
low divide. 



54 



The field, between Seminary Ridge and Willoughby Run, 
is traversed by two intermediate ridges, both radiating from 
» >ak Hill. The first ridge, west of Seminary Ridge, which 
may be called Reynolds Ridge, since it is now followed by 
Reynolds Avenue, crosses the Fairfield road a half mile west 
of Seminary Ridge. North of the Cashtown road, the depres- 
sion between this and Seminary Ridge is hardly perceptible, 
but at the Fairfield road the bottom of the depression is 
fifteen feet below Reynolds Ridge, and thirty-five feet below 
Seminary Ridge. 

lief ween Reynolds Ridge and Willoughby Run and about 
three hundred and fifty yards from the former is McPherson 
Ridge, now followed by Stone and Bnford A renins. This 
ridge is pierced by Bender's /'urine north of the Cashtown 
road and terminates in the McPherson Woods, about a quar- 
ter of a mile south of that road. The depression between 
tins and Reynolds Ridge is a shallow one. 

The Maryland ami Western Railroad, at the time of the 
battle graded but not completed, runs nearly parallel to and 
about a hundred yards north of the Cashtown road. It tra- 
versed all the ridges above described in cuts four to six feet 
deep. 

The field was generally open, but scattered over it were 
groves of small extent. The most notable of these were the 
McPherson Woods, a grove two hundred yards wide, extend- 
ing from Willoughby Run to Reynolds Ridge; Shead's 
Grove, covering the west slope of Oak Ridge from the railroad 
northward; and the Seminary Grove, between the Cashtown 
and Fairfield roads. 

In rear of the position and the town, near the junction 



00 

of the roads from Emmitsburg, Taneytown and Two Tav- 
erns, is Cemetery Hill.- This elevation commands the plain 
north of it by about one hundred feet and the ridge at the 
Seminary building by about fifty feet. Since it commanded 
all the roads by which the I and XI corps could retreat or be 
reinforced, it was the true key-point of the position." 

heth's attack on the MORNING OF JULY 1. 

On the morning of July 1, as Heth passed the Marsh 
Creek bridge on the Cashtown road, he encountered the ad- 
vanced picket of the 8th Illinois, which tired the first shot 
of the battle. As the Confederates were seen advancing, by 
the main picket line on the ridge west of YVilloughby Run, 
Gamble's cavalry brigade, which was south of the Cashtown 
road, was at once deployed along Reynolds and McPherson 
ridges from the railroad towards the Fairfield road. Calefs 
horse battery was posted along Ins line; two guns on the 
right of the Cashtown road, two on the left, all on McPher- 
son Ridge, and two still further to the left, beyond McPher- 
son's woods. Devin's brigade was north of Bender's Ravine. 
It was Buford's intention to hold Gettysburg until he was 
compelled to retire or ordered to do so. He knew that the 
1 corps was on its way to Gettysburg and not far distant. 

When General Heth encountered the advanced picket 
line near the Marsh Creek bridge, he deployed Archer's 
brigade, which was in advance, on the south side of the Cash- 
town road, and Davis' brigade, which followed it. on the north 
side. By this advance line the Union pickets were gradu- 
ally driven back until the main Union line east of Willough- 



56 



by Run was encountered. Then the artillery was ordered to 
the front to silence Calefs battery, and Archer and Davis 
prepared to attack the cavalry's line of battle. 

It was probably nearly 11 a.m. when the two Confed- 
erate brigades waited near Willoughby Run for the artillery 
to silence Calefs guns before attacking the line on McPlier- 
son Ridge. At this time Wadsworth's division was approach- 
ing Gettysburg. 

Upon hearing that Buford was attacked, General Rey- 
nolds rode at once to the field and ordered Wadsworth's 
division to march over Seminary Ridge and go to the support 
of the cavalry. 

Davis' brigade was probably crossing the creek, when 
Wadsworth approached the field from the Seminary. Cutler's 
brigade, being in advance, was sent with Hall's battery to 
check the advance of the Confederates north of McPherson's 
Woods. Hall's battery came in position on the north side of 
the Cashtown road near Calefs right platoon and the bri- 
gade line was formed by placing two regiments on his left 
and three north of the railroad. Meredith's brigade of Wads- 
worth's division was sent against Archer's brigade, which 
was just emerging from McPherson's Woods as it arrived. 
Four of Meredith's regiments charged and drove Archer 
back into the creek where he with a number of his men 
were captured; the other regiment of Meredith's brigade 
was held in reserve. General Reynolds was killed in the Mc- 
Pherson Woods by one of Archer's men and the command of 
the corps fell to General Doubleday. 

Davis was at first more successful than Archer; he com- 
pelled two regiments of the right wing of Cutler's brigade, 



57 

not fully deployed, to fall back to Seminary Ridge and nearly 
captured Hall's battery before it could retire. However, as 
he was advancing over Reynolds Ridge, with two regiments 
north and one south of the railroad, he was attacked in flank 
by Meredith's reserve regiment and the two regiments of 
Cutlers left wing. His right regiment was driven into the 
railroad cut where a large part of it was captured. The other 
regiments of Davis' brigade thereupon retired across Wil- 
loughby Run. This was probably about twelve o'clock and 
about the time the other brigades of the 1 corps were reach- 
ing the field. 

AYhen the cavalry was relieved by the infantry it was 
withdrawn to the rear and then posted on the left flank of 
the line. Calef's battery was withdrawn to Seminary Ridge 
and enfiladed the railroad cut, but upon Davis' retreat, re- 
turned for a short time to McPherson Ridge. Although 
Heth had the brigades of Pettigrew and Brockenbrough in 
reserve he did not employ them to support Archer and Davis 
because, as he says in his report, his operation was simply an 
armed ree< mnaissance. 

INTERVAL BETWEEN MORNING AND AFTERNOON ENGAGEMENTS. 

After the defeat of Archer and Davis, the Union line 
was rectified by General Doubleday. Meredith's brigade was 
deployed along Reynolds Ridge in rear of the McPherson 
woods with a skirmish line in WT Cutler was deployed along 
the same ridge north of the railroad, the gap between the 
two brigades was filled by Stone's brigade, which had come 
up about the end of the engagement and advanced to Mc- 
Pherson Ridge. Meredith's line was prolonged to the left 



58 



by Rowley's brigade, which also arrived towards the end of 
the engagement, having marched from Marsh Creek bridge 
<ai the Emmitsburg road along YVilloughby Run to the 
Fairfield road. From that point it moved to the general 
line and was deployed along Reynolds Ridge some distance 
north of the Fairfield road. Gamble's cavalry was as- 
sembled in rear of Seminary Ridge south of the Fairfield 
road. The corps artillery was posted in the best positions pos- 
sible along Seminary Ridge. Baxter's and Paul's brigades 
of the second division were on their arrival posted in reserve 
at the Seminary itself. Shortly thereafter, Baxter's brigade 
was sent to the intersection of the Mummasburg road with 
Oak Ridge, to protect the right flank. As he did not 
connect with Cutler's brigade on his left, the division com- 
mander sent Raul's brigade to till the gap. This brigade was 
posted iii rear of a stone wall which followed the crest of the 
ridge north of Shead's grove, along what is now Doubleday 
A venue. 

Genera] Howard, who had preceded his corps, arrived 
on the field during the morning tight and succeeded General 
Reynolds in command of the entire field. General Schurz 
took command of the XI corps. After consultation with 
Genera] Doubleday, General Boward decided to send two 
divisions of his corps to prolong the right wing of the I 
corps along Oak Ridge and prevent its being turned by the 
Munnuasburg road. Before his corps reached the ridge, 
however. Rodes* division appeared in force ancLfour brigades 
of RarTT^w's and Sckurz's divisions of the XI corps, took up a 
line on the low ridge extending from Barlow's Knoll to Sem- 
inar v Ridgv . 



59 

General Howard recognized the importance of Cemetery 
Hill, and upon their arrival in the afternoon posted .two 
brigades of Steinwehr's division in reserve at that point 
where he also established his headquarters. of tin- corps 
artillery, two batteries were posted north of the town near 
the Carlisle road; one was posted on the right of the line, 
four of its guns on Barlow's Knoll; one was held in reserve 
near the town; and the other was held in reserve on Cemetery 
Hill. 

Dev in's cavalry brigade, which was relieved by the XI 
corps, assembled east of Rock Creek near the Hanover road. 
In the afternoon it moved through the town to Gamble's 
position, just before the town was captured. 

THE AFTERNOON ENGAGEMENT. 

Before the battle was renewed in the afternoon, General 
Hill, with Pender's division, had reached the field from the 
west, and General Ewell with Bodes" division, from the 
north. At the opening of the battle Early's division had not 
arrived. 

The infantry attack, which began probably about 2.30 
p.m.. was preceded by artillery fire. Two batteries of Bodes' 
divisional artillery opened ou Cutler's and Stone's brigades 
from the west side of Oak Hill and compelled Cutler to fall 
back to Shead's grove and Stone to change front with two of 
his three regiments, from west to north; the other was con- 
cealed by the McPherson barn. The other two batteries of 
Bodes' division were sent to the plain east of Oak E^d^e. Pen- 
der's batteries were placed on the ridge west of Willoughby 
Run between the Cashtown and Fairfield roads. 



60 

In the afternoon of July 1 the brigades of A (Rowley) and 
Meredith were attacked by the divisions of Heth and Pender; 
the brigades of Cutler, Paul and Baxter were attacked by 
those of O'Neal, Iverson, Daniel and Kaniseur; Stone's 
brigade, being at the angle, was engaged both by Daniel and 
Brockenb rough ; the first and third divisions of the XI 
corps were attacked first by Dole's brigade, and later by that 
brigade reinforced by Early's division. 

General Hill, in making his attack, placed Heth's di- 
vision in the first line, and Pender's in the second. Heth 
formed his brigades also in two lines, placing the brigades 
of Archer, Pettigrew and Brockenbrough in the first line 
and Davis in reserve. Archer, being threatened in flank by 
Gamble, did not attack. As a result only two of Heth's 
brigades were in contact with the enemy, while General 
Doubleday had all three of his brigades in the front line. 
Even Brockenbrough did not attack simultaneously with 
Pettigrew; the latter therefore struggled alone for some time 
with Meredith and Rowley. Doubleday was therefore able 
to check i lie advance of Hill's corps until about 3.45 p.m., 
when Pender's division was ordered to the front and the 
brigades of Scales, Perrin and Lane were formed for the 
attack. With this new line Hill was able to carry Seminary 
Ridge, but not before the escape of most of the troops, whose 
line of retreat would have been compromised by its earlier 
loss. The brigades of Meredith, Stone and Rowley retreated 
to Cemetery Hill, where they were posted by General Han- 
cock. The retreat was protected by Buford, who first de- 
ployed Gamble's brigade on Seminary Ridge south of the 
Fairfield road to cover the left flank, and later reunited his 



61 

command and threatened to take in flank any force crossing 
the valley in his front. 

General Rodes, in making his attack, placed O'Neal's 
brigade across Oak Ridge and extended his line to the right 
by Iverson's brigade. Daniel's brigade was in echelon in 
rear of Iverson, and Ramseur in reserve in rear of Daniel. 
In attacking the right wing of the I corps it was necessary 
for Rodes' division to make a complete wheel to the left. This 
brought Iverson in the angle between Shead's grove and Oak 
Rddge and exposed him to the front fire of Paul's brigade 
from the stone wall and to the enfilade fire of Cutler. Rodes' 
attack was therefore wholly unsuccessful. O'Neal was 
repulsed by Baxter, who had the cover of a sunken road; 
Iverson was badly cut up by Cutler and Paul; and Daniel 
was diverted from his point of attack by Stone's brigade, 
which seized the opportunity, moved up to the railroad cut 
and took him in flank. He therefore became engaged with 
Stone over the possession of the cut. Doubleday's right 
wing easily held its line, until the retreat of the XI corps 
on its right compelled it to fall back. The troops then re- 
treated along the foot of the ridge to the town and with the 
remainder of the I corps went to Cemetery Hill. 

Doles' brigade of Rodes' division was for some time en- 
gaged alone with the XI corps and was obliged to call to its 
assistance one of the batteries from the west slope of Oak 
Hill. About 3 p.m., however, Early's division appeared on 
the Heidlersburg road on its left. Early at once established 
twelve guns to fire on Wilkeson's battery on Barlow's Knoll 
and enfilade Barlow's line. At the same time he deployed his 
brigades for attack; Hays' brigade across the road, Gordon 



62 

( (uhma) 

on his right, Hokexm his left, and Smith in reserve. In this 
formation he advanced; Gordon assaulted and captured Bar- 
low's Knoll, while Hays and Hoke advanced on his left to cut 
off the retreat of the XI corps. At this stage General 
Howard sent Coster's brigade from his reserve along the 
Heidlersburg road to the edge of the town to check the ad- 
vance of Hays and Hoke and give time for his line to fall 
back to Cemetery Hill. The Union forces were now all fall- 
ing back, and while there was much disorder in the town 
and many of the 1 and XI corps were captured, still the re- 
treat was sufficiently orderly to permit a new line to be estab- 
lished on Cemetery Mill, overlooking the town, with Colonel 
Smith's Union brigade of the XI corps as its center. 

The retreat of the Union troops was followed by the 
advance to the town of all of EwelFs brigades, save one; 
General \Y. Smith's Confederate brigade remained on the 
York road, probably because Kilpatrick was reported mov- 
ing in along that road. Although in some confusion, both 
Early and Rodes awaited orders to attack Cemetery Hill. 
About this time General Lee reached Seminary Ridge and 
sent word to General Ewell to take Cemetery Hill, if he felt 
able to do so. General Ewell saw that the position had al- 
ready been prepared for the defense and was held by a strong 
line of infantry and artillery. As he could not use his ar- 
tillery against it, and as his troops had been either march- 
ing or fighting all day. he decided to delay the attack until 
the arrival of Johnson's division, which was momentarily 
expected ; in the meantime he would reconnoiter the position. 
As Johnson did not come up before dark, the attack was not 
renewed. 



68 



Not receiving orders to move on Cemetery Hill, General 
Hill remained with Heth's and Pender's divisions on Sem- 
inary Ridge. 

That night Heth and Pender bivouacked on the west 
slope of Seminary Ridge; Bodes along the Fairfield road be- 
tween the Seminary Ridge and the town; Hays and Hoke^in 
the fields east of the town; and Gordon, W. Smith and 
Jenkins' cavalry east of Rock Creek. 

In the battle of July 1 the I corps bore the brunt of 
the attack and was assailed by at least twice its numbers. 
Rodes gives the strength of his infantry at Carlisle as 8,065 
[•resent for duty. Excluding Doles' brigade he had 6,271 
infantry and a battalion of artillery. (W. R. No. 44, p. 564.) 
The divisions of Hetli and Pender of Hill's corps, with their 
artillery battalions, must have brought the number available 
for attacking the I corps to at leas! 20,000. The strength 
of the I corps is given in the returns of June 30 as 10,355 
present for duty. 

The losses were correspondingly heavy. The casualties 
of this corps in the battle of Gettysburg, most of which oc- 
curred on July 1, were: 

Killed. Wounded. Captured and Missing. 

1st division 299 1.229 027 

2nd division ill 616 983' 

3rd division 265 1,297 511 



Total 655 3,112 2,151 

— 5,948 

33.6 per cent, in killed and wounded. 



64 



The XI corps had present for duty on June 30, 10,576, 
of which only two-thirds, or about 7,000 men, were deployed 
along the line in advance of the town. These were attacked 
by Doles" brigade and Early's division, probably about 9,000 
in all. Their position was rendered untenable by the direc- 
tion of Early's advance. The losses of the two advanced 
divisions in the battle of Gettysburg, most of which occurred 
on July 1, were also heavy. 

Killed. Wounded. Captured and Missing. 

1st division 122 677 507 

3rd division 105 507 332 



65 



CHAPTER VI. 

BATTLE OF JULY 2. 

MOVEMENT OF TROOPS NOT ENGAGED IN BATTLE OF JULY 1. 

Confederate Army. — Early in the morning of July 1, 
Anderson's division of Hill's corps marched from the vicin- 
ity of Fayetteville to Gashtown in pursuance of orders re- 
ceived on the previous day. At the latter place, General 
Anderson heard the artillery of Heth's morning attack and 
an hour later received orders from General Hill to move on 
to Gettysburg. The division reached the field in the after- 
noon shortly after Pender's division moved to attack and 
remained in reserve until the close of the day. 

On the morning of July 1, Johnson's division of Swell's 
corps, which was still west of Fayetteville, started for Cash- 
town with Ewell's trains. In the vicinity of Fayetteville, 
it encountered McLaws' division, which was about to move 
to the same place. General Lee, who was present, gave 
Johnson the right of way and he followed Anderson through 
the gap. The movement of his division through that of 
McLaws caused some delay and it was evening before the 
head of Johnson's column reached Gettysburg. During the 
night his troops were moved across Rock Creek and bivou- 
acked in the fields north of the Hanover Road. 

The divisions of McLaws and Hood of Longstreet's corpg 
followed Johnson through the gap. McLaws' advance was 



6Q 

so delayed by Ewell's wagons that he bivouacked that night 
near the Marsh Creek bridge on the Cashtown road, about 
two miles from Willoughby Run. Here Hood joined him at 
midnight. Hood had left one brigade, Law's, on picket at 
New Guilford, which did not reach him until noon of July 
2. Pickett's division was unable to leave the vicinity of 
Chambersburg until the morning of July 2 and reached 
Marsh Creek bridge that night. 

On July 1 Stuart with the brigades of Fitz Lee and 
Chambliss marched from Dover, in the vicinity of .York, to 
Carlisle; Hampton stopped ;it Dillsburg. During the night 
Stuart received orders to move on Gettysburg. Hampton's 
brigade, which was in advance, encountered Kilpatrick on the 
evening of the 2nd near Hunterstown. On the morning of 
July 3, Stuart reached Gettysburg with his three brigades 
and about noon moved towards the extreme left of the Con- 
federate line. 

Robertson's two brigades reached Chambersburg on the 
evening of July 2 and bivouacked on the road to Cash- 
town ; on the following day they marched through Cashtown 
to Fairfield. 

Imboden reached Chambersburg on the evening of July 
1 and relieved Pickett; the next day he started for Gettys- 
burg with the trains. 

< ieneral Lee first heard the guns of Gettysburg as he rode 
towards Cashtown at the head of Longstreet's corps about 
noon of July 1. Hastening to the field he reached Bill's 
corps about 2 :30 p.m. 

Union Army. — General Meade was at Taneytown on 
July 1, and received his rirst information of the battle about 



67 

1 p.m., when he learned of the death of General Reynolds. 
At this time the II corps was at Taneytown and he was 
explaining his proposed position on Pipe Creek to its com- 
mander, General Hancock. Since General Hancock was 
fully acquainted with his plans, he sent him at once to 
Gettysburg to take command of the I, III and XI corps and 
to examine the site. If under the existing circumstances 
General Hancock found the field a better one (than Pipe 
Creek), he was to notify General Meade, who would order 
up the remaining troops. (W. r. no. 45, p. 461.) 

General Hancock proceeded to Gettysburg and arrived 
about the time the Union forces were falling back. He at 
once established a new line along the crest of Cemetery Hill, 
extending to the east and south. About 5 :30 p.m. he sent a 
written report to General Meade, in which he reported that 
he had taken up a position in the cemetery which could not 
well be taken. It was a position, however, which could be , 
readily turned. He reported General Slocum coining up and 
probably General Sickles. He stated that the ground ap- 
peared to him not unfavorable for a battle with good troops. 

(W. R. No. 45, p. 366.) 

Upon the receipt of this communication, General Meade 
decided to concentrate at Gettysburg, towards which point 
many of his troops were already marching. 

The II corps started towards Gettysburg early in the 
afternoon on the Taneytown road, to protect the flank of the 
I corps should it retreat to Emmitsburg. This corps reachd 
a point three miles south of Gettysburg after dark and there 
bivouacked for the night. 

The 111 corps was ordered to the front on the afternoon 



68 



of July 1, by General Howard. This order was modified 
by General Meade, who directed that a division be left at 
Emmitsburg to guard that point. General Birney left one 
brigade at Emmitsburg and with the other two marched 
directly towards Gettysburg, reaching the left of the field 
after dark. General Humphreys also left one brigade at 
Emmitsburg and with the other two marched on a parallel 
road to the westward which entered the Emmitsburg road at 
the Peach Orchard. Being led astray by his guide, General 
Humphreys did not reach the field until 1 A.M., July 2. 
As soon as General Meade decided on the concentration at 
Gettysburg, he ordered the two brigades of the III corps, left 
at Emmitsburg, to join their divisions. They reached the 
field about 9 a.m. July 2. 

The V corps, which had reached Hanover about 5 p.m., 
received orders that night to move towards Gettysburg. The 
first and second divisions made a night inarch and reached 
Bonneauville, or Bonaughton, at midnight; they were on the 
march again at 4 a.m., and reached the enemy's position, on 
the Hanover road, at 7 a.m. The third division joined the 
other divisions about noon. 

In the afternoon of July 1, before ordering the concen- 
tration, General Meade decided that the VI corps was too far 
east and ordered it to move to the Taneytown road. Later 
he sent orders to the corps to move straight to Gettysburg. 
This corps made a forced night inarch and reached the field 
between 4 and 6 p.m.. July 2, by the Baltimore pike. 

The XII corps reached Two Taverns, on the Baltimore 
pike, five miles from Gettysburg, at 11 a.m. on July 1. In the 
afternoon General Slocum received notice from General 



69 

Howard that Hill and Ewell were both marching on Gettys- 
burg and that the left wing of the army was engaged. At 
3 :30 p.m.,, General Slocum moved to Gettysburg and reached 
the field at 5 o'clock. The first division, on approaching Rock 
Creek, was moved to the Hanover road and* threatened 
Swell's left; it was later bivouacked on the Baltimore pike 
just east of Rock Creek. The second division crossed the 
creek and bivouacked near the Round Tops. 

On the morning of July 2, General Buford, with the 
cavalry brigades of Gamble and Devin, was ordered to 
Taneytown to collect the trains left there and take them to 
Westminster; he left the field about 9 A.M. General D. McM. 
Gregg, with the brigades of Irvin Gregg and Mcintosh, was 
ordered to Gettysburg and reached the field about noon; he 
was posted on the extreme right of the line on the Hanover 
road. 

Kilpatrick's division spent the 1st and 2nd of July in 
reconnoitering the country north of the York road and on the 
evening of the 2nd encountered Hampton's brigade at Hun- 
terstown. That night his division bivouacked at Two 
Taverns. 

General Meade remained at Taney town itntil he had 
dispatched the final orders for concentration to the III, V 
and VI corps. He then rode to Gettysburg and reached 
Cemetery Hill shortly after midnight July 1. 

RESUME. 

On the morning of July 2, General Lee had, in the im- 
mediate vicinity of Gettysburg, all of Ewell's and Hill's 



70 



corps, and two divisions of Long-street's corps less one 
brigade, or thirty-three infantry brigades in all. Of these 
sixteen had not been engaged in the battle of July 1. He 
had also one brigade of cavalry. 

At the same time General Meade had in the vicinity of 
Gettysburg all of the I, II, XI and XII corps, four brigades 
of the III and six brigades of The V corps. In all he had 
thirty-nine infantry brigades, of which only twelve had been 
engaged in the battle of the 1st. In addition he had Buford's 
two cavalry brigades. Although numerically stronger on 
paper, it is probable that there was little difference 1 in the 
numerical strength of the two forces, as the Union army had 
been making long marches in a friendly country since June 
-Nth, and there were many stragglers. The Confederate 
army, being in a hostile country, had few stragglers. 

At noon Law's brigade had joined Longstreet's corps, 
the two brigades left at Emmitsburg had joined the III 
corps, ami its third division had joined the V corps; Lee 
therefore had thirty-four brigades and Meade forty-three. 
During this morning also Gregg's two cavalry brigades and 
the reserve artillery of the Union army reached the field, 
but Buford's two brigades marched to Taneytown. 

About 4 p.m. the VI corps began to arrive, and at dark 
all the infantry of both armies was on or near the field. 

BATTLEFIELD OF JULY l' AND 3. 

The field occupied by the opposing corps on the 2nd and 

3rd of July lies south of the Fairfield and the Hanover roads. 

Its western limit is Willoughby Run; its eastern limit 



71 

is Rock Greek, from a point three miles south of Gettysburg 
northward to the bridge on the Baltimore pike; thence the 
eastern limit is the wooded ridge which passes through IVolf 
Hill and crosses the Hanover road about a mile east of Rock 
Creek. The field is traversed by three of the highways over 
which the Union army reached the field; the Emmitsburg, 
the Taney town and the Baltimore roads. These are connect- 
ed by various cross roads, the principal of which is the 
Wheatfleld road, running from the Peach Orchard on the 
Emmitsburg road, eastward to the Taneytown road, where 
it connects with a road running to the bridge over Rock 
Creek on the Baltimore pike. From the Teach Orchard the 
road runs westward to Willoughby Run, whence a branch 
road runs to Black Horse Tavern on the Fairfield road. 

The field is traversed by various ridges which separate 
the watersheds of Rock Creek, Willoughby Run and their 
various tributaries. 

The principal of these ridges are East Cemetery and 
Gulp's Ridge, Cemetery and Round Top Ridge, Emmitsburg 
Road Ridge, Seminary Ridge and Snyder's Ridge. 

Hast Cemetery and Gulp's Ridge, now followed by 
Slocum Avenue, runs eastward from Cemetery Hill to Gulp's 
Hill and thence parallel to the Baltimore pike to Spangler's 
Spring. Each of the hills commands the field to the north 
by about one hundred feet. The lowest point of the connect- 
ing ridge is about fifty feet lower than the summits of the 
hills. From Gulp's Hill the crest of the ridge slopes gradu- 
ally downwards to Spangler's Spring, where the ridge ter- 
minates. Gulp's Hill and the ridge to the south was covered 
by a thick growth of timber and was strewn with boulders. 



72 



In rear of Gulp's Hill is a valley followed by the Baltimore 
pike. This valley and the ridge south of Culp's Hill is com- 
manded by Power's Hill, in the angle between the Baltimore 
pike and the School House road, and by the high ground 
between the Baltimore and Taneytown roads. 

Cemetery and Found Top Ridge, now followed by Han- 
cock, Sedgwick and Sykes Avenues, runs southward from 
Cemetery Hill to Big Round Top. From Cemetery Hill, as 
far southward as the intersection of Plum Run and the Em- 
mitsburg road, near Codori's house, this ridge is very clearly 
denned and commands all the ground to Seminary Ridge 
on its west. From this point southward, as far as the Round 
Tops, it is broken, wooded and the field of view is limited by 
the ridge followed by the Emmitsburg road. Big Round. 
Top is the most conspicuous elevation in the vicinity of 
Gettysburg. Tt is a conical peak, covered by a thick growth 
of timber and innumerable boulders, which rises one hundred 
and fifty feet above Cemetery Hill. Little Round Top is a 
rocky ridge about fifty feet higher than Cemetery Hill, and 
is separated from Big Round Top by a wooded depression 
about forty feet lower than Little Round Top. From Little 
Round Top the view is limited only by Seminary and Snyder's 
ridges. At the time of the battle the slope in front of Little 
Round Top was cleared of timber. 

Snyder's Ridge is the prolongation of the ridge between 
the Cashtown and Fairfield roads just west of Willoughby 
Run. It crosses the Emmitsburg road about three-quarters 
of a mile south of the Peach Orchard. 

Seminar)/ Ridge, south of the Fairfield road, is a pro- 
longation of the same ridsre north of that road. It runs 



73 

nearly parallel to the Einniitsburg road until it intersects 
Snyder s Ridge. 

Seminary and Snyder s Ridges are now followed by Con- 
federate Avenue. 

The Enimitsburg Road Ridge begins just west of that 
road, near the crossing of Plum Run and terminates near 
the intersection of the Emmitsburg-Wheatfleld roads. It 
is now followed by Sickles Avenue. 

Devil's Den is a hill on the opposite side of Plum Run, 
in front of Little Round Top and commanded by it. The 
Loop is a rocky salient of the ridge between Devil's Den and 
the Peach Orchard and midway between them. The Wheat- 
field is an open field almost surrounded by woods which lies 
behind the line connecting Devil's Den and The Loop. 

Brinkerhoff Ridge, east of Rock Creek, is a ridge ex- 
tending from Rock Creek across the Hanover road; Wolf 
Hill, on this ridge, is about twenty-five feet higher than 
Gulp's Hill. In the angle between Rock Creek and the Han- 
over Road and south of the road is Benners Hill, whose ele- 
vation is fifty feet less than Culp's Hill. i 

At the time of the battle, Wolf Hill, Culp's Hill, Big- 
Round Top, and nearly all the field in front of Big Round 
Top, Devil's Den and The Loop, were covered by trees and 
undergrowth. 

Plum Run is a branch of Rock Creek, whose valley sepa- 
rates Devil's Den from the Round Tops; a branch valley also 
separates Devil's Den and The Loop from the Emmitsburg 
road. Pitzers Run is a small branch of Willoughby Run, 
which is nearly parallel to Seminary Ridge, and has two 
small dry branches which intersect that ridge. 



74 

UNION LINE ON THE MORNING OF JULY 2. 

General Meade arrived on the field shortly after mid- 
night of July 1 and at once proceeded to study the position 
and decide on the proper disposition of the troops. 

The XI corps was left in its position of the previous 
evening-. Its artillery was on the crest of Cemetery Hill and 
its infantry on the slope in advance; one division west of 
the Taneytown road, one between the Taneytown and Balti- 
more roads, and one to the right of the Baltimore road. 

The I corps, now commanded by General Newton, had 
one division, Wadsworth's, on the right flank of the XI ex- 
tending the line towards Culp's Hill; the other divisions 
formed a reserve, in rear of the XI corps. 

The second division of the XII corps, being relieved 
by the III corps, was marched from the vicinity of the Round 
Tops lo Culp's Hill and there put in position on the right of 
the 1 corps. Its line extended from the summit of the hill 
nearly as far as Spangler's Spring; two brigades being in 
the first line and one in the second. The first division of 
the XII corps, being relieved on the east side of Rock Creek 
by the V corps, was posted on the right of the second division, 
extending the line along the creek. One brigade was to the 
left of Spangler's Spring and the others to the right. Five 
guns were placed on Culp's Hill in the afternoon of that day. 

The first and second divisions of the A' corps arrived on 
the Hanover Road, east of Brinkerhoff Ridge, at 7 a.m.; 
they remained east of Rock Creek until Gregg's cavalry di- 
vision arrived in that vicinity abont noon; the two divisions, 
now joined by the third, then took post as a reserve on the 



west bank of Rock Creek, where the roads fork to Cemetery 
Hill and Little Round Top. 

The II corps marched to the field early in the morning 
and was posted on the left of the XI corps, extending the 
line towards Little Round Top; the third division on the 
right, the second in the center, and the first on the left. Each 
division had one brigade in the second line. The corps artil- 
lery was placed in the intervals between the brigades of the 
first line. 

In the morning, the III corps was bivouacked in mass 
along the Taney town road, north of Little Round Top. Be- 
ing ordered to relieve Geary's division (if the XII corps and 
extend tin 1 line of the 11 corps southward, the first division 
was extended to Little Round Top. In this position the 
■corps was joined, between and 10 a.m.. by the brigades 
which had been left at Emmitsburg. About noon the 
second division was moved to a line in front of Plum Run 
and deployed in three lines. The front of the corps now 
extended from Little Round Top to a point in front of the 
II corps. The picket line of the corps was along the Emmits- 
burg road. 

The VI corps did not reach the field during the morning. 

CONFEDERATE POSITION. 

Because of the absence of his cavalry, General Lee was 
wholly in ignorance as to the positions of all the corps of 
the Union army, save the I ami the XI corps. As the Union 
line from Cemetery Hill eastward appeared to be a strong 
one, on the evening of July 1 General Lee ordered General 



76 

Ewell to move his corps to the right of Hill, if it could not be 
used to advantage where it was. Two of EwelFs aids had, 
however, been on Culp's Hill in the early evening and re- 
ported it unoccupied; as this hill was an important tactical 
point, Ewell was allowed to remain to secure it. At midnight, 
therefore, Ewell directed Johnson to occupy this hill if he 
had not already done so; but the latter, on sending out a 
reconnoitering party, found it occupied by a regiment of the 
I corps. While the reconnoitering party was out, Johnson 
captured a message from General Sykes to General Meade, 
saying that he would reach the field at daylight by the Han- 
over road. As this would bring the V corps on his Hank and 
rear, Johnson decided to await further orders before attack- 
ing Gulp's Hill. 

General Lee had decided to make his main attack on 
July 2 with his right wing, as the ground here seemed favor- 
able for offense. The main attack was to be made by Long- 
street with the three divisions not employed on the preceding 
day; those of McLaws, Hood and Anderson. As it was too 
late to move E well's corps to their support after the latter 
found he could not take Gulp's Hill without fighting, General 
Lee ordered him to make a demonstration at the time of 
Longstreet's attack, and convert it into a regular attack if 
possible. General Hill was to occupy the center and threat- 
en attack, to prevent the reinforcement of the wing's of the 
Union army. 

In the morning, the position of the Confederate army was 
as follows: East of Rock Greek were Johnson's division of 
four brigades north of the Hanover road, and Gordon's and 
Smith's brigades of Earlv's division near the York road. 



77 



Between Rock Creek and the town were the brigades of 
Hoke and Hays. In the town, and extending along the Fair- 
field road to Seminary Ridge, were the brigades of Doles, 
Iverson and Ramseur; to their right and rear, along the 
railroad, were those of Daniel and O'Neal. Pender's division 
was along Seminary Ridge, its left resting on the Fairfield 
road. Heth's division was near Pender's; Anderson's di- 
vision was in rear of Willoiighby Run ; McLaws' and Hood's 
divisions were near Marsh Creek on the Cashtown road. 

It was General Lee's intention to make the attack in 
the morning as early as possible, but there were unavoidable 
delays due to the necessary examination of the position and 
the movement of the troops into place. 

In the morning Anderson's division was moved from 
Wdlloughby Run and deployed in a single line along Semi- 
nary Ridge south of Pender's division, thus relieving Heth's 
division, which was moved back to Willoiighby Run. The 
brigade of Wilcox, which formed his right, was beyond 
Spangler's grove. In reaching this position, this brigade, 
about 11.45 a.m., encountered details from two regiments of 
sharp-shooters and the 3rd Maine infantry, sent by General 
Sickles on a reconnaissance. At the time, these troops were 
in the woods on Snyder's Ridge south of Pitzer's Run. The 
Union troops were compelled to fall back to the Emmitsburg 
road. 

In the morning, Longstreet's divisions were moved from 
Marsh Creek to a position near Black Horse Tavern, but 
north of the Fairfield road. About noon, being joined by 
Law's brigade, they started to march by a road leading from 
Black Horse Tavern direct to Willoughbv Run. After mov- 



78 

ing for some distance along this road it was apparent that 
the column would come in full view. of Big Round Top. As 
it was desired to have the attack in the nature of a surprise, 
the column was countermarched to a point midway between 
the Cashtown and Fairfield roads, moved into the valley of 
Willoughby Run from that point, and then down the valley 
to the right of Anderson's division. Here the divisions were 
deployed in line behind the belt of woods which crowned 
Snyder's Ridge. In the front line, from right to left, were 
the brigades of Law, Robertson, Kershaw and Barksdale; 
in the second line those of Benning, Anderson, Semmes and 
VVofford. The center of McLaws' division was the road lead- 
ing to the Peach Orchard; that of Hood, the Emmitsburg 
mad. Alexander's battalion of corps artillery was in the 
center of McLaws' division, and Cabell's on his right. One- 
half of Anderson's divisional artillery was between Wilcox 
and McLaws. Two batteries of Henry's artillery were on the 
extreme righl of the line. The development of the troops for 
battle was nol c pleted until 4 p. m. 

CHANGE OP POSITION OF THE III CORPS. 

On the morning of July 2, General Meade's head- 
quarters were near the Cemetery and he was occupied almost 
wholly in establishing the lines of the I, 1 1, XI and XII corps. 
He proposed an attack on Ewell's corps by tin- XII corps, re- 
inforced by the V corps, but upon reconnoitering the position, 
General Slocum, commander of the XII corps, and General 
Warren, the chief engineer of tin' army, both reported against 
it. At this time all of the Confederates visible in the field w^v 



79 



in front of the positions occupied by the I, II, XI and XII 
corps. All of Bn ford's cavalry had, by a misunderstanding, 
been sent away from the left of the line by General Pleasan- 
ton, a fact that General Meade was not aware of until in- 
formed by General Sickles about noon; orders were at once 
sent to have it replaced. This order could not be complied 
with, however, until the following- day. For information as 
to the movements of the Confederates on the left, General 
Meade had to rely on the signal station on Little Round Top. 
The first report sent by the signal station of operations on 
the left flank was made at 11 :4o a.m., when Wilcox's skir- 
mishers were sighted. At 11.55 a. m. the signal station re- 
ported the 111 corps skirmishers falling back. (w. r. no. 45, p. 

487.) 

The movement of Longstreet's corps towards the Union 
left flank was apparently not discovered by anyone, until his 
skirmishers appeared in the woods along Snyder's Ridge at 
4 :00 o'clock. At 1 :30 P.M. the signal station reported a large 
force, 10,0(10 strong, moving from the extreme left to the 
right, and at 2:10 p.m. added that the troops were moving 
towards Heir's tavern on the Cashtown road. (W. r. No. 
45, p. 488.) This column was evidently Longstreet's making- 
its countermarch. 

On the morning of July 2, the III corps was bivouacked 
in mass east of Plum Run near what is now the junction 
of Hancock and United states avenues; Humphreys' division 
was on the right, Birney's on the left. On the right of 
Humphreys was Caldwell's division of the II corps; on the 
left of Birnev was Geary's division of the XII corps. Some 



80 



of Geary's troops were ou Little Round Top, but the division 
was in bivouac rather than in position. 

The instructions sent to General Sickles by General 
Meade were to form line of battle on the ground occupied by 
Geary's division connecting on the right with the II corps 
and extending the left to the Round Tops if practicable. In 
the morning therefore when Geary moved away and went 
to Culp's Hill, Birney deployed his division to cover the 
front between Humphreys' division and Little Round Top. 
The two brigades left at Emmitsburg joined the corps be- 
tween 9 and 10 a.m.. and shortly thereafter a staff officer 
came from General Meade's headquarters In sec if the Til 
corps was in position. 

The ground occupied by the III corps was rough and 
wooded; to its front were the woods extending from Devil's 
Den along the farther side of the W-heatfield and thence 
in a fringe eastward along Plum Run. It was commanded 
by the Emmitsburg road ridge, which limited the view in 
this direction. In front of the Emmitsburg road ridge, where 
the III corps had its skirmish line, was open country in all 
directions as far as Seminary and Snyder's ridges. 

Being impressed by the defects <>f his position and the 
advantages of the Emmitsburg road ridge, General Sickles 
rode to General Meade's headquarters to request General 
Meade either to examine the ground in front of the III corps 
himself or to send his chief engineer, General Warren. 

Unfortunately General Meade did not anticipate an at- 
tack on his left and did not feel that either he or Warren 
could go. However, at that moment General Hunt, chief of 
artillery, came in, and he was requested by General Meade 



81 • 

to accompany Sickles" It was 11 a.m. when the two officers 
rode towards the Peach Orchard to examine Sickles' pro- 
posed line. General Hunt was impressed by the favorable 
position it would give the enemy if abandoned to him, but 
also by the difficulties attendant on its occupation by the 
III corps. He saw that the right flank of the III corps would 
be in the air and that its front would be too long for its 
effective strength. He also noted the woods on Snyder's 
Ridge in front of the Peach Orchard and suggested that a 
reconnoitering party be sent into them. It was this party 
that met Wilcox about noon. 

General Hunt would not take the responsibility of 
authorizing General Sickles to move to his proposed line, but 
said he would report the matter to General Meade. While 
awaiting the orders he hoped and expected to receive, Gen- 
eral Sickles advanced Humphreys' division beyond Plum 
Run and deployed it in three lines, one brigade in each. 

As Anderson was now in force in the woods in his front, 
it was apparent to General Sickles that he must either 
occupy the Emmitsburg road ridge at once or abandon all 
hope of occupying it, as the Confederates would soon drive 
back his skirmish line. Believing he would be sustained in 
his action he therefore advanced his whole line. 

Ward's brigade of Birney's division was advanced to 
Devil's Den and the woods to its right, and a battery was 
placed on the Den. De Trobriand's brigade was advanced 
to the Loop and the woods in that vicinity. Graham's brigade 
was advanced to Peach Orchard cross roads. As Birney's 
line was loug, he was given Burling's brigade of Humphreys' 
division as a reserve. The movement was completed by ad- 



82 



vancing Humphreys' division to the Emmitsburg road. 
Along the Emmitsburg road were placed three batteries of 
artillery, and a fourth was placed along the Wheatfleld road 
east of the cross roads. The general line of the III corps is 
now marked by Sickles Avenue. The troops had just reached 
their new positions when Longstreet's artillery appeared in 
their front. 

General Meade was not aware of this movement of the III 
corps, since General Hunt had reported to him that he had 
advised General Sickles not to move his troops unless au- 
thorized by General Meade. A meeting of the corps com- 
manders was ordered for the afternoon of July 2 in 
anticipation of the arrival of General Sedgwick with the VI 
corps. General Meade had already ordered the V corps 
to move to the left of the line to make way for tin 1 VI corps. 
As General Sickles approached General Meade's headquar- 
ters, Longstreet's artillery opened fire. lie at once returned 
to his corps and was followed by General Meade. The latter 
appreciated the impossibility of withdrawing the III corps 
under tire and therefore confined himself to reinforcing it. 
General Sykes was ordered to support Sickles with the V 
corps and Caldwell's division of the II corps. When at about 
6 p.m.. the whole advance line gave way, he ordered up the 
XII corps. 

General Hunt was directed to assist Sickles with artil- 
lery and at once sent forward McGilvery's brigade, of which 
two batteries were posted in the Peach Orchard, and two on 
the Wheatfleld road to its right and rear facing south. 

THE CONFEDERATE ATTACK. 

General Lee, whose headquarters were at the Seminary, 



83 

had not reeonnoitered the field of attack since morning. He 
was under the impression that the main Union line lay along 
the EmmitsbuTg road. His plan was therefore to form Long- 
street's divisions across this road beyond the Union left flank 
and then sweep forward along the road. Although the con- 
ditions were found by Longstreet, who had personal charge 
of the attack, to differ somewhat from those upon which the 
movement was based, he did not feel justified in changing 
the plans already made. After the preliminary artillery at- 
tack, the brigades were to move forward in echelon from 
right to left and then each face to the left and move parallel 
to the Emmitsburg road. 

The artillery opened about 4 p.m. and immediately there- 
after Law's brigade moved forward; the movement was car- 
ried along very slowly to the left, which did not move until 
about 6 p.m. 

Law's brigade, followed by Robertson's, moved through 
the open fields in front of the extreme right of the Confeder- 
ate line south of Devil's Den. At Devil's Den the left two- 
regiments of Robertson's brigade became involved with the 
troops behind a stone wall in the woods at its foot, while the 
others moved on with Law's brigade to attack Little Round 
Top. 

About 4 p.m. General Warren, who had accompanied 
General Meade to Sickles' position, ascended Little Round 
Top, which was then unoccupied by troops, and caught the 
reflection of the bayonets of Hood's division as it was pre- 
paring to move. Being impressed by the importance of the 
hill, he at once hurried off to meet the advancing V corps 
and secured Vincent's brigade for its protection. Later when 



84 

the next division arrived, Weed's brigade and Hazlett's bat- 
ten were sent to the same position. Vincent was hardly in 
position when Law's column attacked the hill in front and 
on the left flank; desperate fighting here continued until 
dark, but the Confederates were continually repulsed. After 
dark some regiments of Vincent's and Fisher's brigades 
seized and occupied Big Round Top. At Little Round Top 
both of the brigade commanders, Vincent and Weed, and 
the battery commander, Hazlett, were killed. 

Robertson, with his two left regiments, encountered a 
vastly superior force at Devil's Den and several times sent 
back for assistance. At last the brigades of Anderson and 
Benning came to his relief. This force drove Ward's brigade 
from the hill and captured most of the guns. 

Kershaw's brigade moved from its position in line di- 
rectly on the Loop, occupied by De Trobriand's brigade. In 
moving forward, however, it received the fire of some Union 
troops in the Peach Orchard and from the batteries along 
the Wheal held road. This diverted his left regiments to 
their left and he reached the knoll too weak to carry it and 
was driven hack. Some time later Semmes' brigade came up 
on his right and Wofford's on his left and together they 
carried the Loop. The Confederates now had a continuous 
line extending from Devil's Den diagonally to the Wheat- 
field road. This line now wheeled gradually to the right 
and ended the day by an unsuccessful assault on Little 

Round Top and the ridge to its north. (Battles and Leaders, 
Vol. Ill page 331 ) 

Long-street's artillery having silenced that of the III 

corps, about 6 P.M. Barksdale's brigade moved over the field to 



85 

the north of the cross roads and carried all before him until he 
/cached Plum Run. This advance was participated in bv the 
brigades of Wilcox, (Perry and Wright on his left. With the 
exception of Wright's brigade, all of these brigades were 
stopped near Plum Run ; Wright's brigade carried the main 
Union line in its front, but having no support was compelled 
to retire. 

THE DEFENSE. 

The III corps fought desperately before falling back: 
General Sickles was severely wounded early in the fight and 
General Meade ordered General Hancock to assume command 
of the II and III corps. The Union reserves were sent in 
wherever weakness was developed in the Union line. The 
first and second brigades of Barnes' division of the V corps 
were sent to reinforce de Trobriand's brigade at The Loop; 
the first and second brigades of Ayres' division of regulars of 
the V corps were sent to reinforce Ward's brigade and cover 
the gorge between Devil's Den and Little Round Top; Cald- 
well's division of the II corps was pushed into the Wheat- 
field between the two. All of these troops were, however, 
compelled to fall back when the brigades of Barksdale, 

Wilcox, (Perry; and Wright turned their right. 
• s 

Willard's brigade, which was in the second line of the 
II corps on the afternoon of July 2, was moved to the left 
of the line and there made a countercharge on Barksdale's 
command to recapture some guns in his rear. He encoun- 
tered Barksdale's brigade in the underbrush along Plum 
Run; Barksdale was killed and his brigade was driven back 
towards the Eminitsburg road. In this movement Willard 
was also killed. 



86 

From Harrow's brigade, which was also in the seeouc 
line of the II corps, two regiments were sent about two linn 
tired yards in front of the general line to protect the right 
flank of the III corps; the other regiments were moved to the 
left to protect the batteries left uncovered by Caldwell's 
withdrawal from the main line. It was one of these regi- 
ments, the 1st Minnesota, which was selected by General 
Hancock to make a countercharge on Wilcox's brigade as it 
was emerging from the underbrush along Plum Run near 
the close of the battle; the percentage of loss suffered by this 
regiment in this charge and upon the following day was 
greater than that of any other Union regiment engaged in the 
battle. 

Farther to the left, towards the close of the day, counter- 
charges were made by Crawford's division of the A' corps 
and later about dark by Lockwood's brigade of the XII 
corps. 

When the fighting closed for the day the bri- 
gades of Hood's division held an advanced line along the 
slope of Big Round Top midway between its summit and 
Plum Run. McLaws' division held the woods from Devil's 
Den to the AA'lieatfield road. Longstreet's artillery had ad- 
vanced to the Emmitsburg road. The Union line was that 
now marked by Hancock, Sedgwick and Sykes avenues and 
was that occupied on July 3. 

ewell's attack. 

Ewell's corps was to attack simultaneously with Long- 
street's. It was difficult for this corps to act as a unit, as it 



87 



>\as separated into three parts by the town and by Rock 
Creek. As a result the three divisions acted independently. 
When he heard Longstreet's guns, Johnson established 
his divisional artillery upon Benner's Hill and opened fire 
upon Culp's Hill. These batteries, being exposed to the con- 
centrated fire of the Union guns on Culp's and Cemetery 
Hills, at ranges of one thousand and one thousand four hun- 
dred yards, suffered severely and were eventually withdrawn. 
The infantry was then formed for the attack parallel to the 
YJ&nk Road and was about moving forward when Gregg's 
cavalry brigades attacked Walker's pickets on the Hanover 
road; Walker's brigade was therefore detached to meet him. 

The brigades of Steuart, Nichols and Jones, however, con- 

/\ 

tinned on. 

When the III corps was about to fall back, General 
Sloeum was ordered to send the XII corps to its relief. Not 
wishing to abandon Culp's Hill while threatened by Johnson, 
General Sloeum retained Greene's brigade which was posted 
on its summit. All the other brigades of the XII corps aban- 
doned their trenches to go +o the point of attack. Only 
Lockwood's brigade, however, reached that point in time to 
take part in the action. 

Some time after the XII corps was withdrawn, the bri- 
gades of Steuart, Nichols and Jones, of Johnson's division, 
crossed Rock Creek and took possession of the vacated 
trenches. Only when they attempted to ascend Culp's Hill 
did they meet with any opposition. Here General Greene's 
brigade was protected by a breastwork of stones and logs and 
was able to hold this important position. Aid was sent him 
by the troops on his left. It was dark when the Confederates 



88 



crossed Kock Creek and it was 10 p.m. when lighting ceased 
at this part of the line. Although Johnson's men were close 
to the ammunition train of the Union army near the Balti- 
more road they were unaware of this fact. 

When the different brigades of the XII corps returned 
to their original positions during the night, they found the 
Confederates occupying the line from Culp's Hill to Spang- 
ler*s Spring; they therefore bivouacked in the vicinity and 
waited for daylight to drive the Confederates back across 
the creek. 

To the east of the town, Early had the brigades of Hays 
and Hoke. in the first line and that of Gordon, which had re- 
turned to the town, in the second; Smith's brigade was still 
diit on the York Road. Early was ordered to attack Ceme- 
tery Hill when Johnson attacked Culp's Hill. He moved for- 
ward about dusk and drove the XI corps infantry from the 
stone wall on the slope of I he hill and Hays penetrated the 
batteries on the crest. The attack had by this time become 
so disorganized that the Confederate troops were easily 
driven out by troops sent from the left. In this attack Col. 
Avery, who commanded Hojke's brigade in this campaign, was 
killed. 

When Rodes saw the commotion in the Union line 
caused by the withdrawal of troops and batteries to go to the 
left, he decided to attack and so notified Early. However, 
before IJodes could reach the enemy's line, it was necessary 
for him to withdraw his troops from the town, deploy on a 
new line parallel to the Emmitsburg road, and then advance 
over a long distance His line had not reached the Emmits- 
burg road when he heard of Early's defeat, As it was get- 



89 

l ting dark lie decided thefore to defer his attack and await 
orders. To be ready for an attack in the morning, he biv- 
ouacked his troops along a sunken road parallel to the Em- 
mitsburg road and 600 yards from it. 



COUNCIL OF WAR. 

Being impressed probably by the insecurity of his flanks 
as well as by his losses, General .Meade called for a council 
of his corps commanders on the night of July 2-3. At this 
council the following propositions were voted on : 

1st — Shall the army remain in its present position or 
retire to another nearer its base? 



2nd — If it remains, shall it attack the enemy or await 
the attack of the enemy 

3rd — If it awaits attack, how long should it await such 
attack? 

After some discussion the corps commanders unani- 
mously voted to remain and await an attack for at least one 
day. 

It was therefore decided to strengthen the position for 
defense and on the following morning await attack by Gen- 
eral Lee. 



90 



CHAPTER VIII. 

BATTLE OF JULY 3. 

POSITIONS. 

Union Line. — On the morning of July 3, the Union 
line extended from a point east of Rock Creek on the right, 
to a point beyond Big Round Top on the left. 

On the extreme right, across Rock Creek, north of the 
Baltimore road, was Neill's brigade of the \\ corps, along 
what is now Neill Avenue. Encircling the Confederate 
trenches along Culp's Hill ridge was the XII corps with 
Shaler's brigade of the VI corps. The corps artillery occupied 
Power's Hill and other commanding positions along the line. 
The positions of the XI corps, the first and second divisions 
of the I corps, and the second and third divisions of the 
II corps were as on the preceding day. To the left of the 
second division of the II corps was the third division of 
the I corps. The reserve artillery was next in line, its center 
opposite the School House Road ; intrenched in its rear was 
the first division of the II corps. To its left were two brigades 
of the VI corps. The V corps extended the line to Big- 
Round Top, and two brigades of the VI corps, along what 
is now Wright Avenue, protected the left flank. The III 
corps and the remaining brigades of the VI corps were in 
reserve. The artillery was posted along the line, wherever 
a good position could be found. On the left flank, forming a 
line from Willoughby Run to Big Round Top, were Merritt's 



91 

and Farnsworth's cavalry brigades, under Kilpatrick. On 
the right flank, extending from Wolf Hill or Brinkerhoff 
Ridge to White's G^eek, along the Hanover road, were the 
cavalry brigades of Irvin Gregg, Mcintosh and Custer under 
General D. McM. Gregg. 

Confederate Line. — On the morning of July 3, Jen- 
kins' cavalry brigade was east of Brinkerhoff Ridge between 
the Hanover and York roads. This brigade relieved the in- 
fantry brigades of Smith and Walker, which were sent to 
Johnson. Stuart's cavalry was approaching the field from 
Jenkins' rear. 

Johnson was holding the trenches along Gulp's ridge, 
which he had captured ; he had been reinforced by the 
brigades of Walker and Smith from his rear, and by 
those of Daniel and O'Neal from Rlodes' second line. The 
brigades of Hoke and Hays occupied the town, while Gor- 
don's brigade occupied the ground between the town and 
Rock Creek. 

The brigades of Doles, Iverson and Ramseur, of Rodes' 
division, and those of Perrin and Thomas, of Pender's divis- 
ion, held the sunken road in the valley extending from the 
town parallel to the Emmitsburg road. 

The divisions of McLaws and Hood held the line south 
of the Wheatfield road, extending over Devil's Den to the 
slopes of Big Round Top and thence westward to Willoughby 
Run. 

Along Seminary Ridge between Thomas' brigade on the 
left and McLaws' division on the right, were being assembled 
the divisions of Heth and Pickett in the first line, supported 



92 

by the brigades of Lane, Scales, W right, (Perry) and Wilcox in 
the second line. 

Influenced by his successes of the previous days General 
Lee decided to make another effort to pierce the Union line. 
The attack was to be made simultaneously by Johnson, who 
had been reinforced by the three brigades of Daniel, O'Neal 
and Smith, and by the brigades that were being assembled 
under Longstreet along Seminary Ridge. 

Before his troops were ready to attack, however, John- 
son was himself attacked by General Slocum. 

ATTACK OF THE XII CORPS. 

At daylight the batteries of the XI 1 corps, which had 
taken up commanding positions enveloping the Confederate 
position en Culp's Ridge, opened fire. To this fire Johnson's 
command could make no reply, since he had no positions 
upon which he could establish batteries. The artillery fire 
was followed by an infantry attack, in which Shaler's 
brigade of the VI corps also participated. Though John- 
son made desperate efforts to hold his position, he was com- 
pelled to retire and about 11 a.m. retreated to the position 
from which he had advanced the preceding day. The XII 
then reoccupied its trenches. 

ATTACK ON CEMETERY RIDGE. 

Early in the morning the Confederate infantry and 
artillery began moving in place for the proposed attack on 
Cemetery Ridge. The center of attack selected by General 
Lee was a salient in the line of the IT corps, marked by an 



93 

umbrella-shaped clump of trees between the brigades of 
Webb and Hall of Gibbon's division. A line joining this 
with the salient angle of Spangler's grove on Seminary Ridge 
separated the artillery of Longstreet and Hill, and the divis- 
ions of Heth and Pickett. Both Generals Lee and Longstreet 
viewed the final charge from positions near this line. 

Extending northward from the Peach Orchard cross 
roads, along Emmitsburg road ridge, Colonel Alexander, 
Longstreet's chief of artillery, placed seventy-five guns. Ex- 
tending southward from the Fairfield road along Seminary 
Ridge General Hill had fifty-eight guns and in addition five 
more on the left of Longstreet's artillery. To oppose these 
one hundred and thirty-eight guns and sweep the field over 
which the attack was to be made, the II corps had twenty- 
six guns, the artillery reserve thirty-nine guns, and a rifled 
battery of six guns on Little Round Top; in all seventy-one 
guns. General Hunt, however, had many batteries in reserve. 
The average distance between the opposing lines was about 
three-quarters of a mile. 

Pickett moved his command to the field and placed 
them in and about Spangler's grove. Heth's division was 
moved to the field and place 1 along Seminary Ridge from 
Spangler's grove northward to the grove in rear of the right 
flank of Rodes' advanced line in the valley. The formation 
for the attack is thus described by General Longstreet: 

"Orders w r ere given to Major General Pickett to form his 
line under the best cover that he could get from the enemy's 
batteries and so that the assaulting column would arrive at 
the salient of the enemy's position. General Pickett's line to 
be the guide and to attack the line of the enemv's defenses. 



94 



General Pettigrew, in command of Heth's division, moving 
on the same line as General Pickett, was to assault the sal- 
ient at the same moment. Pickett's division was arranged 
with tAvo brigades in the front line, supported by his third 
brigade. Wilcox's brigade was ordered to move in rear of 
Pickett's right flank to protect it from any force the enemy 
might send against it. 

"Heth's division, under the command of General Petti- 
grew, was arranged in two lines, and these were supported 
by part of General Pender's division, under General 
Trimble." 

At 1 p.m. the signa] guns for the artillery bombardment 
were fired and at once the Confederate artillery opened fire. 
The instructions of General Hunt to the Union artillery were 
to fire slowly and deliberately in reply and not to waste 
ammunition. These instructions were followed by the artil- 
lery reserve, but in the II corps, to save bis infantry from loss 
and demoralization, General Hancock directed his chief 
of artillery to reply vigorously. 

To Colonel Alexander, General Longstreet had assigned 
the responsibility of deciding the moment when the infantry 
was to advance. It was about 1:30 p.m. wheu Alexander 
decided to give the order, lest his ammunition run too low to 
support the attack. Five minutes later the II corps artillery 
ceased firing because it had exhausted all its long range 
ammunition, and the artillery reserve ceased, to keep its 
ammunition for the infantry assault which was expected. A 
few minutes later Alexander urged Pickett to hurry, and the 
latter riding to General Longstreet to have the order con- 
firmed, moved to the attack. When the order was given, 



95 



Pickett had formed his division in front of the grove, in the 
ravines and along the fences north and south of the Spangler 
house. Each brigade was in line; Garnett on the left, 
Kemper on the right, and Armistead in rear. Moving toward 
the point of attack they formed three long lines which could 
be enfiladed from the position of the artillery reserve. 

Along the front of attack and about a hundred yards in 
front of the crest of Cemetery Ridge is a low stone wall pro- 
longed to the south by a rail fence. In rear of this wall and 
fence from right to left were the brigades of Webb, Hall and 
Harrow, each with one regiment behind the crest in rear. 
Along the stone wall were some of the guns of the II corps 
waiting to receive the charge with canister, while on the 
crest in rear were some fresh batteries of the artillery re- 
serve which had replaced those of the II corps. 

To the right of Webb but two hundred and fifty feet to 
his rear was another stone wall parallel to the front which 
protected Smyth's brigade; Willard's was in his rear. A 
battery in Ziegler's grove on Smyth's right swept his front. 

All of the attacking troops moved towards Webb and 
Hall except the brigades of Davis and Brockenbrough, who 
attacked Smyth. 

As the attacking troops converged on this small front, 
the brigades intermingled and it was a mass of mixed units 
led by General Armistead, which finally swept over the wall 
along AYebb's front. Nearly all of these men were killed or 
captured by the Union reserves in rear, or by Hall's and Har- 
row's men on the flanks. 

Seeing that Pickett's column would strike the line on 
his right, Stannard formed two of his regiments in front and 



96 



perpendicular to the general line and took Pickett in flank. 
He captured three regimental flags and many prisoners. 
Davis and Brokenbrough were repulsed by Smyth before 
they reached his wall. 

Pickett's three divisions according to the returns num- 
bered about 5,000 men ; of these 1,389 were killed or wounded, 
and 1,499 were captured. Among the killed were two of his 
brigade commanders, Garnett and Armistead, and among 
the severely wounded, was the third, Kemper. The six brig- 
ades of Heth and Pender having lost severely on July 1, it is 
impossible to give their losses or numbers accurately; they 
probably arrived on the field of Gettysburg with over 10,000 
men. Capt. Young of the 26th X. C. reports that Heth's 
division reached the field of Gettysburg with about 8,000 ef- 
fectives and en the evening of -Inly 3, had but 1,500 or 1,600 
men. His own regiment of Pettigrew's brigade was reduced 
from 800 to 210 on the afternoon of July 1, and to 80 men fit 
for duty on -Inly 3. A major was left to command the brig- 
ade and the regiment was commanded by the only captain 
til for duty. (W. R. Xo. 44, p. 645.) 

General Trimble, who commanded Pender's brigades, 
the latter officer having been wounded, was captured in the 
assault. , 

The brigades of Wilcox, (Perry) and Wright moved out 
after Pickett. Those of Wilcox and (Pbrr$ moved towards 
the position of the artillery reserve ; they reached Plum Run, 
but being subjected to a severe artillery fire and being threat- 
ened by a flank attack of Stannard's brigade, fell back 
to their original positions. Wright's brigade advanced only 
a short distance when it was recalled by General Longstreet. 



97 



After the repulse, the lines were re-formed behind tho 
artillery. 

There was no counter-attack and the day was closed by 
an armed reconnaissance by some brigades of the V and VI 
corps which advanced along the Wheatfield road to the Em- 
mitsburg road, driving back the Confederate troops in their 
front. 

CAVALRY OPERATIONS ON JULY 3. 

OPERATIONS <>X THE IMo\ RIGHT FLANK. 

Union Cavalry. — At noon on July 2, the brigades of 
Mcintosh and Irvin Gregg of General D. McM. Gregg's cav- 
alry division, reached a point on the Hanover road about 
three miles east of Rock Creek, where the Low Dutch, or 
■Salem Church road connects the York, Hanover and Balti- 
more roads. At this time a regiment of the V corps was on 
outpost duty on Brinkerhoff Ridge. At 3 p.m. this regiment 
was relieved by the cavalry and joined its corps. The Con- 
federate outpost on the Hanover road at Brinckerhoff 's Ridge 
was a regiment of Walker's brigade of Johnson's division. 

At G p.m. a reconnoitering squad of fifty men was sent 
forward by the cavalry to develop the Confederate strength. 
This led to an engagement between the Confederate infantry 
and some squadrons of dismounted cavalry on the ridge near 
the Howard house, west of Cress' Run. As Walker's regi- 
ment was repulsed, he reinforced it with his whole brigade 
and was therefore absent that night from tin 1 attack of Gulp's 
Hill. At 10 p.m. the cavalry retired to the Baltimore road 
at White's Run. a mile east of Rock Creek. 



ys 



The orders for July 3, were for Gregg's division to move 
back to the Hanover road to protect the right Hank of the 
army, and Kilpatriek's division, which bivouacked that night 
at Two Taverns, to replace Buford on the left flank. By mis- 
take, Custer's brigade of Kilpatrick's division moved up the 
Low Dutch road to the Hanover road. 

Until noon, Custer remained in the vicinity of the cross- 
roads with outpost squadrons about a mile and a half north 
of it, on both the Low Dutch road and the intersecting road 
connecting the Low Dutch with the York road. Gregg's bri- 
gade was massed about a quarter of a mile south of the Han- 
over road and about the same distance west of Cress' Rum 
He had established a skirmish line extending from the Han- 
over road in front, westward to Wolf Hill where it connected 
with that (if Neill's brigade of the V I corps. Mcintosh's bri- 
gade was massed along the Low Dutch road about a half 
mile behind Custer. Two of his regiments, the 1st Pennsyl- 
vania and the 1st Massachusetts, were absent on detached 
duty. He had been reinforced by a company of Maryland 
cavalry and a platoon of two guns of the 3rd Pa. heavy 
artillery picked up in the march to the field. 

About noon General D. McM. Gregg received a copy of 
a message from General Howard to General Meade informing 
the latter that a large cavalry force was seen marching to- 
wards the right flank of the Union army. At the same time 
General Gregg also received an order from General Pleasan- 
ton to send Custer's brigade to Kilpatrick as originally 
ordered. 

To comply with the latter order Mcintosh's brigade was 
directed to relieve Custer, which it at once proceeded to do. 



99 

Mcintosh replaced Custer's squadrons in the woods at the 
cross roads by the 1st New Jersey, and placed his other two 
regiments, the 1st Maryland and 3rd Pennsylvania, south of 
or in rear of these woods. Custer assembled his brigade and 
prepared to move off the field. 

Confederate Cavalry. — Stuart's cavalry reached the 
vicinity of Gettysburg on the morning of July 3, where he 
was joined by Jenkins' brigade. He spent some hours in 
resting his horses and men, in issuing ammunition, etc. ; then, 
with the brigades of Cham bliss and Jenkins, he moved over 
to the York road and along the intersecting road towards the 
Low Dutch road. He knew from his map that the road he 
was following would enable him to reach the Baltimore 
road, only four miles distant, at a point two miles east of 
Rock Creek. He would thus be in rear of the enemy and on 
his line of communications; the very point from which he 
could make a diversion in favor of General Lee. As he reached 
the bend of the intersecting road at the Stallsmith farm, lie 
halted his column behind the woods and rode into the field 
to scan the country. He saw that the country was open and 
sloped gradually southward. None of the Union cavalry 
was in sight; Gregg's brigade was concealed by the woods 
and ridge on Stuart's right, Mcintosh by the woods at the 
forks of the road, and Custer by distance and minor obstruc- 
tions on the field. Jenkins and Chambliss were placed in 
the woods and a messenger was sent to bring up Lee and 
Hampton. 

The Battle Field. — The field upon which Stuart's cav- 
alry met that of Gregg is about three miles east of Bock Creek 
and lies in the northwest ano-le of the Hanover and Low 



100 

Dutch roads. Its western boundary is Cress' ridge, which 
extends from Granite Hill on the York road to the Hanover 
road at Cress' house; its elevation, where it crosses the road 
by which Stuart advanced, is about one hundred feet higher 
than its elevation at the Hanover road or at the Hanover- 
Low Dutch crossroads. 

The field is traversed by the intersecting- road upon 
which Stuart advanced and by a private road further south 
running- east and west near the Rummel house. The east 
branch of Cress' Run, called Little's Run, rises near this 
road and flows parallel to and a mile west of the Low Dutch 
road. A wood, about four hundred yards long and two hun- 
dred yards wide, extends from the intersecting road on which 
the Confederates reached the field, southward along the ridge. 
This is the wood in which the Confederates were concealed. 
Another wood about four hundred yards square was in the 
southwest angle of the Low Dutch road and its intersecting 
road. In these woods rested the right flank of the Union 
line. Otherwise the ground was open, but divided into fields 
by si one and rail fences, which had to be thrown down for 
mounted maneuvers. 

The Lott house is a half mile from the Hanover road and 
about three hundred yards west of the Low Dutch road. The 
Rummel house with its large frame barn is about a mile from 
the Hanover road and about three hundred yards south of 
the woods in which the Confederates were concealed. 

The Cavalry Fight. — (About 2 p.m., immediately after 
reaching the angle of the road, Jenkins' brigade took posses- 
sion of the Rummel place and Chambliss was put in the 
woods on his left. When Mcintosh observed the troops at 



101 

the Rummel place he sent the 1st New Jersey dismounted to 
develop their strength. Jenkins met this movement, which 
he soon observed, by sending his dismounted troops to oc- 
cup}' the line of fence along Little's Run. Mcintosh sent a 
part of the 3rd Pennsylvania to reinforce the 1st New 
Jersey and the remainder to occupy the woods vacated 
by the 1st New Jersey. He also sent word to General D. 
McM. Gregg that he could not alone hold the enemy with his 
three regiments. The latter thereupon ordered General Ir- 
vin Gregg to move to the Low Dutch road, and ordered 
Custer to remain and support Mcintosh until further orders. 
Upon reaching the field itself and seeing Lee and Hampton 
appear, he ordered Mcintosh's third regiment, the 1st Mary- 
land, to occupy the woods in its front and protect his right 
flank. 

Along Little's Run the Confederate line was strength- 
ened by Chambliss and the line was prolonged to the left by 
skirmishers sent to the front by Hampton and Lee when they 
reached the field. The attacking line was strengthened on 
the left by the 5th Michigan and on the right by a squadron of 
the 6th Michigan. The attack was aided by Pennington's 
and Randol's batteries near the Hanover-Low Dutch cross 
roads, which soon silenced the Confederate battery which ap- 
peared in front of the woods north of Rummel's. 

At length Jenkins' troops, who had only ten rounds of 
ammunition, were compelled to retire and the Union line ad- 
vanced to the creek. Shortly thereafter the Union line re- 
tired for the same reason and was pursued by two of Cham- 
bliss' regiments, the 9th and 13th Va., one mounted and the 



102 



other dismounted. This was the beginning of the mounted 
action. 

The 7th Michigan mounted was sent to protect the right 
flank of the retreating troops and encountered Chambliss' 
regiment in the northwest corner of the field containing the 
Lott house; there the two regiments fought over a stone and 
rail fence. While thus engaged, the 1st Virginia, one of 
General Fitz Lee's regiments, charged down on the right of 
the 7th Michigan and two of Hampton's regiments, the 1st 
N. C. and the Jeff. Davis' legion, on its front and left. The 
7th Michigan fell back and the 1st Virginia almost reached 
(luster's platoon of artillery in rear of the Lott house, when 
it was forced to retire. Hampton's regiments were met by 
the fire of Pennington's artillery and were charged in flank 
by the 5th Michigan. They were also forced back. 

This was followed by the final charge of the remaining 
regiments of Fitz Lee's and Hampton's brigades, save a regi- 
ment of each held in reserve. This attack, made in column 
of squadrons, was met first by the artillery and then 
by the last regiment of Custer's brigade, the 1st Michigan, 
under his personal leadership. The column was charged in 
flank by the squadrons of the 1st New Jersey and 3rd Penn- 
sylvania, which had fought dismounted in the earlier part of 
the engagement and were now again mounted ; and also by 
such scattered troopers as could be collected by General Mc- 
intosh himself. These successive shocks caused the Confed- 
erates to fall back to their original positions and at 5 P.M. 
the fight was over. In this last attack General Hampton was 
seriously wounded. 

Immediately after the fight the Union picket line was 



103 



re-established along the line of Little's Run, which had been 
the scene of the dismounted fighting, and the Confederate 
line was established at Rummers and in the woods to the 
north. 

Irvin Gregg's brigade was not engaged in the fight, but 
was held in reserve along the Low Dutch road south of the 
Hanover road. 

That night Stuart retired to the west of Gettysburg and 
Custer joined Kilpa trick. 

CAVALRY OPERATIONS ON THE UNION LEFT FLANK. 

On the morning of July 3, General Kilpatrick with 
Farns worth's brigade of cavalry moved from Two Taverns to 
the fields southwest of Big Round Top and being joined by 
Merritt's brigade of Buford's division formed a line extend- 
ing from Plum Run to Wjilloughby Run. The right of the 
line rested on a wooded knoll, covered with boulders, which 
is separated from Big Round Top by Plum Run gorge. 
Farnsworth's brigade held this knoll and a line extending a 
short distance to the left; Merritt prolonged his line to Wil- 
loughby Run. One battery of artillery was on the wooded 
knoll and another near the Emmitsburg road. 

To meet this flanking movement, General Law, who now 
commanded Hood's division, sent the 1st Texas of Robert- 
son's brigade to form a line across the valley from Plum Run 
to Snyder's Ridge; this regiment intrenched itself behind the 
stone fences and boulders at the foot of the wooded knoll 
occupied by Farnsworth. Anderson's brigade was also with- 
drawn from the front line and sent to prolong the line of the 



104 ' 

1st Texas to Willoughby Run. The brigades of Robertson 
and Law lay behind stone walls, which they had thrown up 
on the face of Big Round Top parallel to Plum Run. Hood's 
artillery was along Snyder's Ridge behind this line. 

The only operations of note on this flank were the 
mounted charges made by different units of Farnsworth's 
brigade, in the last of which the brigade commander was 
killed. 

The field covered by these charges was limited on the 
south by the wooded knoll, on the east by the Confederate in- 
trenched line along Big Round Top, on the north by the stone 
fence below Devil's Den and on the west by the Confederate 
line on Snyder's Ridge. East of Plum Run the slopes of Big 
Round Top are wooded and covered with boulders, with the 
exception of a small cleared field on the wood road connect- 
ing Big Round Top with the Emmitsburg road. West of 
Plum Run the Held is open, but divided into several small 
tracts by stone and rail fences. It was also swept by the fire 
of the batteries on Snyder's Ridge. In this open field are 
two houses with outbuildings. 

In all the charges the mounted troops were formed to the 
left and rear of the wooded knoll and moved to its left. 

About 5 p.m. General Kilpatrick decided to strike in 
rear the brigades of Law and Robertson and thus make a 
diversion in favor of the Union infantry in their front. He 
first ordered the 1st West Virginia to charge the 1st Texas 
infantry and clear the way. Farnsworth, with the two 
squadrons of the 1st Vermont, was then to charge Law and 
Robertson. 

The 1st West Virginia charged the 1st Texas and oierced 



105 

it* . lines, but as the Confederate regiment was protected by 
walls and fences little damage was done. Immediately 
thereafter the first squadron (four troops) of the 1st Ver- 
mont rode along the north slope of the wooded knoll and 
straight across the fields to the wood road north of the house 
near Plum Run. At the road the squadron turned to the 
right and crossed the run, where it was re-formed near the 
cleared field. The third squadron led by Farnsworth in 
person, followed the first, but skirted the north slope of the 
wooded knoll, crossed Plum Run and rode along the Confed- 
erate line on the slope of Big Round Top as far as the wall 
south of Devil's Den ; here the squadron divided, some of the 
troops riding straight across the open fields to the point of 
starting, while Farnsworth, with others, rode back along the 
Confederate line to the cleared field near which the first 
squadron was rallied; here he was killed. The first squadron 
charged through the cleared field and then turned to the 
right and rode through the gorge between Big Round Top 
and the wooded knoll. 

Two of the Confederate regiments, one of Law's rejn- 
ments east of Plum Run and one of Anderson's west of Plum 
Run, left their trenches and moved to the edge of the woods 
to take the charging columns in flank. 

No movement was made by the Union infantry on Big 
Round Top during these charges, because the field of opera- 
tions was not visible from the infantrv line. 



106 



CASUALTIES IN BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 



The losses in the three days' battle are as follows 





(W. R. No. 43. 


p. 173.) 








Killed. 


Wounded. 


Missing. 


Total 




3231 


2162 


6059 


II 


' 797 


3194 
3029 


378 
589 


4369 


III 


' 593 


4211 


V 


' 365 


1611 


211 


2187 


VI 


' 27 


185 
1922 


30 
1510 


242 


XI 


' 369 


3801 


XII 


' 204 


812 


60 


1082 


Cavalry 


' 91 


354 


407 


852 


Artillery 


reserve 43 


187 


12 


242 



Totals 3155 



14525 



5365 



23045 



(W. R. No. 44. p. 338.) 

Longstreet's corps 910 4339 

Ewell's " 809 3823 

Hill's " 837 4407 

Cavalry " 36 140 



2290 


7539 


1305 


5937 


1491 


6735 


64 


240 



Totals 2592 



12709 



5150 



20451 



The number of prisoners taken, wounded or unwounded in the field 
by the Union army was 12,227 

The greatest numerical losses by brigades in the Union 

<ii- mi/ wore: 

Meredith I corps, 1153 Carr Ill corps, 790 



Paul I 

Cutler I 

Rowley I 

Stone I 

Schlmmelfennig XI 



1041 Ward Ill 

1002 Brewster Ill 

898 Ames XI 

853 Harrow II 

807 Willard II 



781 
778 
778 
768 
714 



The greatest numerical losses by brigades in the Con- 
federate army were: 



Armistead, Longstreet's corps, 1191 

Pettigrew Hill's " 1105 

Garnett ..Longstreet's " 941 
Daniel Ewell's' " 916 



Iverson Ewell's corps, 820 

Wilcox Hill's " 777 

Barksdale, Longstreet's " 747 

Kemper, Longstreet's " 731 



107 



CASUALTIES AMONG PROMINENT OFFICERS. 

Killed or Mortally Wounded. 

UNION. CONFEDERATE. 

Maj. Gen'l Reynolds Maj. Gen'l Pender 

Brig. " Farnsworth Brig. " Armistead 

Brig. " Weed Brig. " Barksdale 

Brig. " Zook Brig. " Garnett 

Colonel Vincent Brig. " Semmes 

Colonel Willard Colonel Avery 

Colonel Cross 

WoillliJcd. 



Maj. Gen'l Hancock Maj. Gen'l . 



Maj. " 

Brig. " 

Brig. " 

Brig. " 

Brig. " 

Colonel Stone 

Colonel Biddle 

Colonel Brooke 



.Sickles 
.Gibbon 

Paul 

.Graham 
. Barlow 



Maj. 
Maj. 
Maj. 
Brig. 
Brig. 
Brig. 
Brig. 
Brig. 
Brig. 
Brig. 



Hood 

. . . Pickett 

Heth 

. .Trimble 
.Anderson 
. .Kemper 

Law 

... .Jones 
. . . . Scales 
. Pettigrew 
.Hampton 



Captured. 

Brig. Gen'l Barlow Maj. Gen'l Trimble 

Brig. " Graham Brig. " Archer 

Brig. " Schimmelfennig 

All of the above officers commanded corps, divisions or 
brigades at the beginning of the battle. 

Brig. Gen'l Pettigrew was killed at Williamsport in the 
retreat. 



108 



CHAPTER VIII. 

THE RETREAT AND PURSUIT. 

On the night of July 3-4, Ewell's corps was withdrawn 
to Seminary Ridge and Stuart was ordered to move to the 
extreme right of the Confederate army, leaving Fitz Lee's 
and Hampton's brigades on the Cashtown road to assist in 
guarding the trains. General Imboden was ordered to col- 
lect, on the Cashtown road, on the following morning, all the 
ammunition, artillery and general supply trains which were 
not to accompany the troops, all the wounded and prisoners, 
and escort them to \\ illiamsport through Cashtown. The 
regiments left by Early in Virginia were ordered to Wil 
liamsport, and a supply of ammunition was ordered to the 
same place from the depot at Winchester. 

On the same night Buford, who had just reached West- 
minster, was ordered to march to Frederick with the brig- 
ades of Gamble and Devin, and Huey's brigade of Gregg's 
division was ordered from Manchester to report to Kilpatrick 
at Emmitsburg. 

On July 4 General Lee gave his final orders for the re- 
treat. The army was to move through Fairfield, Monterey 
Pass and Hagerstown to Williamsport, near which the Con- 
federates had a pontoon bridge, and the river was usually 
fordable in summer. The trains, protected by Iverson's bri- 
gade, were to move first, and then the corps of Hill, Long- 
street, and Ewell. The movement was to begin at dark. 



109 

Robertson, who was at Fairfield, with his two cavalry bri- 
gades, was to assist in protecting the trains, while Stuart, 
with the brigades of Chambliss and Jenkins, was to move to 
Emmitsburg, and watch the roads leading to the mountains 
from that town. 

The Cavalry and Confederate Trains. — At 4 p.m. 
July 4, in a severe rain storm, Imboden started with his 
trains for Williamsport, marching through Cashtown, Green- 
wood and Greencastle. His column, which was seventeen 
miles long, was escorted by his own brigade, assisted by those 
of Fitz Lee and Hampton and twenty-three gnus, lie was 
pursued by Irvin Gregg's cavalry brigade 1 . The head of his 
column reached Williamsport on the afternoon of the 5th, 
and on the morning of the 6th all the wagons were at the 
river. The two cavalry brigades, which acted as a rear 
guard, did not reach Williamsport until that evening. At 
Greenwood, Irvin Gregg overtook the rear guard and had an 
unimportant skirmish with it. At Greencastle, the column 
was attacked by a picked body of 200 cavalry sent from Mil- 
roy's old command, which had been assembled near Bedford, 
Pennsylvania ; they captured or destroyed about sixty 
wagons before they could be driven off. 

When Imboden reached Williamsport, he found that the 
pontoon bridge at Falling Waters, upon which Lee had relied 
for his crossing, had been destroyed by a cavalry force sent 
from Frederick the day before, and that the heavy rains of 
the 4th had raised the river above its fording level. 
He was therefore obliged to intrench his position and send 
his wagons over on two small flat boats. He was here rein- 



110 

forced by two of Early's regiments from Virginia, which 
escorted an ammunition train from Winchester. 

On the afternoon of July 6, Imboden was attacked, by 
Buford's entire division on the Boonsborough-Williamsport 
road and by Custer's brigade on the Hagerstown- Williams- 
port road. Kilpatrick had left the brigades of Huey and 
Farnsworth to protect his rear against Stuart's cavalry. By 
arming the teamsters and the least seriously wounded sold- 
iers, Imboden was able to hold his own until the approach 
of Stuart from Hagerstown caused Buford to fall back and 
guard his own communications. 

The trains were not again attacked; before the army 
crossed the river, Imboden's column had been ferried over 

and sent to Winchester. (Battles^ Leaders, Vol. Ill, page 420.) 

At 7 P.M. July 4 the army corps trains began to move 
along the Fairfield road towards Monterey Pass. The train 
was not properly guarded, since Iverson's brigade had not 
reached its position in the column, and Stuart had not had 
time to place himself astride the road running from Emmits- 
burg to Monterey Pass. This road was guarded only by a, 
single company of Confederate cavalry on patrol duty. 

The train having been observed by the signal officers on 
Big Round Top, Kilpatrick, who had moved to Emmitsburg 
in the morning, was directed to move on Monterey Pass and 
attack it. Kilpatrick reached the mountains about dusk in 
a rain storm. The officer in command of the Confederate 
patrol at once rode to the train passing in his rear and or- 
dered the wagons to be driven in haste to Williamsport. He 
also ordered the wagons which had not reached the fork of 
the road to be stopped. He then returned to his station and 



Ill 

made such demonstrations of resistance that he deceived 
Kilpatrick and succeeded in delaying his advance. He thus 
saved the first section of the train, which reached Williams- 
port in safety. As the road had to be cleared for the troops, 
the head of the second section of the train could stop only 
long enough to close up and was then obliged to move on. 
When Kilpatrick finally brushed aside the patrol, he found 
a part of the second section of the train in the road in his 
front; he took it with him to Smithsburg, a town across the 
mountains from Mechanicstown. 

On the morning of July 5, Stuart, with the brigades of 
Chambliss and Jenkins, reached Emmitsburg and there 
learned that he was too late to stop Kilpatrick. He at once 
decided to seek him by crossing the mountains by the Me- 
chanicstown road. As he was leaving the mountains in the- 
afternoon, he found Kilpatrick in his front, and was unable 
to get through the passes. Towards evening, however, Kil- 
patrick withdrew to Boonsborough and Stuart advanced to 
Smithsburg. 

On the morning of July <>, Buford and Kilpatrick with 
six brigades of cavalry were at Boonsborough and it was 
agreed between them that Kilpatrick with his three brigades 
should go to Hagerstown and delay the advance of the Con- 
federate army, while Buford marched to Williamsport to 
capture the trains. Stuart was at Smithsburg on the morn- 
ing of July 6, where he was joined by the brigades of Robert- 
son and Jones. That morning he set out for Hagerstown and 
found Farnsworth's brigade of Kilpatrick's division in pos- 
session of the town and Huey's brigade in support. Believ- 
ing this to be a covering force and that the main force was 



112 



attacking the trains at Williamsport, Stuart attacked vigor- 
ously with all his cavalry, aided by Iverson's brigade of in- 
fantry. He drove Farnsworth's brigade back on the Boons- 
borough road and Huey's on the Williamsport road. It was 
the noise of Stuart's guns in their rear that caused Buford 
and Custer to retire from Imboden's front before piercing 
his lines. That night Buford and Kilpatrick were again in 
Boonsborough, and Stuart's cavalry, now joined by the 
brigades of Fitz Lee and Hampton, was posted along the 
Antietam. 

On the morning of July 7, Stuart strengthened his line 
by securing Wofford's infantry brigade from Longstreet; this 
was posted on tire road from Boonsborough to Williamsport 
in rear of the cavalry. Anderson's brigade of Hood's divi- 
sion was ;il this time on the Antietam at Funkstown. 

On July 9 and 10 there were also indecisive engage- 
ments on the Boonsborough-Hagerstown roads in which An- 
derson's dtrrskm of Longstreet's corps took part. 



On the 10 th the infantry intrenched line was established 
between Bagerstown and the Potomac river and the cavalry 
was withdrawn from the front and placed on the left flank. 

The Infantry. — The Confederate infantry started for 
Williamsport on the night of July 4 and on the night of July 
5 Hill bivouacked at Waynesborongh, Longstreet in Mon- 
terey Pass, and Ewell at Fairfield. E well's rear guard was 
attacked by the VI corps. 

The night of July 6, Longstreet was two miles beyond 
Hagerstown, Hill at Hagerstown, and Ewell beyond Mon- 
terey Pass. 

On July 7 Ewell reached Hagerstown. 






113 

As soon as General Meade learned that the Confederate 
army was withdrawing from Gettysburg, he decided that a 
direct pursuit through the passes of the South mountains 
would be impracticable; if he found that General Lee was 
really retreating, he proposed to move the Union army paral- 
lel to the Hagerstown road, through the passes west of 
Frederick. He therefore ordered General French, who was 
stationed at Frederick with some of the troops Avithdrawn 
from Harper's Ferry, to occupy these passes at once. 

Jul}- 5 was spent by General Meade in ascertaining the 
position and intentions of the Confederate army as well as 
in the care of the wounded and the dead of both armies. 
Irvin Gregg's brigade on the right reconnoitered as far as 
Hunterstown; the XI corps advanced one brigade into Get- 
tysburg; the VI corps pursued the retreating Confederate 
army as far as Fairfield. 

From the information obtained on this day, General 
Meade decided that the Confederate army was really retreat- 
ing to the Potomac instead of simply retiring to the passes 
of the South mountains. He therefore ordered all his corps 
to march for the passes west of Frederick, leaving only one 
brigade of the VI corps, with Mcintosh's cavalry brigade, 
to follow the Confederate army along the Fairfield road. 

On July 9 the V and VI corps were across the mountains 
at Boonsborpugh, and the II and XII corps were at Rohrers- 
ville at the base of the mountains due east of Shepherdstown ; 
all the other corps were in close supporting distance. As 
the bridge over the Potomac at Falling Waters was still un- 
finished and the river unfordable, upon the approach of these 
corps, the Confederate army deployed on a line extending 



114 



from the Potomac river a short distance below Falling 
Waters northward to a point one mile due west of Hagers- 
town. This line was thoroughly intrenched and well de- 
fended by artillery; Longstreet held the right, Hill, the cen- 
ter, and Ewell, the left. The cavalry was in rear of Eweli. 

On July 12, the entire Union army was deployed and in- 
trenched on a line extending from Funkstown, on the Antie- 
tam, to a point on the Hagerstown-Sharpsburg road opposite 
the Confederate right flank. The right wing was composed 
of the XI, I and VI corps, the left wing of the V, II and XII 
corps; the III corps was in reserve. Kilpatrick's cavalry 
was on the right flank, Buford's on the left, and Gregg in 
reserve. ►Since* reaching the river the army had been rein- 
forced by the four brigades of French's ills Uion. 

The Union army also had a reserve composed of three 
brigades of New York and Pennsylvania militia, which had 
been assembled by General Couch for the defense of Harris- 
burg. On the retreat of the Confederate army, these brigades 
took the field as a division, commanded by General W' k F. 
Smith. On July 12 he was a short distance northeast of 
Hagerstown. 

On the night of July 12-13, General Meade called a 
council of war and submitted to his corps commanders the 
question of the advisability of assaulting the Confederate 
lines on the following day, July 13. The commanders in 
favor of attacking were Generals Wadsworth and Howard; 
those opposed, were Generals Hays, French, Sykes, Sedgwick 
and Slocum. It was therefore decided to defer the assault. 

On July 13 the bridge at Falling Waters was finished' 
and the river at Williamsport reached the fording stage. 



115 



General Lee now decided to retire into Virginia, as it was 
difficult to subsist his army, and he feared the Union army 
would be greatly reinforced before making an assault. He 
directed the infantry and artillery to withdraw from the 
trenches immediately after dark and the cavalry to replace 
them. Longstreet was ordered to cross at once over the 
bridge at Falling Waters, live miles in his rear, and Hill 
ami the cavalry along his front were ordered to follow him. 
Ewell and the rest of the cavalry were directed to ford the 
river at Williamsport. 

The 13th of July was overcast and misty and the night 
following dark and stormy. This made it easy to withdraw 
the Confederate army without attracting the attention of the 
Union troops, but made it difficult for the troops to move 
rapidly. 

At 5 p.m. the artillery was started to the rear and imme- 
diately after dark Longstreet's infantry followed. During 
the night the bridge was broken by the heavily loaded wagons 
and for two hours communication was interrupted; it was 
therefore 9 A.M. on the 14th before Longstreet's corps was 
across. He was at once followed by two squadrons of caval- 
ry which had been left to cover Hill's rear, but by mistake 
crossed the river ahead of him. 

EwelFs corps moved to Williamsport after dark and 
there forded the river after midnight, The artillery ammu- 
nition chests and one brigade were taken across in boats. 
The crossing was completed at 8 a.m. on the 14th. With the 
exception of the two cavalry squadrons mentioned above, 
Stuart's cavalry crossed at Williamsport with Ewell. 

On the morning of July 14, Kilpatrick moved forward 



116 



and finding the Confederate lines evacuated pushed on to 
Williamsport only to find Ewell and Stuart on the Virginia 
side. He then moved down to Falling Waters. 

HilFs divisions marched all night in the rain in the 
order Anderson, Pender, Heth. In the morning Heth posted 
his division in line on the hills about two miles from the 
bridge to check the pursuers, while the artillery and trains 
were crossing. Pender's division was his reserve. About 11 
a.m.. after the artillery, trains, and Anderson's divisions had 
crossed, Heth was ordered to send Pender's division to the 
bridge. He was also directed to hold his line with one 
brigade, and to direct the others to follow Pender's division. 

About this time Kilpatrick appeared in his front. An 
advance guard of Custer's brigade consisting of about fifty 
mounted troopers at once charged the Confederate line. This 
movement deceived the Confederates, who thought this body 
must be a troop of their own rear guard cavalry. The Con- 
federate infantry therefore delayed firing upon them until 
the cavalry was almost upon the Confederate line. The Con- 
federates had only two men killed by this charge, but one of 
them was General Pettigrew ; t wo-thirds of the Union cavalry 
were killed. This was followed by an advance of one of 
Custer's regiments dismounted; he was driven back by 
Brockenbrough, whose brigade thus became detached from 
the division. At this moment Buford appeared on the field 
and moved his dismounted cavalry to turn Heth's right flank 
and intercept his retreat. Heth was about to call up Pen- 
der's brigades to meet this movement when he was ordered to 
retreat at once. 

He sent one brigade to form a line a quarter of a mile 






117 



nearer the bridge, and then retired his other brigades through 
it ; by repeating this operation he reached the bridge. Brock- 
enbrough's brigade was too much involved to withdraw 
easily when the order was given, and therefore left on the 
field three regimental colors and a number of prisoners. 
Hill's corps was also obliged to abandon two guns and a 
large number of stragglers who had been overcome by the 
fatigue of the night march in a rainstorm. It is probable, 
however, that the total losses on this day did not exceed one 
thousand. 

At 1 p.m., the Confederate army being on the Virginia 
shore, the bridge was cut loose, and General Lee's offensive 
campaign was over. 



118 

CHAPTER IX. 

COMMENT ON GETTYSBURG. 

( ( >NFEDERATE OPERATIONS. 

Though the battle of Chancellorsville, fought iu the 
early days of May, L863, was a Confederate victory, it did not 
materially improve the condition of affairs in Virginia. A 
week later the armies of the Potomac and of Northern Vir- 
ginia were in the same relative positions they had occupied 
before the battle. 

The Army of Northern Virginia was rendered more con- 
fident by its success in that campaign, and its faith in its 
commander was even stronger than ever-. The army had, 
however, suffered an irreparable loss in the death of its most 
brilliant corps commander, General Thomas J. Jackson. 

Y\ nile the Army of the Potomac had lost some of its con- 
fidence in the ability of its commander, it had by no means 
lost confidence in its own fighting powers. The corps that 
had been but little engaged were eager to meet their adver- 
saries at once. Before resuming the offensive, however, it 
was necessary to remount the cavalry, and to reorganize the 
infantry brigades that were daily losing regiments whose 
terms of service had expired. 

( leneral Lee was no doubt extremely gratified by the out- 
come of the Chancellorsville campaign, yet he was well aware 
that the victory had been won by taking such chances as he 
would be unwilling to risk again. When he divided his 
army in the presence of overwhelming odds, he ran great 



119 



risk of being destroyed in detail. His success was due 
largely to the genius of General Jackson and to the errors of 
his adversary. Now that Jackson was no more and his adver- 
sary had learned the true use of cavalry, it was improbable 
that there would be a second Chancellorsville surprise. 

He felt confident that if General Hooker was left undis- 
turbed on the north bank of the Rappahannock, the regi- 
ments he was daily losing would soon be replaced and when 
his army was thoroughly reorganized he would again assume 
the offensive. Profiting by his numerical strength and the 
errors of his previous campaign, it was fair to assume that 
this time he would be successful and force Lee to retire to the 
North Anna. 

General Lee was too great a commander to willingly as- 
sume a passive role, when he had an opportunity of striking 
a blow. He knew that ultimate success must go to him ayIio 
can assume and maintain the offensive. He determined there- 
fore to recruit his army to its maximum possible strength at 
once and open the new campaign before General Hooker had 
had time to reorganize. He withdrew the divisions of Hood 
and Pickett from southern Virginia and ordered them to re- 
join the army. He reinforced his infantry by the brigades 
of Pettigrew and Davis from southern Virginia and North 
Carolina, as well as by two regiments from western Virginia. 
His cavalry he reinforced by the brigade of Robertson from 
North Carolina and that of Jenkins from western Virginia. 
General Lee was able to withdraw troops from southern Vir- 
ginia because at this time the IX corps was ordered from 
southern Virginia to Kentucky. 

While Lee's plan of operations was somewhat like that 



120 

of Hooker in his Chancellorsville campaign, it was designed 
to be much more decisive in its results. Hooker planned 
only to force Lee to retire from the line of the Rappahan- 
nock ; the latter proposed to compel Hooker not only to give 
up the line of the Rappahannock, but to retire behind the 
Potomac. General Lee's plan was to accomplish this result, 
if possible, without a battle and to tight only at some point 
north of the Potomac river. Without wholly uncovering the 
main road to Richmond, he proposed to assemble his army 
at Oulpeper and from that point to hurl against Winchester 
a force which should not only capture the division which 
Mil'roy had incautiously assembled there, but should in addi- 
tion so threaten the northern states that the authorities 
would hasten to recall Hooker from the Rappahannock and 
direct him to defend the capital. The Army of Northern 
Virginia could then be assembled on the Totomac, march into 
Pennsylvania and draw Hooker far north of his base. At 
some point in that state it was hoped that Hooker could be 
decisively defeated in battle. Secrecy and celerity were 
necessary to the accomplishment of this plan. 

The reorganization of the Army of Northern Virginia 
was completed towards the end of May, 1863, but Lee's ad- 
vance was delayed a few days by the sudden appearance of a 
Union force in the vicinity of White House, on the Pamunkey 
river. To ascertain its meaning, both Pickett and Petti- 
grew were halted, on their march northward, in the vicinity 
of Hanover Junction. Being convinced that the movement 
was not a serious one. on June 2 Pickett and Pettigrew were 
ordered to join their corps and the campaign began. 

Dwell and Longstreet withdrew quietly from the trenches 



121 



behind Fredericksburg and moved to Culpeper Court House, 
where Stuart, with five of his cavalry brigades, was awaiting 
them. Hill's corps was left in the trenches to hold the direct 
line to Richmond, until Hooker retired from his front. 
From these instructions, it is evident that General Lee did 
not expect Hill to be seriously attacked. He hoped that 
Hooker would remain in ignorance of his movements until 
Winchester was assailed and captured; he was satisfied that 
this attack would cause Hooker to receive orders to retire at 
once to protect Washington. 

On the evening of June 9th, General Lee knew that the 
presence of Ewell's infantry at Brandy Station would lead 
General Hooker to suspect that the Confederate army was 
divided and might be defeated in detail either by an attack 
on Fredericksburg or an attack on Culpeper. It required 
courage, therefore, to adhere to his original plan and on the 
morning of the 10th send Ewell's corps to Winchester. Win- 
chester is fifty miles from Culpeper, and the latter is thirty 
miles from Fredericksburg. General Lee was undoubtedly 
much relieved, when on June 12th he learned from his out- 
posts that the Union army had abandoned the Rappahannock 
and was moving northward. His general plan was now suc- 
cessfully inaugurated. 

Ewell's operations at Winchester were not so successful 
as they should have been, due to his failure to entirely sur- 
round that town. Had Rodes moved from Berryville to- 
wards Winchester and cut off communications between that 
town and the Potomac, Milroy and his whole command would 
have been captured. Ewell's orders to Rodes may have been 
in compliance with instructions to appear on the Potomac 



122 



as soon as possible, and may have been simply due to an 
error of judgment. Rodes, himself, should have moved on 
Winchester without orders, since he knew that General Lee 
was anxious to capture Milroy. 

The movement of the Confederate army from the Rappa- 
hannock to the Potomac, with its marching flank covered by 
Stuart's cavalry, was an extremely well conducted march. 
Having a cavalry screen between them and the enemy and 
the possession of the roads on both sides of the Blue Ridge 
mountains, the infantry made the march in a surprisingly 
short time. 

The first and the most serious error in the conduct of 
the campaign, was made when General Stuart was author- 
ized to pass around the Union army and cross the Potomac 
river between that army and Washington. This error seems 
to have arisen as follows: From his "War Reminiscences," 
we learn that Colonel Mosby, the famous partisan leader of 
Virginia, was near Middleburg, Virginia, June 10, 1863, 
organizing the first company of his battalion. On that day 
he crossed the Bull Run mountains and marched across 
country for Seneca Falls on the Potomac, where the follow- 
ing morning he surprised a body of Union troops and took 
many prisoners. He then returned to Middleburg and there 
awaited General Stuart, to whom on June 17th he described 
his exploit. Impressed by Mosby's story, it is probable that 
sometime between the 17th and 22nd, Stuart suggested to 
General Lee that the cavalry cross the Potomac at the same 
point. 

On the morning of June 22, General Stuart reported by 
better to General Lee that the Union troops were retiring 



123 



to Aldie Gap. As this indicated that Hooker had no in- 
tention of advancing in force across the London Valley, 
it pointed to a movement towards the Potomac and it was 
high time that Lee moved into Maryland. On receipt of 
Stuart's note, General Lee directed Longstreet, whose head- 
quarters were near his own, to withdraw his troops from the 
Blue Ridge mountains and prepare to follow the other corps. 
Recurring to the suggestion of General Stuart, he discussed 
the matter with General Longstreet and finally decided to 
let Longstreet decide the point of crossing when he was in a 
position to dispense with the protection afforded by Stuart. 
Both generals interpreted Stuart's suggestion as a proposi- 
tion to pass around the rear of the Union army. 

Longstreet, in "Manassas to Appomattox," says that he, 
Longstreet, was to decide whether Stuart was to cross the 
Potomac above or below the Union army. 

As a result of that interview, there followed this cor- 
respondence : 

Headquarters, June 22nd, 1863. 
Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, 
Commanding Cavalry. 
General, I have just received your note of 7.45 this 
morning to General Longstreet. I judge the efforts of 
the enemy yesterday were to arrest our progress and as- 
certain our whereabouts. Perhaps he is satisfied. Do 
you know where he is and what he is doing? I fear he 
will steal a march on us, and get across the Potomac be- 
fore we are aware. If you find that he is moving north- 
ward, and that two brigades can guard the Blue Ridge 
and take care of your rear, you can move with the other 



124 



three into Maryland, and take position on General 
Ewell's right, place yourself in communication with him,, 
guard his flank, keep him informed of the enemy's move- 
ments, and collect all the supplies you can for the use 
of the army. One column of General Ewell's army will 
probably move toward the Susquehanna by the Emmits- 
burg route; another by Chambersburg. Accounts from 
him last night state that there was no enemy west of 
Frederick. A cavalry force (about 100) guarded the 
Monocacy Bridge, which was barricaded. You will, of 
course, take charge of (A. G. ) Jenkins' brigade, and give 
him necessary instructions. All supplies taken in Mary- 
land must be by authorized staff officers for their re- 
spective departments — by no one else. They will be 
paid for, or receipts for the same given to the owners. 
I send you a general order on this subject, which I wish 
you to see is strictly complied with. 

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

R. E. Lee, 



General. 



(W. R. No. 45, p. 913.) 



Headquarters, 

June 22, 1863—7.30 p.m. 
General E. E. Lee, 

Commanding, and so forth. 

General : Yours of 4 o'clock- this afternoon is re- 
ceived. I have forwarded your letter to General Stuart, 
with the suggestion that he pass by the enemy's rear if 



125 

he thinks that he may get through. We have nothing 
of the enemy to-day. 

Most respectfully, 

James Longstreet, 
Lieutenant-General, Commanding. 

(W. R. No. 45, p. 915.) 

Headquarters, 
Millwood, June 22, 1863—7 p.m. 
Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, 
Commanding Cavalry. 

General Lee has inclosed to me this letter for you 
(of same date), to be forwarded to you, provided you 
can be spared from my front, and provided that I think 
that you can move across the Potomac without disclos- 
ing our plans. He speaks of your leaving, via Hope- 
well Gap, and passing by the rear of the enemy. If you 
can get through by that route, I think that you will be 
less likely to indicate what our plans are than if you 
should cross by passing to our rear. I forward the let- 
ter of instructions with these suggestions. 

Please advise me of the condition of affairs before 
you leave, and order General Hampton — whom I sup- 
pose you will leave here in command — to report to me 
at Millwood, either by letter or in person, as may be 

most agreeable to him. 

Most respectfully, 

James Longstreet, 
Lieutenant-General. 
N. B. — I think that your passage of the Potomac 
by our rear at the present moment will, in a measure. 



126 

disclose our plans. You had better not leave us, there- 
fore, unless you can take the proposed route in rear of 
the enemy. (W. R. No. 45, p. 915.) 

As General Lee's letter made no mention of Stuart's 
proposed plan approved by Longstreet, but laid great stress 
on the necessity of his reaching the Potomac as soon as pos- 
sible, Stuart was somewhat in doubt as to the best route to 
follow. Colonel Mosby, being in Stuart's camp that night, 
the latter sent for him to get his views. Mosby urged that 
the shortest practicable line to the Potomac was the line 
Gum Springs-Seneca Falls, through the Union army. The 
Union corps being widely separated, he contended that the 
movement could be easily made. En route much damage 
could be done to the Union trains and the communications 
between the Union army and the capital could be severed. 
Mosby says this was the plan Stuart adopted, and that he 
was to meet Stuart at Gum Springs, to conduct his advance 
guard. After the interview, General Stuart sent a messen- 
ger to General Lee and the following night received this 
reply : 

Headquarters, Army of Northern Virginia, 

June 23, 1863—5 p.m. 
Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, 

Commanding Cavalry. 
General: Your notes of 9 and 10.30 a.m. to-day have 
just been received. As regards to the purchase of to- 
bacco for your men, supposing that Confederate money 
will not be taken, I am willing for your commissaries 



127 



or quartermasters to purchase this tobacco and let the 
men get it from them, but I can have nothing seized by 
the men. 

If General Hooker's army remains inactive, you can 
leave two brigades to watch him, and withdraw with the 
three others, but should he not appear to be moving 
northward, I think you had better withdraw to this side 
of the mountain to-morrow night, cross at Shepherds- 
town next day, and moveover Fredericktown. 

You will, however, be able to judge whether you can 
pass around their army without hindrance, doing them 
all the damage you can, and cross the river east of the 
mountains. In either case, after crossing the river, you 
must move on and feel the right of Ewell's troops, col- 
lect information, provisions, and so forth. 

Give instructions to the commander of the brigades 
left behind, to watch the flank and rear of the army, and 
(in the event of the enemy leaving their front), retire 
from the mountains west of the Shenandoah, leaving 
sufficient pickets to guard the passes, and bringing 
everything clean along the valley, closing up on the rear 
of the army. 

As regards the movements of the two brigades of 
the enemy moving toward Warrenton, the commander 
of the brigades to be left in the mountains must do what 
he can to counteract them, but I think that the sooner 
that you cross into Maryland, after to-morrow, the bet- 
ter. 

The movements of Ewell's corps are as stated 
in my former letter. Hill's first division will reach the 



128 

Potomac to-day, and Longstreet will follow to-morrow. 
Be watchful and circumspect in all your movements. 
I am, very respectfully and truly, yours 

R. E. Lee, 

General. 

(VV. R. No. 45, p. 923.) 

It is difficult to understand General Stuart's reasons 
for his movement. On June 22nd he knew that General Lee 
considered it of the greatest importance that he should place 
himself on Swell's right flank. There were three courses 
open to him to accomplish this result. The first was to go 
down the Loudoun valley and either cross the river east of 
Harpers Ferry, or traverse the mountains near Charlestown 
and the Potomac west of Harper's Ferry. The time neces- 
sary to make this movement could have been accurately cal- 
culated, as the routes were practically unobstructed. The 
second, was to ride around the Union army. As he had not 
ascertained the position of the rear corps of that army, he 
could not tell in advance how long his route would be or 
where he could cross the Potomac. It was certain to be a 
plunge in the dark. The third was to ride through the Union 
army, as advised by Colonel Mosby. This is probably what 
he intended to do, as it was the shortest line to the Potomac. 
This was certainly a hazardous operation with as large a 
force as a cavalry division. It is probable that he was fortu- 
nate in finding his route obstructed before he had penetrated 
the Union lines. Mosby, who went to Gum Springs to meet 
him, found himself in the midst of the Union army and found 
it difficult to escape. 

AYhile General Lee no doubt deeply regretted that he 



129 

had acceded to Stuart's plan, he can hardly be blamed for au- 
thorizing- a plan approved by Generals Longstreet and Stuart, 
•especially after he himself had so clearly indicated to the 
latter that haste was necessary and he must select a route 
•over which he could march without delay. 

The result of Stuart's action was far reaching. From 
the time Lee crossed the river into hostile territory, he had 
no reliable information of the movements of the Union army. 
The two brigades left by Stuart in the mountains, were prac- 
tically useless in the absence of their division commander. 
On the night of June 30th, when they should have been with 
the advance guard at Cashtown, Penn., they were at Mar- 
tinsburg, Virginia, two days in rear. 

When General Ewell was directed to cross the Potomac 
Tiver he was instructed to inform the inhabitants that his 
movement to Hagerstown was for the purpose of enveloping 
Harper's Ferry. By this ruse General Lee hoped to have 
this garrison withdrawn, as it menaced his communications. 

It is not altogether clear what General Lee expected to 
accomplish in Pennsylvania besides drawing Hooker north 
of the Potomac and gathering supplies for his army. On 
•June 22nd he wrote to General Ewell as follows: 

Headquarters, June 22, 1863. 
Lieut. Gen. R. S. Ewell. 

General : Your letter of 6 p.m. yesterday has been 
received. If you are ready to move, you can do so. I 
think your best course will be toward the Susquehanna, 
taking the routes by Emmitsburg, Chambersburg and 
McConnellsburg. Your trains had better be, as far as 



130 



possible, kept on the center route. You must get com- 
mand of your cavalry, and use it in gathering supplies, 
obtaining information, and protecting your flanks. If 
necessary send a staff officer to remain with General 
Jenkins. It will depend upon the quality of supplies 
obtained in that country whether the rest of the army 
can follow. There may be enough for your command, 
but none for the others. Every exertion should, there- 
fore, be made to locate and secure them. Beef we can 
drive with us, but bread we cannot carry, and must se- 
cure it in the country. 

I send you copies of a general order on this subject, 
which I think is based on rectitude and sound policy, 
and the spirit of which I wish you to see enforced in 
your command. I am much gratified at the success 
which has attended your movements, and feel assured, 
if they are conducted with the same energy and cir- 
cumspection, it will continue. Your progress and di- 
rection will, of course, depend upon the development of 
circumstances. If Harrisburg comes within your means, 
capture it. General A. P. Hill arrived yesterday in the 
vicinity of Berryville. I shall move him on to-day if 
possible. Saturday, Longstreet withdrew from the Blue 
Ridge. Yesterday the enemy pressed our cavalry so 
hard with infantry and cavalry on the Upperville road 
that McLaws' division had to be sent back to hold Ash- 
by 's Gap. I have not yet heard from there this morn- 
ing. General Stuart could not ascertain whether it was 
intended for a real advance toward the Valley or to 
ascertain our position. 



131 



The pontoons will reach Martinsburg to-day, and 
will be laid at the point you suggest, 4 or 5 miles below 
Williamsport, if found suitable. I have not counter- 
manded your order withdrawing the cavalry from 
Charlestown. I will write you again if I receive in- 
formation affecting your movements. 

Trusting in the guidance of a merciful God, and 
invoking His protection for your corps, I am, with great 
respect, your obedient servant, 

R. E. LEE, 

General. 

(W. R. No. 45, p. 914.) 

From this it would appear that EwelFs movement was 
intended mainly to gather supplies for the army in and near 
the Cumberland Valley. He was directed to take Harris- 
burg, if it proved to be a feasible task. General Lee's move- 
ment against Hooker was to be planned later, after he learned 
from the cavalry the exact position of Hooker's army. From 
Longstreet's writings it appears that Lee hoped to maneuver 
so as to place himself between the Union army and Wash- 
ington, and thus compel Hooker to attack him in position. 
In his own report, General Lee says that Early was sent to 
York to cause the Union army to drift in that direction, 
away from his own line of communications. 

He was without information of the position of Hooker's 
army from the morning of June 22, when Stuart reported 
rieasanton retreating, until June 28, when he learned from 
Longstreet's spy that the Union army was around Frederick. 
He then felt it incumbent upon himself to cross the moun- 
tains to draw Hooker away from Frederick. Had he known 



132 



that the Union army was under orders to move toward 
York on the morning of the 29th, this movement would havt 
been unnecessary. The Union army was now moving in the 
direction he- had designed it should move when Early was 
sent to York. His natural maneuver was not to interfere 
with that movement, but to concentrate quietly and move 
towards Washington by Fairfield and Emmitsburg, or by 
some other route even farther south. He would then place 
himself on the flank or in rear of the Union army, with his 
communications secure and could either attack his enemy 
in flank or rear, or await attack in a favorable position. 
Longstreet's spy left the Union army a few hours too sood 
to bring General Lee this valuable information. 

Although the movement of General Lee's army to Gettys- 
burg was forced upon him, it produced a condition of affairs 
which might have been fatal to the Union army had General 
Lee known the true situation of that army. 

On the afternoon of July 1, the I and XI Union corps, 
the smallest of the army, found themselves in a very critical 
position. South of the Cashtown road, in the fields west of 
Seminary Ridge, were the three brigades of Stone, Meredith 
and Rowley. Their only supports were the artillery of the 
I corps on the ridge in their rear, and the cavalry brigade of 
Gamble to their left and rear in the valley behind Seminary 
Ridge. In their front were the eight brigades of the divisions 
of Heth and Pender of Hill's corps. 

At the north end of Seminary Ridge, widely separated 
from its left wing, were the three brigades of Baxter, Paul 
and Cutler forming the right wing of the I corps. In their 



• 



133 

jront were the brigades of O'Neal, Iverson, Danie] and 
Ramseur of Rodes' division of Ewell's corps. 

In the low ground, north of the town, far in rear of the 
right flank of the I corps, were four brigades of the XI corps. 
On their right and rear was Devin's cavalry brigade; in their 
front was Doles' brigade of Rodes 1 division, and coming 
down the Heidlersburg road to turn their right, were the 
four brigades of Early's division. 

The general reserve of the whole line consisted of two 
brigades of the XI corps, which were with the commander of 
the field, General Howard, on Cemetery Hill. 

All that was necessary to give the Confederates a de- 
cisive victory was a commander on the field who could see 
the entire situation. While Rodes was fighting a delaying 
action witli the troops in his front, a vigorous attack could 
have been made on Rowley, Meredith and Stone and at the 
same time their left flank could have been turned. In this 
attack the whole of Hill's force, eight brigades, could have 
been employed, since Anderson's division was close behind. 
Had these troops attacked, as they and others did on the 
2nd and 3rd of July, they could hardly have failed to de- 
stroy the three small brigades in their front. Having cap- 
tured the ridge at the Seminary, they would have been in a 
position to cut off the retreat of the right wing of the I corps 
and the advanced brigades of the XI corps. The position of 
the latter could, in the meantime, have been turned by Early. 
As the Union troops had but a single line of retreat, that up 
Cemetery Hill, it is fair to presume that the two corps would 
have been almost annihilated by the superiority of position 
and numbers of the Confederate forces engaged. If these 



134 

two corps could have been destroyed, General Lee woul; 
have been in an excellent condition to meet the reniainin 1 
corps of the Union army. 

The failure of the Confederates to profit by their ad- 
vantages on this day may be attributed to a single cause, 
defective information. General Lee did not expect a battle 
this day and did not reach the field until the afternoon 
fight was begun, too late to change any of the dispositions 
for attack even had he desired to do so. West of the town, 
General Hill, who commanded in the critical part of the 
field, was unaware of the importance of Seminary Hill, since 
the ridge concealed from him the town and the position of the 
XI corps. He therefore made very defective tactical dispo- 
sitions foT its capture. So badly were these made in fact 
that instead of engaging with his eight brigades the entire 
attention of Doubleday's three, one of these latter, Stone's 
brigade, had time to turn its attention to Rodes' division 
and make a Hank attack on Daniel's brigade. The result 
was that Seminary Hill was not captured until the rest of the 
Union troops were re-forming on Cemetery Hill. Had Hill 
carried Seminary Hill early in the afternoon, General Lee 
won hi have had an opportunity of directing operations from 
that point, where he would have seen the precarious position 
of the other Union troops on the line. 

When General Lee reached Seminary Ridge, the battle 
seems to have been practically over. Hill's troops were rest- 
ing on the ridge. Ewell's men were in the town, and the 
Union troops were re-forming on Cemetery Hill. Lee saw 
at a glance that the battle was not won unless Cemetery Hill 



135 

•was also taken, and he at once sent word to Ewell to take 
it if he felt able to do so. 

Ewell reported that his troops were worn out with 
marching and fighting and that he was unable to bring his 
artillery to bear on the Union line. He would therefore 
postpone the attack until Johnson's division arrived. It is 
possible that Ewell was wrong in making this decision, but 
he was probably right. It would have taken him some time 
to re-form his troops, who must have been in considerable 
confusion; he would then have been obliged to advance 
without artillery support against a strong position. It is 
possible that before he was ready to move, the XII corps 
would have reached the field. The opportunity of taking the 
hill was lost when the Union troops were not vigorously 
pursued in their retreat by all the troops of both Ewell and 
Hill. 

The opportunity of fighting a battle under favorable 
conditions, one of the objects for which he had moved north 
of the Potomac, came to General Lee on July 1, but he was 
ignorant of that fact until it was too late. He was destined 
not to have another. 

After the battle of July 1, from the cupola of the col- 
lege. General Lee carefully examined the Union position upon 
Cemetery Hill. He then decided that it would be too strong 
to assault on the morrow. He therefore directed General 
Ewell to move to the west of the town and take his position 
on the right of Hill's corps. From the report of General 
Pendleton, his chief of artillery, who had made an examina- 
tion of the ground along this front, he decided that an attack 
could be made from this direction. This attack he hoped 






136 



to make, with the divisions of McLaws, Hood, Anderson and 
Johnson, before the Union army was united; all of these 
divisions were arriving 011 the field and had not been pre- 
viously engaged. 

The order for the movement of Ewell's corps was, how- 
ever, countermanded at the request of the corps commander. 
Early in the evening of July 1, two of Ewell's staff officers 
had ascended Gulp's Hill and found it unoccupied. Having 
reported this at headquarters, Ewell asked permission to 
occupy this hill early in the morning with Johnson's di- 
vision and thus compel the Union troops to evacuate Ceme- 
tery Hill. He would thus accomplish what Gfeneral Lee had 
requested him to accomplish by assault the night before. 
This plan would have been eminently successful had the 
Union army not been marching that night for Gettysburg, 
and had not the commander on Cemetery Hill realized the 
necessity of occupying ('nip's Hill. During the night John- 
son learned from an intercepted messenger that Sykes' V 
corps was coming along the nanover road, and from a re- 
connoitering party that Gulp's Hill was occupied by some 
Union infantry. The information thus received deterred 
him from acting without further orders. Before the wishes 
of Generals Ewell and Lee could be ascertained, morning 
broke and it was too late to move Ewell's corps, as first pro- 
posed. He was therefore left in a position from which he 
was obliged to attack without artillery support, and with his 
wings separated by the town, so that concerted action along 
his line was impossible. His partial success, on July 2, was 
due wholly to an error made by the Union commander, and 
not to any virtue in his own position. 



137 



• Would the attack on the Union left wing have been suc- 
cessful on July 2, had Ewell moved as General Lee first di- 
rected? This is extremely doubtful, for the Union right 
flank would then have rested on Cemetery Hill and the XII 
and V corps would have extended the line to the Round Tops. 
General Meade would have given more attention to the left of 
the line, which could have been made safe. 

It would, however, have placed General Lee in a posi- 
tion to shift his line of communication to the Emmitsburg 
road and maneuver about the left flank of the Union army 
and thus compel Meade to evacuate the lines of Gettysburg. 
This would have been the great advantage secured by the 
shifting of E well's corps. 

It has been said that the battle of July 2 was not a 
more decided success because of the failure of Longstreet 
to attack at daylight. That General Lee desired to attack 
as soon as possible on the 2nd, is only natural, for he knew 
that the other Union corps must be marching towards Get- 
tysburg. That he expected an attack at daylight seems 
hardly plausible. On July 1, only a single officer of his 
army, General Pendleton, had examined this part of the field 
and he was hampered by the presence of Buford's cavalry. 
Before any disposition for attack could be made, it would 
be necessary for General Lee and his staff to examine the 
ground. Time was also necessary to move the troops, who 
were encamped along the Cashtown road, into position. The 
evidence of the records is clear that General Anderson, who 
was to connect Longstreet and Pender and support Long- 
street's attack, was not in position until noon. As no criti- 
cism has ever been made of Anderson's movements, it would 



138 

appear that he moved as rapidly as was expected, and fhe 
attack could not have been made before noon. It was de- 
layed from noon until 4 p.m. by the officers sent from head- 
quarters to guide Longstreet's divisions from the Cashtown 
road to the l#t of Anderson's position. Being more or less 
ignorant of the topography of the country, they delayed the 
movement in their endeavor to reach the position without 
exposing the troops to the Union signal station on Little 
Round Top. Had Longstreet been able to attack an hour or 
two earlier, he would have found the III corps changing po- 
sition and less able to resist his assaults than at 4 p.m. 

When General Lee decided to renew the battle on July 3, 
he probably assumed that a combined effort of Generals Pick- 
ett and Johnson would pierce the Union line, weakened by 
the demoralization caused by the Confederate victories of 
July 1 and 2. He probably also counted on Stuart to assist 
in this effort. Had he been able to view the situation as it 
really was, he would not have ordered the attack, since 
Johnson was certain to be defeated. It is difficult to under- 
stand why the divisions of Pickett and Heth were allowed to 
advance after Johnson's defeat. In addition to advancing 
over open fields exposed to artillery fire, when they reached 
their goal, they were almost certain to meet a vastly superior 
force of infantry. 

The position occupied by the Confederate army on 
July 2 and 3 was undoubtedly a bad one. With fewer troops 
than General Meade, General Lee occupied a longer line, 
which was nearly etery where commanded by the Union posi- 
tion and was interrupted by the town of Gettysburg. It 
offered no good points from which an attack could be made. 



139 



Such success as Lee had was due almost wholly to the 
absence of cavalry on the Union left flank on July 2, which 
enabled Longstreet and Anderson to concentrate in front of 
that flank without the knowledge of General Meade. The 
whole situation on the left would have been- changed, had 
Meade known in the morning that Anderson and Longstreet 
were advancing towards his left. 

It is difficult to imagine a more discouraging situation 
than that in which General Lee found himself between the 
4th and 14th of July. Decisively repulsed in battle and 
compelled to retreat, his communications were suddenly sev- 
ered by the destruction of his only bridge and by the floods 
at the fords. Yet it is clear, that never once through these 
trying days, did the commander or his men show any sign 
of demoralization. On the contrary, it is certain, they 
would have welcomed an attack on their intrenched lines 
about Falling Waters. 

Union Operations. 

To attack the fraction of the Confederate army in his 
front, as soon as he ascertained that the Confederate army 
was divided, was a most natural plan for General Hooker 
to suggest to the President, and it was equally natural for 
General Halleck to reply that if either fraction was to be 
attacked, it should be the one which crossed the Rappahan- 
nock rather than the one left in the trenches at Fredericks- 
burg. General Hooker knew where he would find Hill's 
corps, but the corps moving towards Culpeper were not' so 
easily brought to battle. The President and General Hal- 



140 

leek on the other hand remembered the depression through- 
out the North produced by Lee's invasion of Maryland and 
Jackson's Shenandoah Valley operations, and could not 
consent to a movement which did not conform to Hooker's 
general orders of "covering Washington and Harper's Ferry." 

Neither plan was wrong, but of the two that of General 
Halleck was the safer. Hill might have declined to await 
Hooker in his trenches and marched at once to join Lee by 
the shortest practicable route. With the Confederate army 
on the Potomac, a movement on Richmond, as General 
Hooker proposed, was one to which the Northern people 
would never have given their consent. 

The retrograde movement of General Hooker from the 
Rappahannock to Frederick was well executed in all its de- 
tails. The excellent employment of cavalry is especially 
to be commended. 

When he reached Frederick, General Hooker was natu- 
rally much embarrassed. His orders were to cover Wash- 
ington and Harper's Ferry and also to seek the Confederate 
army and attack it. The Confederate army, being reported at 
York, Carlisle and Chambersburg, it was manifestly impos- 
sible to carry out all these instructions, and as he was not 
allowed to abandon Harper's Ferry and absorb its garrison 
into his army, he submitted his resignation. 

When relieved, General Hooker was planning a move- 
ment northward with his flanks on opposite sides of the 
South Mountains. His left column was to be composed of 
the XII corps, strengthened by the Harper's Ferry garrison, 
and was to move up the Cumberland valley on Lee's line of 



141 

communication. As Lee ordered his concentration east of 
the mountains and practically abandoned his communica- 
tions, General Hooker would thus have run the risk of having 
his right wing destroyed before the left wing crossed the 
mountains. General Meade's plan of operations was a safer 
one, since there were no mountain passes between his wings. 

If there was any error in General Meade's advance 
from Frederick, it was in advancing with too great a front. 
It would have been better, from a tactical point of view, to 
move the VI corps to Hanover rather than to Manchester. 
It is possible, however, that this would have been too great 
a concentration for convenience of supply. That he real- 
ized the disadvantages of his extended front is evident 
from his selection of the Pipe Creek line, to which his forces 
could retire should either wing suddenly meet an over- 
whelming force. It was a wise provision, for which he has 
received more criticism than praise. 

General Meade also realized that General Lee's most 
probable move would be to turn his left flank. He there- 
fore placed three corps on this flank and combined them in 
a single command under his most trusted corps commander. 
He cautioned him to reconnoiter carefully the ground about 
Emmitsburg in view of a possible battle there. 

General Meade intended to advance cautiously, for he 
realized that he was facing a commander of great genius, 
and that the result of the campaign would be of the utmost 
importance to the North and to the South. While he did not 
shun a battle he did not care to engage in one in which 
General Lee had any advantage, through position or numbers. 

In spite of all his precautions and through no apparent 



142 

error of any commander, his left wing was drawn into the 
battle of July 1, in which the chances were all against it. 
General Buford reached Gettysburg about noon of June 30 
and at once sent patrols along all the roads, to ascertain 
the position of the Confederate troops. He reported late 
that night that he believed all of Hill's corps was at Cash- 
town, that Rodes was reported coming from Carlisle, and 
that rumor said that some troops were coming from York. 
There was nothing in the information received by General 
Reynolds from General Buford that should have led Reynolds 
to act otherwise than he did. He moved on Gettysburg in 
accordance with his previous orders, taking the precaution to 
have the XI corps close at hand. 

The position of the Union army was not an unfavorable 
one, while Heth and Rodes were alone on the field; but 
when Pender and Early appeared on the two flanks the posi- 
tion of the Union forces was rendered extremely hazardous. 
At 1 o'clock, as soon as General Howard knew that Rodes 
was in the vicinity, he sent word to the commanders of the 
III and XII corps that he was engaged. These corps were, 
however, unable to reach the field until the battle was over. 
Had he known that Pender and Early were so near, he would 
probably have withdrawn the whole command to Cemetery 
Hill before the afternoon engagement. Had he sent word 
to General Slocum as soon as he reached the field in the 
morning, the latter would have been on the field in the early 
afternoon. The head of Slocum T s corps was at Two Taverns, 
five miles from Gettysburg, at 11 a. m. 

When General Meade sent Hancock to inspect the field of 
Gettysburg, he did not know that the III and XII corps had 



H3 



been notified and were on their way to assist General How- 
ard. He probably thought that the main battle was to be 
fought on Pipe Creek and that it was advisable for him to 
remain where he had established his headquarters for the 
day. Had he known that these corps were moving towards 
Gettysburg, he would probably have gone there in person. 
In the course of the afternoon, however, it became evident 
that the battle must be fought at Gettysburg, and he ac- 
cordingly sent his orders to the V and VI corps and moved 
up to the field. 

When General Meade arrived on the field of Gettysburg, 
he was impressed by its defects. It was a position which 
could easily be turned, as General Hancock had said in his re- 
port, and presented a very narrow front to the troops of Ewell 
and Hill whom he saw on the north, stretched from Seminary 
Kidge on the west to Benners Hill on the east. Johnson was 
encamped along the Hanover road in close proximity to his 
main line of communications, the Baltimore pike. lie natu- 
rally wanted to drive Johnson from this position, and early 
in the morning of July 2 directed that an attack be made 
by the XII and V corps as soon as the latter should come 
up. It was because of this proposed movement that he failed 
to critically examine the position of his left wing. 

There were two serious errors made on July 2 which con- 
tributed greatly to such success as the Confederates won — 
the removal of Buford's cavalry from the field, and the with- 
drawal of most of the XII corps from its trenches. 

General Pleasanton seems to have had the same idea as 
General Meade, that the left flank of the Union army would 
be safe as soon as the III corps readied the field. He there- 



144 

fore ordered Buford to move off the field and go to West- 
minster to guard the trains. Had Buford been on the field, 
all the movements of Anderson and Longstreet would have 
been discovered as soon as made. Had Longstreet's move- 
ment been known in time, the left wing of the Union army 
could have been strengthened to resist it, by the use of the 

V corps. 

When Barksdale, Wilcox, Perry and Wright's brigades 
followed the retreating line of the III corps about 6 p.m., 
two divisions of the V and one of the II had already been 
thrown into line to support the III Corps. As reserves, Gen- 
eral Meade had but one division of the V corps left. As the 

VI corps was just coming up and he did not know to what ex- 
tent he could rely upon it for assistance, he sent for the 
XII corps. As it turned out this additional force was un- 
necessary and was not employed. The absence of the XII 
corps from its trenches enabled Johnson to get a foothold on 
the slopes of Culp's Hill. Only the stubborn resistance of 
Greene's brigade, which was retained at General Slocum's 
request, prevented Johnson from securing the position which 
had been Ewell's objective since the preceding evening. 

Although the movement of General Sickles' corps to its 
position in advance of the general line was not contemplated 
by General Meade, it was probably a fortunate move, as it 
gave the warning which should have been given by the cav- 
alry and broke up Longstreet's attack before it reached the 
main line. As the foreground, over which Longstreet ad- 
vanced against Little Bound Top, was broken and wooded, it 
would have been difficult, if not absolutely impossible, for the 
III corps alone to have stopped Longstreet's corps, had it 



145 

reached Devil's Den and the ground in its vicinity, intact. 
The ground was quite different from that over which the 
charge was made the following day and was not easily swept 
by either infantry or artillery fire. 

The disposition of the Union army on July 3 was an 
ideal one for passive defense. It's flanks were well protected 
by cavalry, its infantry and artillery were well distributed, 
and stone walls were thrown up wherever the material on 
the site permitted it ; as on the Round Tops and Culp's Hill. 
Not knowing at what point General Lee would launch his 
next attack, General Meade distributed the VI corps along 
the line wherever he thought it needed strengthening, and 
therefore had no organized reserve ready to follow the re- 
treating troops after Pickett's charge. To have moved for- 
ward with his main line without previous preparation, and 
have led to confusion, and the advance would have probably 
been stopped by the line of Longstreet's guns, even though 
the Confederate batteries had exhausted much of their am- 
munition. 

The operations of the cavalry on the right flank of the 
Union army on July 1, 2 and 3 were extremely well con- 
ducted. It was fortunate that Custer made the mistake of 
moving to the right flank of the army on the 3rd, instead of 
going to the left flank where he was expected. 

The operations on the left flank were not so successful. 
On the 2nd Buford received the unfortunate orders which led 
to his absence at a critical time; and on the 3rd Kilpatrick 
made an ill-judged attack which caused the loss of many of 
his men without the possibility of its affecting the Confed- 
erate infantry concealed by woods and stone fences. 



146 

General Meade has been much criticised for allowing the 
Confederate army to cross the Potomac without vigorously 
attacking it. This criticism does not seem to be just, for 
the following reasons: 

General Lee had the shortest line to Williamsport and 
Falling Waters, and had it not been for the flood in the 
river and the destruction of his pontoon bridge, would have 
been across the river long before General Meade could have 
overtaken him. It would have been impossible for any force 
to effect much on his direct line of retreat, since his line 
lay through a mountain pass where the pursuer could be read- 
ily stopped. General Meade made undoubtedly the right 
move when he launched his cavalry in pursuit and followed 
with his infantry via Frederick and the passes nearer the 
river than those followed by General Lee. The records show 
that the cavalry began to move for Frederick on July 4, and 
on the same day the infantry moved from Frederick to seize 
the passes through the mountains. The movement of the in- 
fantry from the battlefield began the following day. 

On the evening of July 12 the Union army, reinforced 
by the Harper's Ferry garrison, was in front of the Confeder- 
ate intrenched line, which extended from the vicinity of 
Hagerstown to the river. That night General Meade called a 
meeting of his corps commanders and requested their 
opinions as to the advisability of an attack. Of the seven 
corps commanders, five considered that the chances of suc- 
cess were not sufficient to warrant the risk of losing the 
moral and material effect of Gettysburg. They believed that 
the main object of the campaign was to drive the Confederate 
army out of the Northern states, and that that object should 



147 

be gained without running any unnecessary risk. Without an 
assault it was certain that Lee would cross the river; if the 
assault failed, he would probably renew his invasion. Under 
the circumstances, General Meade could hardly be blamed 
for accepting the judgment of such generals as Slocum, 
Sedgwick and Sykes. 

Those who at the time criticised General Meade's action, 
assumed that the Confederate army was demoralized and out 
of ammunition, and that an assault must have resulted in 
the annihilation of the Confederate army. We now know 
that the Army of Northern Virginia was well supplied with 
ammunition, and instead of dreading an assault, was eager 
to have the opportunity of repulsing one. In view of Spott- 
sylvania and Cold Harbor, it is probable that the assault 
would have been repulsed. If the assault had been repulsed, 
the losses would have been great, and this would have done 
much to neutralize the moral effects of Gettysburg and 
Vicksburg. 



L 6> 



MEADE, GEORGE GORDON. Born in Spain, 1815. Graduate U. S- 
M. A., 1835. Second lieutenant of artillery, 1835-1836. Resigned. Re-entered 
service as lieutenant of topographical engineers. First lieutenant, 1851 ; cap- 
tain, 1856; major, 1862; brigadier general, 1863; major general, 1864. Brevet- 
ted first lieutenant for conduct in battle of Monterey, Mexican war. Brigadier 
general of volunteers, August 31, 1861 ; major general of volunteers, Novem- 
ber 29, 1862-1864. On surveys and engineering duties, 1836-1861. At battles 
of Palo Alto, Resaca de la Palma, and Monterey, and at the siege of Vera 
Cruz in Mexican war, 1846-1847. Comnnnded brigade in Peninsula cam- 
paign, taking part in battles of Mechanicsville, Gaines' Mills, and Glendale, 
and later in battle of Manassas. Commander of a division, September to 
December, 1862. Engaged in battles of South Mountain and Antietam. 
Corps commander, December, 1862- June, 1863. Engaged in battles of Freder- 
icksburg and Chancellorsville. Commander of Army of the Potomac, 1863- 
1865. Engaged in all the operations of that army beginning with Gettysburg, 
1863, and terminating with Appomattox, .'865. After the war in corrmand of 
various military departments and divisions. Died 1872. 



148 

REYNOLDS, JOHN F. Born in Pennsylvania, 1820. Graduate U. S. 
M. A., 1841. Second lieutenant of artillery, 1841 ; first lieutenant, 1846; cap- 
tain, 1855 ; lieutenant colonel of infantry, 1861 ; colonel of infantry, 1863. 
Brevetted captain for conduct in battle of Monterej, and captain for con- 
duct in battle of Buena Vista, in Mexican War. Brigadier general of volun- 
teers, August 20, 1861 ; major general of volunteers, November 29, 1862. On 
artillery duty, 1841-1861. At defence of Fort Brown and in battles of Mon- 
terery and Buena Vista in Mexican war. Commanded brigade in Peninsula 
campaign of 1862, being engaged in battles of Mechanicsville, Gaines' Mills, 
and Glendale. Commander of division in battle of Manassas, and of Penn- 
sylvania state militia during Antietam campaign. Corps commander, Nov- 
ember, 1862-July, 1863, and as such engaged in battles of Fredericksburg, 
Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg. Killed at Gettysburg, July 1, 1863. 

HANCOCK, WINFIELD S. Born in Pennsylvania, 1824. Graduate U. 
S. M. A., 1844; second lieutenant of infantry, 1844; first lieutenant, 1853; 
captain, quartermaster's department, 1855; major, 1863; brigadier general, 
1864; major general, 1866. Brevetted first lieutenant for conduct in battles 
of Contreras and Cherubusco, Mexican War. Brevetted major general, U. 
S. A., for conduct in battle of Spottsylvania. Brigadier general of volun- 
teers, September 23, 1861 ; major general of volunteers, November 29, 1862. 
On infantry duty, 1844-1855. In engagements at Plan del Rio, San Antonio, 
Cherubusco, Molino del Rey, and City of Mexico, in Mexican War. On 
quartermaster duty on the frontier 1855-1861. As brigade commander in 
Peninsula campaign in engagements at Yorktown, Williamsburg, Gelding's 
Farm, Savage Station, White Oak Swamp, and in Maryland campaign at 
Antietam. Division commander in the campaigns and battles of Fredericks- 
burg and Chancellorsville. Corps commander and as such engaged in all the 
operations of the Army of the Potomac from Chancellorsville to Petersburg, 
except when temporarily absent because of wound received at Gettysburg. 
November, 1864, to February, 1865, organizing corps of veterans. After the 
war in command of various military departments and divisions. Died 1886. 

SICKLES, DANIEL E. Born in New York City, 1825. Member of 
state and national legislature, 1857-1861. Colonel of regular infantry, 1866; 
retired with rank of major general, 1869. Colonel of New York volunteers, 
1861 ; brigadier general of volunteers, 1861 ; major general of volunteers, 
1863; mustered out, 1868. Brigade commander before Richmond, T862; di- 
vision commander at Fredericksburg; corps commander at Chancellorsville 
and Gettysburg. Lost a leg at Gettysburg. On special mission to South 
America in 1865. Since retirement has filled various legislative and execu- 
tive offices. 

SYKES, GEORGE. Born at Dover, Delaware. October 9, 1822. Gradu- 
ate U. S. M. A., 1842; lieutenant of infantry, 1842-1855; major, 1855-1861; 
lieutenant colonel, 1863; colonel, 1868. Brigadier general of volunteers, Sep- 
tember 28, 1861 ; major general of volunteers, November 29, 1862. Brevetted 



149 

captain for conduct in battle of Cerro Gordo, Mex. Served in Florida (In- 
dian wars) ; on frontier duty in the south and south-west; in Texas; in the 
Mexican war; and again on frontier. Served in Bull Run campaign; divis- 
ion commander in the Peninsula, at Manassas, Antietam, Fredericksburg, 
and Chancellorsville ; corps commander at Gettysburg and in the subsequent 
campaigns of the Army of the Potomac. Later again on frontier and gar- 
rison duty. Died February 18, 1880. 

SEDGWICK, JOHN. Born September 13, 1813, at Cornwall, Connecti- 
cut. Graduate U. S. M. A., 1837; artillery officer until 1855, when appointed 
a major of cavalry. Brigadier general of volunteers, August 31, 1861 ; major 
general, July 4, 1862. Brevetted captain for conduct in battles of Contreras 
and Cherubusco; major, for conduct in battle of Chapultepec, Mex. Served 
in the Florida war, on the western and Canadian frontiers, and throughout 
the Mexican War in the artillery; and in Indian wars in the cavalry. Divis- 
ion commander in the Peninsula compaign until wounded, June 30, 1862; 
rejoined and again wounded at Antietam; corps commander at Chancellors- 
ville and Spottsylvania. Killed at Spottsylvania C H., May 9, 1864. 

HOWARD, OLIVER O. Born in Maine, November 8, 1830. Graduate 
U. S. M. A., 1854; lieutenant of ordnance, 1854-1861; resigned June 7, 1861 ; 
brigadier general, December 21, 1864; major general, March 19, 1886. Col- 
onel of Maine Volunteers, June 4, 1861 ; brigad'er general of volunteers, Sep- 
tember 3, 1861 ; major general of volunteers, November 29, 1862. Before the 
war served at various arsenals, in the Florida Indian troubles, and as instruc- 
tor in mathematics at the U. S. M. A. Commanded a brigade at Bull Run, 
commanded XI Corps at Chancellorsville, Gettysburg and in Sherman's ad- 
vance on Atlanta. Became commander of the Army of the Tennessee, July, 
1864, and served as such in the operations of Sherman's army to the close of 
the war. After the war commanded various territorial departments and 
divisions and served a tour of duty as superintendent U. S. M. A. 

SLOCUM, HENRY W. Born in New York. Graduate U. S. M. A., 
1852; resigned as lieutenant of artillery, October 31, 1856; after volunteer 
service declined a regular commission as colonel. Colonel of New York 
volunteers, May 21, 1861 ; brigadier general of volunteers, August 9, 1861 ; 
major general of volunteers, July 4, 1862; resigned. September 16, 1865. 
Commanded his regiment at the first Bull Run; division commander in the 
Peninsula and at Antietam; corps commander at Chancellorsville, Gettys- 
burg and thereafter. After the war returned to New York and re entered 
public life, serving as congressman, etc., until his death in 1894. 

PLEASANTON, ALFRED. Born in D. C. Graduate U. S. M. A., 1844; 
lieutenant of cavalry till March, 1855; captam of cavalry, 1855-1862; major 
of cavalry, 1862-1868, when he resigned after having declined a commission 
as lieutenant colonel of infantry ; restored to the retired list by act of Con- 
gress in October, 1888. Brigadier general of volunteers, July 16, 1862; major 



150 

general of volunteers, June 22, 1863. Brevetted first lieutenant for conduct 
in battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, Mex. In his early career 
served on the frontier, in the Mexican war, and in various Indian expeditions; 
during the early days of the war was on recruiting and mustering duty; com- 
manded a cavalry division at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville and the 
cavalry corps thereafter until March. 1864, when he was sent to the west in 
charge of operations in Missouri and Kansas. After leaving the army occu- 
pied various public and private civil positions. 

LEE, ROBERT E. Born in Virginia, -,£07. Graduate U. S. M. A., 1829; 
engineer officer through grades to include captain until March 3, 1855, when 
appointed a lieutenant colonel of cavalry; colonel of cavalry, March 16, 1861 ; 
resigned, April 25, 1861. Brevetted major for conduct in battle of Cerro 
Gordo, Mex. ; lieut. -colonel for conduct in battles of Contreras and Cheru- 
busco ; colonel for conduct in battle of Chapultepec, Mex. Brigadier general 
in the Confederate service, May 14, 1861 ; general, June 4, 1861 ; general-in- 
chief, January 31, 1865. As engineer officer in regular service was engaged 
in the civil duties of his corps, in the Mexican war, and as superintendent, 
U. S. M. A. ; as cavalry officer in the regular service was engaged in frontier 
Indian duties, department commander, etc. As confederate officer was in 
command in West Virginia in the autumn of 1861 ; of the defences of the 
coast of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida in the Spring of 1862; and 
after June 1, 1862, commanded' the Army of Northern Virginia until the 
close of the war. After the war was President of Washington College, Lex- 
ington, Va., until his death in 1870. 

LONGSTREET, JAMES. Born in South Carolina. Graduate U. S. M. 
A., 1842; infantry officer of grades to include captain, until July 19, 1858, 
when appointed major and paymaster; resigned June 1, 1861. Brevetted 
captain for conduct in battles of Contreras and Cherubusco; major, for con- 
duct at battle of Chapultepec, Mex. Lieutenant colonel of confederate in- 
fantry, March 16, 1861 ; brigadier general, June 17, 1861 ; major general, 
October 7, 1861 ; lieutenant general, October 9, 1862. In U. S. service was- 
engaged in frontier, garrison, Mexican war, and similar service. In con- 
federate service, brigade commander at Bull Run; division commander on 
the Peninsula ; commanded a wing, or corps at Manassas and thereafter 
throughout the operations of the Army of Northern Virginia until the end 
of 1863, when he was placed in command of the department of East Ten- 
nessee; later again a corps commander in the Army of Northern Virginia. 
After the war engaged in commercial pursuits and held various state and 
federal positions in Louisiana and Georgia until his death in 1904. 

EWELL, R. S. Born in the District of Columbia. Graduate U. S. M. A., 
1840; cavalry officer in various grades to include captain, until his resigna- 
tion, May 7, 1861. Brevetted captain for conduct in battles of Contreras and 
Cherubusco, Mex. Lieutenant colonel of confederate cavalry, March 16, 
1861 ; brigadier general, June 17, 1861 ; major general, January 24, 1862; 



151 

lieutenant general, Ma}' 23, 1863. In the federal service engaged in frontier, 
garrison, recruiting and other special and routine duties and in the Mexican 
war. In confederate service, brigade commander at Bull Run, division com- 
mander in Jackson's Shenandoah Valley campaign, and later around 
Richmond in the Peninsula campaign ; also at the battle of Manassas, 
where he lost a leg; corps commander from Gettysburg until end of 1864, 
when assigned to the command of the Department of Richmond, which he 
retained until the end of the war. After the war was a farmer in Tennessee 
until his death in 1872. 

HILL, A. P. Born in Virginia. Graduate U. S. M. A., 1847; served as 
lieutenant of artillery until his resignation on March 1, 1861. Colonel of con- 
federate infantry, 1861 ; brigadier general. February 22, 1862; major general, 
May 26, 1862 ; lieutenant general, May 24, 1863. While in U. S. service, took 
part in Mexican war, and was on frontier and garrison duty and scientific 
duty in Washington. In the confederate service, regimental commander at 
Bull Run; brigade and division commander in the Peninsula; division com- 
mander at Manassas, Antietam, and Fredericksburg; division and corps com- 
mander at Chancellorsville, and corps commander thereafter until killed at 
Petersburg, April 2, 1865. 

STUART, J. E. B. Born in Virginia. Graduate U. S. M. A., 1854; 
lieutenant and captain of cavalry until Iris resignation, May 14, 1861. Cap- 
tain confederate cavalry, March 16, 1861 (later colonel) ; brigadier general, 
September 24, 1861 ; major general, July 25, 1862. On frontier, garrison and 
similar duties in Federal service. Commanded a regiment of cavalry at Bull 
Run; commanded the brigade of cavalry in the Peninsula in 1862, and entire 
cavalry, or the cavalry division of the Army of Northern Virginia in all of 
its subsequent operations until mortally wounded at Yellow Tavern, Va., 
May 10, 1864. 



Army of the Potomac. 

Commander-in-Chief — Major General George G. Meade (19-1835). 

Chief of Staff — 'Major General Daniel Butterfield. 

Chief of Artillery — Brig. General Henry J. Hunt (19-1839) 

Chief of Engineers — Brig. General Gouverneur K. Warren (2-1850). 



CORPS. 



DIVISIONS. 



REGIMENTS. 



<u"o 



Provost Guard. 



Brig. General 
Marsena Patrick. 
( 48-1835) 

Capt. Lemuel Norton. 
Guards and Ord'les 



1st Brig. General 

Solomon Meredith 



1st Brig. General 
James S. Wadsworth 2d Brig. General 
Lysander Cutler. 



r 1st Brig. General 
Gabriel R. Paul. 



2d Brig. General 
John C. Robinson. 



3d Maj. General 

Abner Doubleday. 

(24-1842) 



* — Not engaged. 



(18-1834) 



2d Brig. General 
Henry Baxter. 



1st Brig. General 
Thomas A. Rowley. 



2d Colonel 
Roy Stnne. 

3d Brig. General 
George J. Stannard. 
(Joined night of 
July 1st.) 



Artillery, Colonel 
Chas. S. Wainwright. 



93d New York 

8th U. S. Infantry (8 cos.)* 

2d Pennsylvania Cavalry 

6th Penn. Cavalry (2 cos.) 

Signal Corps 

Oneida (New York) Cavalry 

1st Maine Cavalry (Co. L) 

19th Indiana 
24th Michigan 
2d Wisconsin 
6th 
7 th 

7th Indiana 

70th New York 

84th " (14th Militia 

95 th 

147th 

56th Pennsylvania (9 cos.) 

1 6th Maine 

13th Massachusetts 

94th New York 

104th " 

107th Pennsylvania 

1 2th Massachusetts 

8^d New York (9th Militia 

97th 

nth Pennsvlvania 

88th 

90 th 

80th New York (20th Militia 

121 st Pennsylvania 

I42d 

I5IS't 

143d Pennsylvania 

1.19th 

150th " 

12th Vermont (train guard) 

13 th 

14th " 

15th 

16th 

2d Maine Light Bat. (Hall) 

5th 

1 st New York Light Battery 

1st Pennsylvania Light Bat. 

4th U. S. Battery B 



CORPS. 



DIVISIONS. 



BRIGADES. 



REG1 MENTS. 



3 O 



1st Brig. General 
John C. Caldwell. 



2d Brig. General 

John Gibbon. 

(20-1847) 



3d Brig. General 

Alexander Hayes* 

(20-1844) 



General Headq'rs 

r 1st Colonel 
Edward E. Cross. 



2d Colonel 
Patrick Kelly. 



3d Brig. General 
Samuel K. Zook. 



4th Colonel 
John R. Brooke. 



1st Brig. General 
William Harrow. 



2d Brig. General 
Alexander S. Webb. 
(I3-I8S4) 



3d Colonel 
Norman J. Hall. 
(13-1859) 



I Unattached. 

f 1st Colonel 
Samuel S. Carroll. 
(44-1856) 



2d Colonel 
Thomas A. Smyth. 



3d Colonel 
George L. Willard. 



Artillery, Captain 
John G. Hazard. 



6th New York Cavalry, Cos. D 
and K 

5th N:w Hampshire 
61st New York 
81st Pennsylvania 
148th 

28th Massachusetts 

63d New York (2 cos.) 

69th 

S8th 

116th Pennsylvania (4 cos.) 

52d New York 

57th 

66th 

140th Pennsylvania 

27th Connecticut (2 cos.) 
2d Delaware 
64th New York 
53d Pennsylvania 
'145th " (7 cos.) 

19th Maine 

15th Massachusetts 

1st Minnesota 

82d New York (2d Militia) 

69th Pennsylvania 

71st 

72d 

106th " 

19th Massachusetts 

20th 

7th Michigan 

42d New York 

59th New York (4 cos.) 

1st Co. (Mass.) Sharpshooters 

14th Indiana 

4th Ohio 

8th " 

7th West Virginia 

14th Connecticut 

1st Delaware 

1 2th New Tersey 

10th New /ork (Battalion) 

108th 

39th New York (4 cos.) 

111th 

125th 

126th " 



1st New York Light Bat. B. 
1st Rhode Island Light Bat. A 
1st Rhode Island Light Bat. B 
1st U. S. Battery I 
4th U. S. Battery A 




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\ 



DIVISIONS. 



4> en 

C <L> 

tn ^■ 

n <" 7 
IS ,<P 



1st Brig. General 

James Barnes. 

(5-1829) 



~!o 



2d Brig. General 
Romeyn B. Ayres. >, 
(22-1847) 



Provost Guard 

1st Colonel 
William S. Tilton. 



2d Colonel 

Jacob B. Sweitzer. 



3d Colonel 
Strong Vincent. 



1st Colonel 
Hannibal Day. 
(22-1823) 



2d Colonel 
Sidney Burbank. 
(17-1829) 



3d Brig. General 
Stephen Weed. 
(27-1854) 



1 



REGIMENTS. 



3d Brig. General 
Samuel W. Crawford 



is>t Colonel 

William McCandless. 



^ 3d Colonel 
Joseph W. Fisher. 



Artillery, Captain 
Aueustus P. Martin. 



12th New York, Cos. D & ; 
17th Penn. Cavalry, Cos. E 

1 8th Massachusetts 

22d 

1st Michigan 

1 1 8th Pennsylvania 

9th Massachusetts 

32d 

4th Michigan 

62d Pennsylvania 

20th Maine 
16th Michigan 
44th New York 
83d Pennsylvania 



S. 



3d U. 
4 th 
6th 
1 2th 
14th 



2d U. S. 
7th " 
10th " 
nth " 
17th " 



(6 cos. 
(4 " 
(5 " 
(8 « 

(8 " 

(6 cos. 
(4 " 

(6 " 
(7 " 



140th New York 

146th 

91st Pennsylvania 

I55th 

1st Pennsylvania Reserves*) ( 

2nd 

6th 

13th 

5th Pennsylvania Reserves 

9th 

10th 

nth 

12th '\g cos. 

3d Mass. Light Battery C 
1st New York Light Battery 
1st Ohio Battery L 
5th U. S. Battery D 
5th U. S. Battery I 



CORPS. 



BRIGADES. 



REGIMENTS. 



f ist Maj. General 
David B. Birney. 



I— i rt 

EG 



2d Brig. General 
Andrew A. Hum- 
phreys. (13-1831.) 



f ist Brig. General 
Charles K. Graham. 



2d Brig. General 
J. H. I-Jobart Ward. 



3d Colonel 

P. Regis de Trobriand 



ist Brig. General 
Tosep'h B. Carr. 



2d Colonel 

Wm. R. Brewster. 



3d Colonel 
George C. Burling. 



Artillery, Captain 
George E. Randolph. 



57th Pennsylvania (8 cos.) 

63d 

68th 

105th 

114th " 

141st 

20th Indiana 

3d Maine 

4th 

86th New York 

124th " 

99th Pennsylvania 

ist U.S. Sharpshooters (Berdan) 

2d " " 8 cos. 

17th Maine 

3d Michigan 

5th 

40th New York 

110th Pennsylvania (6 cos.) 

ist Massachusetts 

nth 

1 6th 

1 2th New Hampshire 

nth New Jersey 

26th Pennsylvania 

84th (train guard) 

70th New York 

71st 

72d 

73d 

74th 

1 20th 

2d New Hampshire 

5th New Jersey 

6th 

7th 

8th 

115th Pennsylvania 

2d New Jersey Light Battery 
ist New York Light Bat. D 
4th " " 

ist Rhode Island Light Bat. E 
4th U. S. Battery K 




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\ 



CORPS. 



DIVISIONS. 



REGIMENTS. 



2* 



1st Brig. General 
Horatio G. Wright. 
(2-1841) 



2d Brig. General 

Albion P. Howe. 

(8-1841) 



-I 



3d Maj. General 
John Newton. 
(2-1842) 



Headq'rs Guard 



f 



Frovost Guard 
1st Brig. General 
A. T. A. Torbert. 
(21-1855) 



< 2d Brig. General 
Joseph J. Bartlett. 



3d Brig. General 

David A. Russell. 

(38-1845) 



2d Colonel 
Lewis A. Grant. 



3d Brig. General 

Thomas H. Neill. 

(27-1847) 



1st Brig. General 

Alexander Shaler. 



2d Colonel 
J Henry L. Eustis. 
(1-1842) 



3d Brig. General 
Frank Wheaton. 



Artillery, Colonel 
Chas. H. Tompkins. 



1st New Jersey Cavalry, Co. 
1st Penn. Cavalry, Co. H 

4th New Jersey (3 cos.) 
1st New Jersey 

2d 

3d 

15th 

5th Maine 
121st New York 
95th Pennsylvania 
96th 

6th Maine 

49th Pennsylvania (4 cos.) 

119th Pennsylvania 

5th Wisconsin 

2d Vermont 

3d 

4th 

5th 

6th 

7th Maine (6 cos.) 

33d New York (detachment) 

43d 

49th 

77th 

6rst Pennsylvania 

65th New York 
67th 

I22d 

23d Pennsylvania 

82d 

7th Massachusetts 

10th 

37th " 

2d Rhode Island 

62d New York 
93d Pennsylvania 
98th 

I02d 

I39th 

1st Mass. Light Battery A 
1st New York Light Battery 
3d " " , 

1st Rhode Island Light Bat. C 
1st Rhode Island Light Bat. C 
2d U. S. Battery D 
2d U. S. Battery G 
5th U. S. Battery F 



(train guard] 



)RPS. 



DIVISIONS. 



REGIMENTS. 



1st Brig. General 
Francis C. Barlow. 



Headq'rs Guard 

f ist Colonel 
Leopold Von Gilsa. 



2d Brig. General 

Adelbert Ames. 

(5-i86i) 



f 






iO 



2d Brig. General 
Adolph Von Steinwehr 



3d Maj. General 
Carl Schurz. 



ist Colonel 
Charles R. Coster. 



2d Colonel 
Orland< Smith. 



ist Brig. General 
Alex. Schimmelfennn? 



•2d Colonel 
W. Krzyzanowski. 



Artillery, Major 
Thomas W. Ostoorn. 



ist Indiana Cav. (cos. I & K) 
8th New York Infantry (1 co.) 

41s* New York (9 cos.) 

54th 
68th 
153d Pennsylvania 

17th Connecticut 
25 Ohio 
75th " 
107th " 



134th New York 

I54'th 

27th Pennsylvania 

73d 

33d Massachusetts 
136th New York 
55th Ohio 
73d " 



82d Illinois 

45 th New York 

157th 

6is't Ohio 

74th Pennsylvania 

58th New York 

119th 

82d Ohio 

75th Pennsylvania 

29 th Wisconsin 

ist New York Light Bat. I 
13th New York Light Battery 
ist Ohio Light Batt-ry K 
ist Ohio Light Battery I 
4th U. S. Battery G 
(Wilkison) 




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CORPS. 



DIVISIONS. 



ERIGADES. 



REGIMENTS. 



S.2 

XX 



ist Brig. General 
Alpheus S. Williams. 



2d Brig. General 
John W. Geary. 



Headq'rs Guard 

ist Colonel 
Archibald L. 

McDougal 



2d Brig. General 
Henry H. Lockwood. 
(Joined July 2d) 
(22-1836) 



iotlh Maine (battalion) 

5th Connecticut 

20th 

3d Maryland 

123d New York 

I45th 

46th Pennsylvania 

[Brig; 

ist Maryland Potomac Honii 
1st Maryland Eastern Shore 
150th New York 



3d Brig. General 
Thomas H. Ruger. 
(3-1854) 


27th Indiana 
2d Massachusetts 
13th New Jersey 
107th New York 
3d Wisconsin 


ist Colonel 
Charles Candy. 


5th Ohio 

7th 

29th " 

66th " 

28th Pennsylvania 

147th Pennsylvania (8 cos.) 


2d Colonel 

George A. Cobham. Jr. 


29th Pennsylvania 
109th " 
1 nth 


3d Brig. General 

George S. Greene 

(2-1823) 


60th New York 

78th 

ioed " 

i37th 

149th " 



Artillery, Lieut. 
Edw. D. Muhlenberg. 



ist New York Light Bat M 
Pennsylvania Light Battery 
4th U. S. Battery F 
5th U. S. Battery K 



CORPS. 



DIVISIONS. 



r 



ist Brig. General 

John Buford. 

(16-1848) 









2d Brig. General 
David Mc M. Greee 
(8-18SS) 



3d Brig. General 
Judson Kilpatrick. 
(17-1861) 



Horse Artillery. 



BRIGADES. 



REGIMENTS. 



f ist Colonel 


8th Illinois 


William Gamble 


12th " (4 oos.) 




3d Indiana (6 cos.) 




8th New York 


2d Colonel 


6th New York 


Thomas C. Devin. 


9th 




17th Pennsylvania 




3d West Virginia (2 cos.) 


Reserve, Brig. Gen'l 


6th Penn. 


Wesley Merritt. 


ist U. S. 


(22-1860) 


2d " 




5 th " 




6th " 


Headq'rs Guard 


ist Ohio, Co. A 


ist Colonel 


ist Maryland (n cos.) 


John B. Mcintosh. 


Purnell Legion, Md., Co. A 




ist Massachusetts 




1st New Jersey 




ist Pennsylvania 




3d 




3d Heavy Artillery 




Section Battery H 



2d Colonel 

Pen nock Hnev. 



3d Colonel 
J Irvin Gregg. 



Headq'rs Guard 

ist Brig. General 
Elon J. Farnswotth. 



< 



2d Brig. General 
George A. Custer. 
(34-i86i) 



I 



ist Captain 

Jas. M. Robertson. 






2d Captain 
John C. Tidball. 
(11-1848) 



2d New York 
4th 

6th Ohio (10 cos.) 
8th Pennsylvania 
(At Vestminster during bat.> 

ist Maine 
10th New York 
4th Pennsylvania 
16th 



ist Ohio, Co. C 

5th New York 

18th Pennsylvania 

ist Vermont 

ist West Virginia (10 cos.) 

ist Michigan 

5th 

6th 

7th (10 cos ) 

Qth Michigan Battery 

6th New York 

2d U. S. Battery B, L and M 

4th U. S. B-ttery E 

ist U. S. Batteries E, G & K 
2d " " A (Cale . 

3d «■ " C 




^ # * s 



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CORPS. 


DIVISIONS. 


BRIGADES. 


REGIMENTS. 






Headq'rs Guard 


32d Massachusetts, Inf. Co. K 



Artillery Reserve, 
Brig. General 
Robert O. Tyler 

(22-1853.) 



rst Regular 1st U. S. Battery H 

Capt. Dunbar R. Ran 2d " F and '.'< 

som. 4th " C 

5th U. S. Battery C 

1st Volunteer 5th Mass. Light Battery E 

Lt. Col. Freeman Mc 9th " 

Gilvery. 15th New York Light Batte| 

Pcnn. Light Batteries C & j| 

2d Volunteer 1st Conn. Heavy Battery I: 

Capt. Elijah D. Taft. 1st Conn. Heavy Battery M 

2d Connecticut Light Batter| 

5th New York Light Batte( 



3d Volunteer 
Capt. James F. 
ington. 



1st New Hampshire Light '.': 
Hunt- Is t Ohio Light Battery H 
1 st Penn. Light Battery F & 
West Virginia Light Batterj 



4fch Volunteer 
Capt. Robert H. Fitz- 
hugh. 

Train Guard 

Maj. Charles Ewing. 



6fch Maine Light Battery 
Maryland Light Battery A 
1st New Jersey Light Battel 
1 st N. Y. Light Battery G S| 

4th N. J. Infantry (7 cos.)(| 



Not engaged. 



Army of Northern Virginia. 



Commander in Chief, General Robert E. Lee (2-1829.) 

Chief of Artillery, Brigadier General William N. Pendleton (5-1830.) 



REGIMENTS. 



Brig. General 
J. B. Kershaw 



Brig. General 
Wm. Barksdale. 



Major General Bn S- General 

Lafayette McLaws. \ p - J- Semrnes. 
(48-1842) 



Brig. General 
W. T. Wofford. 



Colonel 

H. C. Cabell. 



Major General 
George E. Pickett. 
(59-1846) 



I 



Brig. General 
R. B. Garnett. 
(29-1841) 



Brig. General 
J. L. Kemper. 



Brig. General 
L. A. Armistead. 



Ma j or 

James Dearing. 



2d South Carolina 

3d 

7tn 

8th 

15th 

3d South Carolina Battalion 

13th Mississippi 

17th 

18th 

2ISt 

10th Georgia 

50th 

5ist 

53d 

16th Georgia 

1 8th 

24th " 

Cobb's Legion, Ga. 

Phillip's Legion, Ga. 

Pulaski. Ga., Battery 

1st N. Carolina Battery A 

Troup, Ga., Battery 

1st Richmond Howitzers 



8th Virginia 

18th 

19th 

28tih 
56th 

rst Virginia 

3d 

7th 

nth 

24th " 

9th Virginia 
14th " 
38th " 
53rd 
57th 

Fauquier Battery 
Hampden Battery 
Richmond Fayette Battery 
Virginia Battery 




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CORPS. 



DIVISIONS. 



REGIMENTS. 



O 

"S £ 22 

1 35 



3 



Major General 
John B. Hood. 
(44- 1853 ^ 



Corps Artillery, 

Colonel 

J. B. Walton. 



1 



Brig. General 
E. M. Law. 



Brig. General 
J. B. Robertson. 



Brig. General 
Geo. T. Anderson. 



Brig. General 
H. L. Benning. 



Major 

M. W. Henry. 



Colonel 

E. P. Alexander. 



Major 

B. F. Eshleman. 



4th Alabama 
15th 

44th 
47 th 
48th 

3d Arkansas 
1st Texas 
4th 

5th " 

7th Georgia 

8th 

9th 

nth 

59th 

2d Georgia 
15th 
17th 
20th " 

Branch, N. C, Battery 
German, S. C. Battery 
Palmetto, S. C, Battery 
Rowan, N. C, Battery 

Ashland, Va., Battery 
Bedford, Va.. Battery 
Brooks, S. C. Battery 
Madison, La. Battery 
Virginia Battery 
ginia Battery 

Washington Artillery 
(4 batteries') 






CORPS 


DIVISIONS 


BRIGADES 


REGIMENTS 




' 


Brig. General 


Sth Louisiana 


f 


Harry T. Hays. 


6th 








7th 








8th 








9th " 






Brig. General 


31st Virginia 






William Smith. 


49th 
?2d 






Hoke's Brigade 


6th N. Carolina 




< 


Col. Isaac E. Avery. 


2ISt 

57th 






Brig. General 


13th Georgia 






J. B. Gordon. 


26th " 




Major General 




31st 

38th " 
60th 




Jubal A. Early. 






(18-1837) 




61st 






Lt. Colonel 


Charlottesville Battery 






H. P. Jones. 


Courtnev Battery 









Louisiana Battery 


1- 






Staunton BatUrv 


ut. Gem 
Ewell. 
-1840) 




Brig. General 


ist Maryland Battalion 




George H. Steuart. 


i«t N. Carolina 


■3*3 




(37-1848) 


3d 






10th Virginia 


J« 






23d 


l—l 






37th " 






Brig. General 


2d Virginia 






James A. Walker. 


4th " 

5th 

27th 




Major General 






Edward Johnson. 




33d 




(32-1838) 


1 Nichol's Brigade 


rst Louisiana 






< Col. J. M. Williams. 


2d 








TOth 
I4th 
15* 






Brig. General 


21 st Virginia 






John M. Jones. 


25th " 






(39-1841) 


42d 

44th " 

48th 

50th 






Major 


ist Man-land Battery 






J. W. Latimer. 


Allegheny Battery 
Chesapeake Battery 
Lee Battery 




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DIVISIONS 



BRIGADES 



REGIMENTS 



V > O 

J Pi 



Major General 
R. E. Rodes. 



Corps Artillery, 

Colonel 

J. T. Brown. 



1 Brie:. General 
Junius Daniel. 



Brig. General 
Alfred Iverson. 



Brie;. General 
George Doles. 



Brig. General 
S. D. Ramseur. 
(14-1860) 



Colonel 

E. A. O'Neal. 



T.ieut. Colonel 
Thomas H. Carter. 



Captain 

Willis J. Dance. 



Lieut. Colonel 
William Nelson. 



32d N 


Carolina 


43d 


M 


45 th 


U 


53d 


" 


2d 


Ba 


5th N. 


Carolina 


12th 


M 


20th 


tt 


23d 


« 


4th Georgia 


12th 


tt 


2ISt 


tt 


44th 


It 


2d N. 


Carolina 


4th 


tt 


14th 


" 


30th 


tt 


3d Alabama 


5th 


tt 


6th 


tt 


12th 


tt 


26th 


(i 



Battalion 



Jefferson Davis Battery 
King William Battery 
Morris Battery 
Orange Battery 

2d Richmond Howitzers 

3d 

Powhatan Battery 

Rockbridge Battery 

Salem Battery 

Amherst Battery 
Fluvanna Battery 
Georgia Battery 



COKPS. 



DIVISIONS. 



BRIGADES. 



REGIMENTS. 



Major General 
R. H. Anderson. 
(40-1842) 



<3SU 

a> a> 7 

»— I O M 



Major General 
Henry Heth. 
(38-1847) 



( Brig. General 
Cadmus M. Wilcox. 
(54-1846) 



Brig. General 
A. R. Wright 



Brig. General 
William Mahone. 



Perry's Brigade 
Col. David Lang. 



Brig. General 
Carnot Posey. 



Major 
John Lane 



Brig. General 
J. J. Pettigrew. 



Colonel 

J. M. Brockenbrough. 



Brig. General 
James J. Archer. 



Brig. General 
Joseph R. Davis. 



Lieut. Colonel 
John J. Garnett. 



8 th Alabama 
9th 

10th " 
nth " 
14th " 

3d Georgia 

22d 

48th " 

2d Battalion 

6th Virginia 
12th 
16th 

41st " 
61st 

2d Florida 

5th 

8th 

12th Mississippi 

16th 

19th 

48th 

Co. A, Sumter Artillery* 
Co. B 
Co. C 



nth N. Carolina 

26th 

47th 

52d 

40th Virginia 

47th 

55th 

22d " Battalion 

5th Alabama Battalion 

13th " 

1st Tennessee 

7 th 

14th 

2d Mississippi 

nth 

42d " 

55th N. Carolina 

Donaldsonville Battery 
Huger Battery 
Lewis Battery 
Norfolk Blues Battery 




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CORPS 


DIVISIONS 


BRIGADES 


REGIMENTS 


f 




r Colonel 


1st S. Carolina 






Abner Perrin. 


12th 

13 th 

14th " 

1st " Rifles 






Brig. General 


7th N. Carolina 






James H. Lane. 


18th 
28th 
33d 
37th 




Major General 


Brig. General 


14th Georgia 




William D Pender. 


Edward L. Thomas. 


35th 




(19-1854) 




45th " 


:=! 






49th 


HX -, 












Brig. General 


13th N. Carolina 


S3 i-m co 
0} *% w 




A. M. Scales. 


16th 








22d " 


o ►* 






34th 


3-9 






38th 


J< 












Major 


Albermarle Batterv 






William T. Pogue. 


Charlotte Battery- 
Madison Battery 








Virginia Battery 






Major 


Danville Battery 






D. G Mcintosh'. 


Hardaway Battery 
2d Rockbridge Battery 




Corps Artillery, 




Virginia Battery 




Colonel ^ 








R. L. Walker. 


Major 


Crenshaw Battery 




i 


W. J. Pegram. 

: 


Fredericksburg Battery 
Letcher Battery 
PeeDee Battery 
Puree 1 ! Battery 



DIVISIONS. 



REGIMENTS. 



6 



Maj. General 
J. E. B. Stuart. 
(13-1854) 



Independent 
Cavalry. 



f Brig. General 
Wade Hampton. 



Brig. General 
Beverly Robertson. 

(25-1849) 
Brig. General 
Fitz Lee. 

(45-1856) 



Brig. General 
A. G. Jenkins. 



Brig. General 
William E. Jones. 
(10-1848) 

Brig. General 

W. H. F. Lee. 

Colonel 

J. R. Chambliss, Jr. 

(31-1853) 
Horse Artillery 
Maj. R. F. Beckham. 
(6-1859) 



Brig. General 
J. D. Imboden. 



1st North Carolina 
1st South Carolina 

2d 

Cobb's Ga. Legion 
Jeff Davis Legion 
Phillips Ga. Legion 

4th North Carolina 
5th " 

1st Maryland Battalion* 
1st Virginia 

2d 

3d 

4th 

5th " 

14th Virginia 

16th 

17th 

34th Va. Battalion 

36th 

Jackson's Battery 

6th Virginia 

7th 

nth 

2d N. Carolina 
9th Virginia 
10th " 
13th 

Breathed's Va. Battery 
Chew's Va. Battery 
McGregor's Va. Battery 
Moorman's Va. Battery 
Griffin's Md. Battery 
Hart's S. C. Battery 

i8Ch Va. Cavalry 
62d Va. Infantry (mtd.) 
Va. Partisan Rangers 
Virginia Battery 



* With Ewell's Corps. 




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v 




From "MAINE AT GETTYSBURG." 




ii 






K'^/PIVJICK 




BATTLE. OF 

GETTYSBURG 

Jul)/ 2nd 1863 
SECOND DAY. 



Confederate , 



From "MAINE AT GETTYSBURG." 




From -MAINE AT GETTYSBURG." 




From-MAINE AT GETTYSBURG" 



